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This	thesis	concerns	pay-for-performance	(P4P)	in	primary	care,	more	specific	in	
general	practice.	
The	introduction	briefly	describes	the	improvement	of	quality	of	care	and	gives	
an	overview	of	the	content	and	effectiveness	of	and	the	experiences	with	P4P	
programs.	This	overview	will	lead	to	a	set	of	research	questions	that	will	be	
addressed.
	 Improvement	of	quality	of	care
The	number	of	new	insights,	methods,	programs	and	techniques	that	are	avail-
able	each	year	in	healthcare	is	enormous.	Healthcare	providers	have	to	deal	with	
all	these	innovations	in	daily	practice,	but	as	has	shown	for	instance	by	the	
introduction	of	guidelines,	innovations	do	not	implement	themselves.1	Effective	
improvement	of	the	quality	of	patient	care	often	starts	with	good	data	on	the	
quality	of	care	delivered.	The	aim	of	feedback	is	to	present	data	about	practice	
performance	and	to	encourage	practices	to	design	specific	practice-based	
improvement	plans	as	a	guide	for	change.2	Feedback	about	individual	perfor-
mance	compared	with	that	of	peer	performance	can	be	a	powerful	motivator	for	
change.3-6	To	give	caregivers	feedback	on	their	performance	does	not	necessarily	
lead	to	behavioural	changes,	but	feedback	can	be	an	important	part	of	a	multi-
faceted	improvement	program.1	We	studied	whether	stimulating	practice-based	
improvement	plans	and	information	about	best	practices	led	to	improvement	
in	accessibility	and	availability	in	general	practice.	Practices	received	feedback	
with	a	benchmark	of	their	peers	accompanied	with	information	of	best	practices.	
With	this	information	they	were	stimulated	to	make	practice-based	improve-
ment	plans.	
Feedback	can	be	effective,	but	the	effects	are	usually	small	to	moderate.1	We	
assume	that	achievement	of	optimal	quality	of	care	delivered	by	healthcare	
providers	can	be	enhanced	further	by	introducing	an	extrinsic	stimulus,	like	
pay-for-performance	(P4P).	Pay-for-performance	is	increasingly	applied	by	payers	
in	healthcare.	We	know	that	financial	incentives	for	quality	of	care	and	improving	
quality	of	care	might	improve	quality	and	efficiency.7-9	The	question	is	how	
exactly	they	work	and	what	factors	may	determine	their	success.
	 Pay-for-performance	programs
International	interest	in	pay-for-performance	(P4P)	initiatives	to	improve	quality	
of	healthcare	is	growing.	Worldwide	many	P4P	programs	exist.	Most	of	these	
programs	can	be	found	in	the	UK	and	the	USA,	but	also	in	Australia	P4P	programs	
have	been	implemented.	A	few	examples	will	be	presented	below.
 Quality	and	Outcomes	Framework	(QOF)
In	2004,	the	NHS	in	the	United	Kingdom	implemented	a	primary	care	pay-for-
10
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performance	program	as	part	of	the	Quality	and	Outcomes	Framework	(QOF),	
linking	up	to	25%	of	general	practitioners’	income	to	performance	on	76	clinical	
quality	indicators	and	a	further	70	indicators	relating	to	organisation	of	care	
and	patient	experience.10	The	clinical	indicators	mainly	relate	to	processes	–	for	
example	measuring	disease	parameters	and	giving	treatment	–	with	only	10	of	
the	76	original	clinical	indicators	relating	to	intermediate	outcomes.	Practices	
earned	points	based	on	the	proportion	of	eligible	patients	for	whom	the	quality	
targets	are	achieved.	GPs	are	permitted	to	use	their	clinical	judgment	to	exclude	
inappropriate	patients	from	achievement	calculations,	a	process	known	as	
‘exception	reporting’.	
	 Integrated	Healthcare	Association	P4P	program
The	Integrated	Healthcare	Association	(IHA)	P4P	program	is	the	largest	non-
governmental	physician	incentive	program	in	the	United	States.	The	program	
provides	physician	groups	with	financial	rewards	based	on	their	performance	
compared	to	quality	and	efficiency	benchmarks.	For	Measurement	Year	(MY)	
2012,	there	are	four	measurement	domains:	clinical	quality	(prevention,	cardio-
vascular,	diabetes,	maternity,	musculoskeletal,	and	respiratory	conditions),	patient	
experience,	meaningful	use	of	health	IT	and	appropriate	resource	use.11
 Practice	Incentive	Program	(PIP)
The	Practice	Incentive	Program	(PIP)	was	introduced	in	2001	in	general	practices	
in	Australia.	The	program	includes	11	incentives	including	quality	prescribing,	
diabetes,	asthma,	cervical	cancer,	indigenous	health,	e-health,	after	hours	care,	
teaching,	rural	loading,	aged	care	access,	and	a	financial	incentive	aimed	at	
insuring	access	to	surgical,	anesthetic,	and	obstetric	services	in	rural	area.12	
	 The	design	of	P4P	programs
Unanswered	questions	about	P4P	programs	are	related	to	the	optimal	design,	
the	effectiveness	and	the	use	of	the	P4P	programs.	P4P	programs	are	very	
heterogeneous,	but	they	share	common	features.	Each	P4P	program	is	developed	
by	discussing	the	objectives	of	the	program,	the	performance	measurement,	the	
appraisal	(unit	of	assessment,	performance	standards,	analysis	and	interpretation	
of	performance	data)	and	reimbursement	(financial	rewards).8,13-15	Table	1	presents	
the	elements	of	a	P4P	program.	
Current	P4P	programs	are	mostly	designed	and	implemented	top-down	by	policy	
makers	and	managers.16	P4P	programs	can	be	seen	as	an	innovation	in	care,	and	
it	is	known	that	the	sustainability	of	an	innovation	can	be	improved	by	involving	
target	users.17	It	has	also	been	suggested	to	involve	target	users	in	the	develop-
mental	process	of	a	P4P	program,	because	this	can	contribute	to	the	effect	
of	incentivised	indicators.15,18	A	more	bottom-up	procedure	in	designing	a	P4P	
11
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program	may	improve	its	future	implementation	and	its	effectiveness.	Therefore	
it	is	important	to	develop	the	P4P	program	in	a	systematic	way,	using	for	instance	
a	Delphi	procedure.19	The	perspectives	of	all	target	users	become	distinct,	and	
the	decisions	made	are	transparent	for	the	target	users.	We	explored	such	a	
bottom-up	approach	in	this	thesis.	
	 Effect	of	P4P	programs
The	effectiveness	of	P4P	programs	is	still	inconclusive20,21,	despite	the	prolifera-
tion	of	these	programs.	Petersen	et	al.	(2006)	give	some	suggestions	for	possible	
elements	of	successful	P4P.20	They	suggest	to	use	combined	incentives	for	both	
overall	improvement	and	achievement	of	a	threshold	and	to	make	use	of	process	
and	outcome	indicators	as	target	measures.	Most	studies	reflect	on	the	effects	
on	specific	indicators,	but	seldom	reflect	on	the	psychology	of	how	people	respond	
to	incentives.	Mehrotra	et	al.	(2010)	presented	seven	lessons	from	behavioural	
economics	that	might	enhance	the	effectiveness	of	P4P	programs22:	
1	 A	series	of	small	incentives	is	better	than	one	large	incentive
2 A	series	of	tiered	absolute	thresholds	is	better	than	one	absolute	threshold
3 Reducing	the	lag	times	between	care	and	receipt	of	incentives	increases	the	
behavioural	response
4 Although	withholds	have	more	of	an	effect	than	bonuses,	one	needs	to	be	
cognizant	of	the	negative	psychological	response
5 Reducing	the	complexity	of	an	incentive	plan	increases	the	behavioural	
response
Table	1	 Elements	of	the	P4P	program
Component
Performance	measurement
Elements
Performance  indicators
Domains,	subjects	and	indicators
Period	of	data	collection
Unit of assessment
Performance standards
Analysis and interpretation of performance data
Weighing	the	domains
Weighing	the	indicators
Calculations
Weighing	the	quality	scores
Differentiation	of	quality	scores
Feedback
Financial rewards
Payment
Size	of	the	bonus	
Spending	the	bonus
Appraisal
Reimbursement
12
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6 P4P	program	and	incentive	payments	should	be	decoupled	from	usual	reim-
bursement
7 ‘In	kind’	rewards	may	be	a	stronger	drive	of	change	than	a	cash	reward	of	the	
same
A	systematic	use	of	behavioural	economics	as	described	is	lacking	in	the	current	
P4P	programs.	More	research	into	elements	of	effective	P4P	is	needed.
	 Experiences	with	P4P	programs
Studies	about	the	experiences	of	target	users	with	P4P	programs	are	scarce.	
Experiences	of	target	users	that	were	involved	in	designing	the	P4P	program	are	
unknown,	though	involving	target	users	could	enlarge	P4P’s	effectiveness.15	
Physicians	participating	in	P4P	programs	in	Massachusetts	and	California	showed	
positive	attitudes	toward	P4P,	but	were	ambivalent	about	specific	features	of	
these	programs.23	General	practices	participating	in	the	Australian	Practice	
Incentives	Program	(PIP)	were	asked	about	their	views	on	PIP’s	contribution	
to	quality	of	care	and	improved	access.	Their	views	were	mixed,	with	27	percent	
of	providers	responding	that	PIP	gives	significant	benefit	to	their	practice,	36	
percent	responding	that	there	is	medium	benefit,	and	27	percent	responding	that	
the	benefit	is	minor.24	Campbell	et	al.	(2008)	interviewed	GPs	and	nurses	about	
their	views	on	changes	in	healthcare	as	a	result	of	the	Quality	and	Outcomes	
Framework	(QOF).25	The	respondents	believed	that	the	financial	incentives	
had	been	sufficient	to	change	behaviour	and	to	achieve	targets,	but	they	also	
mentioned	some	unintended	consequences	such	as	a	decline	in	personal	
continu	ity	of	care.	Furthermore,	the	interviewees	worried	about	an	ongoing	
culture	of	performance	monitoring	in	the	UK.	So,	further	research	into	exper-
iences	of	P4P	target	groups	is	demanded.
	 A	participatory	P4P	program
The	assessment	of	different	P4P	programs	so	far,	show	the	importance	of	
involvement	of	target	users	during	the	complete	phases	of	the	development,	
implementation,	and	evaluation	of	P4P. 15	In	four	studies	that	involved	target	
users,	three	different	P4P	programs	were	evaluated	and	improvements	of	20%	
on	average	in	three	to	five	years	were	reported.26-29	
Another	important	message	is	that	the	design	of	the	P4P	program	should	be	
developed	along	three	framework	components:	performance	measurement,	
appraisal	and	reimbursement.8	In	defining	the	appraisal	the	seven	lessons	from	
behavioural	economics	that	might	enhance	the	effectiveness	of	P4P	programs	
should	be	taken	into	account.22
At	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	it	was	explained	that	improving	the	quality	of	
care	was	instigated	by	stimulating	the	intrinsic	motivation.	Later	on	extrinsic	
interventions	seem	to	took	over.	It	can	be	questioned	whether	it	is	possible	to	
13
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develop	a	P4P	program	that	focuses	on	both	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	motivation.	
This	would	result	in	healthcare	providers	working	on	quality	of	care	based	on	
professionalism,	and	being	rewarded	with	a	financial	incentive	for	their	perfor-
mance	on	quality	of	care.
In	this	thesis	we	attempted	to	develop	a	structured	participatory	P4P	program	
with	both	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	components.	The	mainly	intrinsic	component	
will	be	realized	by	linking	the	P4P	program	to	the	Dutch	National	Accreditation	
program30;	and	the	performance	payment	relates	to	the	extrinsic	component	
mainly.
	 Objective	and	study	aims
The	aim	of	this	study	was	to	develop	a	P4P	program	with	active	involvement	of	
the	target	users	aimed	at	improving	quality	of	care	and	rewarding	professionals	
for	their	performance.	This	thesis	will	address	the	process	of	developing	a	P4P	
program,	discussing	the	design	of	performance	measurement,	appraisal	and	
reimbursement.	We	will	also	cover	the	validity	and	reliability	of	the	clinical	care	
performance	measures.	The	participatory	P4P	program	was	evaluated	on	its	
effect	and	on	the	experiences	of	the	target	users.	Since	quality	improvement	is	
the	main	issue,	and	the	rationale	in	P4P	programs	is	that	feedback	on	actual	
data	and	improvement	plans	can	improve	quality	of	care,	a	separate	study	was	
designed	in	which	the	impact	of	feedback	on	actual	performance	in	general	
practice	was	studied.
The	research	questions	of	the	separate	studies	were	as	follows:
1 What	is	the	impact	of	feedback	on	performance	accompanied	by	information	
on	best	practices	on	the	accessibility	and	availability	in	general	practice?	
(chapter	2)
2 Which	design	choices	are	made	by	the	target	users	for	a	P4P	program,	in	which	
the	different	options	for	performance	measurement,	appraisal	and	reimburse-
ment	were	discussed	in	a	systematic	consensus	procedure?	(chapter	3)
3 What	is	the	validity	of	the	clinical	care	domain?	(chapter	4)
4 What	is	the	effect	of	the	P4P	program	on	clinical	indicators	as	well	as	on	the	
patient	experience	after	one	year?	(chapter	5)
5 Has	the	involvement	of	target	users	in	designing	the	P4P	program	led	to	
positive	evaluations	and	confidence	in	its	future	use?	(chapter	6)
14
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	 Abstract
Problem	 Many	patients	are	not	satisfied	with	the	accessibility	and	availability	of	
general	practice,	and	they	would	like	to	see	improvement.
Design Quality-improvement	study	with	pre-intervention	and	post-intervention	
data	collection	in	36	general	practices.
Setting	 General	practices	located	in	the	south	of	the	Netherlands.
Key	measures	for	improvement	 Patient	satisfaction,	experiences	and	awareness;	
practice	information;	and	experiences	of	a	mystery	patient.
Strategy	for	change	The	practices	received	feedback	about	their	access	ibility	
and	availability	compared	with	data	from	practices	of	colleagues.	The	practices	
developed	practice-based	improvement	plans	using	these	feedback	results.
Effects	of	change	 Eighty	per	cent	of	the	improvement	plans	were	completed	
or	almost	completed	in	5	months.	After	the	intervention,	the	accessibility	by	
phone	within	2	min	increased	significantly	(10%	improvement).	The	practices	that	
designed	an	improvement	plan	showed	a	larger	increase	(25%	improvement)	
than	practices	that	did	not.	Patient	awareness	of	an	information	leaflet	and	a	
separate	telephone	number	for	emergency	calls	also	significantly	increased	(29%	
improvement	and	12%	improvement)	in	practices	that	designed	improvement	
plans.
Lessons	learned	 Feedback	and	practice-based	improvement	plans	were	
a	stimulus	to	work	on	and	to	improve	accessibility	and	availability.	All	practices	
started	improvement	plans,	but	the	overall	effect	of	the	changes	was	modest.	
This	may	be	due	to	acceptable	accessibility	and	availability	before	the	intervention	
was	introduced	and	to	the	time	period	of	5	months,	which	seemed	to	be	too	
short	to	complete	all	practice-based	improvement	plans.	The	mystery	patient	
was	more	satisfied	with	the	accessibility	than	the	real	patients.	This	may	be	
related	to	our	concept	of	accessibility.	We	learned	that	adding	a	mystery	patient	
for	data	collection	can	contribute	to	more	objective	measurements	of	practice	
accessibility	than	patient	questionnaires	alone.
20
chapter 2
Access	to	healthcare	is	a	prerequisite	for	quality	of	primary	care	services.	The	
concept	of	‘access’	includes	availability,	accessibility,	accommodation,	affordability	
and	acceptability.1	In	this	study,	we	focus	on	accessibility	and	availability	in	general	
practice	during	practice	hours	for	both	routine	care	and	emergency	care.2	
Waiting	time	on	the	phone	for	ordinary	consultations	is	one	of	the	aspects	of	
accessibility.	Making	an	appointment	within	two	working	days	with	your	general	
practitioner	is	one	of	the	aspects	of	availability.	Patients	appreciate	a	doctor	
who	is	available	within	a	short	time.	In	particular,	in	primary	care,	fast	access	may	
contribute	to	the	perception	of	patient-centred	healthcare.	Access	to	primary	
healthcare	services	is	a	public	and	political	concern	in	several	countries.3	The	
National	Health	Service	plan	in	the	United	Kingdom,	for	instance,	includes	access	
to	primary	care	as	one	of	the	key	components.4	The	General	Medical	Services	
contract	included	performance	indicators	for	access	in	2006-2007.5	Research	in	
general	practice	in	the	Netherlands	shows	that	patients	were	satisfied	with	the	
accessibility	in	general	but	less	satisfied	with	certain	aspects	such	as	waiting	time	
for	an	appointment,	accessibility	by	phone,	being	able	to	speak	to	the	practitioner	
on	the	telephone,	waiting	time	in	the	waiting	room,	and	emergency	care	ser-
vices.6-8	A	strategy	to	improve	the	access	to	general	practice	consists	of	auditing	
of	and	feedback	about	actual	services.	Feedback	about	individual	performance	
compared	with	that	of	peer	performance	can	be	a	powerful	motivator	for	
change.9-12	The	aim	of	auditing	and	feedback	is	to	present	data	about	practice	
performance	and	to	encourage	practices	to	design	specific	practice-based	
improvement	plans	as	a	guide	for	change.13	In	addition	to	the	performance	data	
of	individual	practices,	information	about	best	practices	was	provided.14	In	this	
study,	we	examined	the	impact	of	this	approach	on	the	accessibility	and	availabil-
ity	in	general	practice.
	 Key	measures	for	improvement
Three	measures	were	used	for	the	evaluation	of	the	intervention:
1	 Patient	satisfaction,	experience	and	awareness
2	 Information	about	general	practice	services
3	 Experiences	of	a	mystery	patient.
	 Process	of	gathering	information
	 Design	and	participants
We	asked	129	general	practices	in	the	south	of	the	Netherlands	to	participate	
in	our	project.	Sixty-six	practices	responded	of	which	36	agreed	to	participate	
voluntarily	(61%).	In	each	practice,	40	patients	registered	with	the	general	
practice	were	asked	to	participate.	These	patients	were	randomly	selected.	We	
collected	data	about	accessibility	and	availability	using:	(1)	questionnaires	com-
pleted	by	adult	patients	(>18	years),	(2)	questionnaires	about	general	practice	
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services	completed	by	general	practitioners	and	(3)	feedback	from	one	mystery	
patient	who	made	15	calls	for	ordinary	consultations	and	5	emergency	calls.	
When	the	phone	was	busy	or	not	answered,	the	phone	numbers	were	called	
three	more	times.	When	the	phone	was	picked	up	and	the	patient	was	asked	to	
hold,	the	service	was	classed	as	accessible.	Data	were	collected	before	the	
intervention	and	5	months	after	the	intervention.
	 Outcome	measures
The	measures	used	were	waiting	time	on	the	phone	for	emergencies	and	
ordinary	consultations,	waiting	time	in	the	waiting	room	before	consultation,	
waiting	time	for	an	appointment	(both	acute	and	chronic	illnesses)	and	the	
quality	of	information	service.	Patients	were	asked	to	report	their	satisfaction	
and	experience	with	the	phone	accessibility	for	emergencies	and	ordinary	con-
sultations,	waiting	time	for	an	appointment	and	the	waiting	time	in	the	waiting	
room	before	consultation.	A	specific	part	of	an	internationally	validated	question-
naire	covering	access	of	care	(Europep,	Visitation	Instrument	Practice	Manage-
ment)	was	used	to	collect	the	data.15 ,16	Practice	information	was	measured	using	
the	same	instrument.16	The	patients’	awareness	of	an	information	leaflet,	a	
telephone	number	for	emergencies	and	information	about	waiting	time	in	the	
waiting	room	were	also	asked	for.	The	general	practitioner	was	asked	to	provide	
practice	information	concerning	the	presence	of	an	information	leaflet,	a	practice	
website	and	a	specific	telephone	number	for	emergencies.	
The	mystery	patient	was	asked	to	make	an	appointment	for	an	ordinary	consul-
tation	and	another	for	an	emergency.	Good	phone	accessibility	for	an	ordinary	
consultation	was	defined	as	receiving	personal	contact	within	60	s	or	when	the	
answering	machine	gave	an	alternative	telephone	number	within	60	s.	For	emer-
gencies,	good	accessibility	was	defined	as	receiving	personal	contact	within	30	s	
or	when	the	answering	machine	gave	an	alternative	telephone	number	within	
30	s.	When	no	contact	had	been	established	after	three	attempts,	the	service	
was	classed	as	inaccess	ible	at	that	time.
	 Data	collection
The	patients	completed	the	questionnaires	after	their	consultations.	
A	practice	assistant	handed	out	the	questionnaires	during	one	week.	Patients	
that	filled	in	a	questionnaire	could	deposit	this	questionnaire	in	a	closed	box.	
After	one	week,	all	questionnaires	that	were	filled	in	were	sent	to	the	research	
team.	One	general	practitioner	in	each	practice	filled	in	the	questionnaire	about	
practice	services.	The	mystery	patient	called	for	an	ordinary	consultation	three	
times	a	day	for	5	days	and	for	emergency	services	called	once	a	day	for	5	days.	
The	measurement	of	patient	satisfaction,	experience	and	awareness;	practice	
information;	and	the	mystery	patient’s	investigation	were	repeated	after	5	months	
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during	which	the	practice	could	have	improved	their	performance	using	the	
individual	feedback	and	information	on	best	practices.	At	the	end	of	the	study,	
the	process	was	evaluated	by	means	of	a	questionnaire	to	investigate	the	expe-
riences	of	the	practices	with	this	study.	The	questions	covered	the	distribution	
of	the	patient	questionnaires,	the	mystery	patient’s	investigation,	the	quality	of	
the	feedback,	and	the	information	on	best	practices.
	 Strategy	for	change:	feedback	and	encouraging	design	
	 of	pratice-based	improvement	plans
The	practices	received	individual	feedback	from	the	research	team	based	on	
their	accessibility	and	they	received	information	about	three	best	practices.	
These	best	practices	were	selected	based	on	the	most	positive	patient	satisfac-
tion	with	waiting	times	in	the	waiting	room,	accessibility	by	phone,	and	informa-
tion	service.	The	recommendations	for	practice-based	improvement	plans	were	
suggested	to	the	general	practitioner	and	concerned	all	practice	members.	
Recommendations	were	made	when	practice	performance	was	5%	lower	than	
the	mean	of	all	participating	practices	or	when	the	individual	performance	
was	relatively	low	(patient	satisfaction,	experience	or	awareness	<75%	for	one	
specific	subject).	Dutch	literature	shows	that	the	average	perceived	accessibility	
of	patients	is	80%.6	We	accepted	a	deviation	of	5%.
Two	and	5	months	after	designing	the	improvement	plans,	the	practices	were	
called	to	report	on	their	progress.
	 Analysis	and	interpretation
We	grouped	the	improvement	plans	into	four	categories:	completed,	ongoing,	
not	started	and	cancelled.	The	focus	of	the	improvement	plans	included:
1	 Information	service
2	 Accessibility	by	phone
3	 Waiting	time	in	the	waiting	room
4	 Organisation	of	consulting	hours
5	 Consulting	hours	by	phone.
We	examined	the	overall	impact	of	the	quality-improvement	intervention	on	
patient	satisfaction	and	experience,	including	those	of	the	mystery	patient.	An	
independent	sample	t	test	was	used	to	analyse	the	data	regarding	the	impact	of	
the	quality	improvement	strategy.	Only	quality-improvement	plans	implemented	
in	more	than	two	practices	were	selected	for	this	analysis.
 Study	population
At	baseline,	1256	patients	from	the	36	general	practices	filled	in	the	question-
naire.	The	response	rate	was	87.2%.	Only	one	of	the	36	practices	originally	
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recruited	dropped	out	because	we	did	not	succeed	to	make	an	appointment	
with	the	general	practice	for	discussion	about	their	per	formance	during	the	study	
period.	After	5	months,	1071	(76.5%)	patients	from	35	practices	filled	in	the	
patient	questionnaire.	The	practices	included	in	the	study	were	representative	
for	all	Dutch	general	practices	(table	1).17	There	was	a	small	over-representation	
of	group	practices	and	practices	in	rural	areas	in	comparison	with	the	overall	
Dutch	general	practices.	
Patients	aged	44-64	years	were	over-represented	in	the	study	population.	
Women	in	the	study	population	were	over-represented	in	comparison	with	
Dutch	general	practices.
 Effects	of	change
The	36	participating	practices	developed	123	practice-based	improvement	plans	
using	the	practice	feedback	results	and	practice	information.	The	practices	
perceived	the	feedback	about	their	performance	as	very	useful.	After	5	months,	
26	practices	filled	in	a	questionnaire	concerning	the	progress	of	their	improve-
ment	plans.	Table	2	shows	that	almost	half	(53/123)	of	the	improvement	plans	
were	related	to	information	service.	One	fourth	(31/123)	was	related	to	phone	
accessibility,	and	another	one	fourth	(33/123)	to	waiting	time	in	the	waiting	room.	
Six	plans	were	related	to	the	consulting	hours.	After	5	months,	51	(42%)	improve-
ment	plans	were	completed.
Practice type
Solo
Dual
Group/health	centre
Urban area
Large	city
Small	city
Rural	city
Practice size
–	Mean	patient	population	per	practice
–	Mean	patient	population	per	full-time
			equivalent	general	practitioner
1	 Since	1/1/2006.	Source:	NIVEL(17)
2	 Sourche:	NIVEL,	NS2 (65	practices)	(18)
Large	city:	>1500	adresses	per	km2;	small	city:	500-1500	addresses	per	km2;	rural	area:	<500	addresses	per	km2
Study	population
36	practices
Number    %
				13	 37.1
				12	 34.3
				10	 28.6
				13	 36.2	 			
				18	 50.0	 			
						5	 13.9
4349	 	
2475
All Dutch general practices1 
4455 practices
Number    %
					 47.9
					 30.1
					 22.0
					 45.9	 			
					 41.8	 			
							 12.3
42832	 	
24372
Table	1	 Practice	characteristics	of	the	study	population	in	comparison	with	all	
	 Dutch	general	practices
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Table	3	presents	the	impact	of	four	specific	practice-based	improvement	plans.	
The	plans	‘distribution	of	information	leaflet’,	‘publicity	of	the	tele	phone	number	
for	emergencies’	and	‘phone	accessibility	for	an	ordinary	consultation	within	2	
min’	improved	significantly.
Table	4	shows	that	there	were	significant	changes	in	patient	experience	of	phone	
accessibility	for	ordinary	consultation	and	for	making	an	appointment	within	two	
working	days.	There	was	also	a	significant	change	in	patient	satisfaction	with	the	
waiting	time	in	the	waiting	room.
Module
Information	service
Accessibility	by	phone
Waiting	time	in	the	waiting	room
Organisation	consulting	hours
Consulting	hours	by	phone
Total
1	 N,	number	of	practice-based	improvement	plans
There	were	26	practices
Completed
N1
22
11
15
		0		
		3
51
Ongoing
N1
20	
14	
16	
		0	
		0
50
Not	started
N1
11
		5
		1
		2
		1
20
Cancelled
N1
0
1
1
0
0
2
Total	plans
N1
		53
		31
		33
				2
				4
123
Table	2	 Progress	of	practice-based	improvement	plans
Table	3	 Impact	of	practice-based	improvement	plans
Module	 Practice-based										Number	of	 Indicator	 T0	 	 T1	 	 Change
	 improvement	plan				practices
    % N1 % N1 %
Information	 Distribution	of		 						5	 Patients’	awareness	 58.2	 170	 87.3	 150	 29.1*
service	 information	leaflet	
	 Publicity	of	telephone		 						7	 Patients’	awareness	 66.5	 233	 78.8	 189	 12.3*
	 number	for	
	 emergencies
Accessibility	 Accessibility	by	phone	 						3	 Good/excellent	 37.6	 101	 29.0	 107	 -	8.6
by	phone	 for	usual	consultation	 	 Contact	within		 35.4	 		96	 60.2	 103	 24.8*
	 	 	 2	minutes
Waiting	time 	 Delay	in	consulting		 				12	 Delay	information		 29.1	 261	 21.2	 208	 -	7.9
in	the	 hours	 	 according	to	patients
waiting	room  	
*	 Significance:	p	<0.05
1	 N,	Number	of	patients	that	filled	in	a	questionnaire	and	filled	in	this	question
T0	 Pre-intervention
T1	 Post-intervention
25
improving 
access 
to 
primary 
care
	 Lessons	learned
All	participating	general	practices	were	motivated	to	improve	their	access	ibility	
and	availability	before	the	study	started.	They	found	the	feedback	about	their	
performance	very	useful.	Most	of	the	practice-based	improvement	plans	con-
cerned	information	service,	waiting	time	in	the	waiting	room	and	phone	acces-
sibility.	After	5	months,	80%	of	the	plans	were	completed	or	almost	completed.	
The	improvement	plans	concerning	process	improvements	would	likely	be	
completed	after	a	longer	period.	The	type	of	improvements	concerned	structural	
changes	in	daily	practice	and	routines,	which	are	expected	to	be	sustainable.
The	experience	of	the	mystery	patient	and	patient	satisfaction	showed	that	the	
accessibility	in	general	practice	was	good.	These	results	are	consistent	with	
other	studies	that	show	high	scores	on	patient	satisfaction	in	the	Netherlands.7,8	
It	can	be	argued	that	our	results	are	an	over-estimation	as	we	defined	accessibil-
ity	as	‘good’	when	an	alternative	phone	number	was	provided	and	did	not	restrict	
accessibility	to	speaking	to	a	person	since	we	assumed	that	a	patient	knows	how	
to	handle	according	to	this	information.	Over-estimation	of	patient	satisfaction	
could	also	be	due	to	the	patient	population,	which	included	relatively	more	
patients	with	chronic	disease.	These	patients	visit	the	practice	more	often	and	
know	the	preferred	times	to	call	the	practice	and	may,	therefore,	be	more	
satisfied	than	other	patients.
Adding	a	mystery	patient	for	data	collection	could	contribute	to	more	objective	
measurements	of	practice	accessibility	than	patient	questionnaires	alone.	In	our	
study,	the	mystery	patient	was	more	satisfied	with	the	accessibility	than	the	
real	patients.	It	may	be	argued	that	we	only	included	one	mystery	patient	in	our	
Table	4	 Impact	of	interventions
	 																									 		 T0	 	 T1	 	 Change	
    % N1 % N1 %
Accessibility		 Patient	satisfaction	 Good	/	excellent	 57.6	 		533	 55.7	 		494	 -1.9
by	phone		 Patient	experience	 Contact	within	2	min	 82.9	 		251	 80.9	 		173	 -1.9
(emergency)	 Mystery	patient	 Contact	within	30	s	 94.0	 			-	 94.0	 		-	 		-
Accessibility	by	 Patient	satisfaction	 Good	/	excellent	 48.6	 1191	 46.5	 1032	 -2.1
phone	(ordinary		 Patient	experience	 Contact	within	2	min	 61.0	 1164	 71.3	 		963	 10.3*
consultation)	 Mystery	patient	 Contact	within	1	min	 84.0	 		-		 87.0	 		-	 		3.0
Waiting	time	in		 Patient	satisfaction	 Good	/	excellent	 42.2	 1156	 48.3	 		988	 		6.1*
the	waiting	room	 Patient	experience	 Within	10	min	 64.1	 1185	 65.4	 1007	 		1.3
Consulting	hours	 Patient	satisfaction	 Good	/	excellent	 56.6	 1175	 59.4	 1005	 		2.8
	 Patient	experience	 Within	two	working	days	 94.0	 1184	 91.3	 		998	 - 2.7*
*	 Significance:	p	<0.05
1	 N,	Number	of	patients	that	filled	in	a	questionnaire	and	filled	in	this	question
T0	Pre-intervention
T1 Post-intervention
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study.	We	gave	clear	instructions	to	this	‘patient’,	which	could	explain	more	
patient	satisfaction.	Another	explanation	is	related	to	our	concept	of	accessibil-
ity,	which	was	defined	as	acceptable	if	the	mystery	patient	contacted	the	practice	
after	three	attempts	at	most.	In	contrast,	patients	might	expect	that	there	should	
be	personal	contact	directly	after	the	first	call.	If	more	information	is	available	
on	patient	expectations,	specific	interventions	could	improve	satisfaction	with	
services	subsequently.18	Finally,	practices	might	have	anticipated	on	a	call	from	a	
mystery	patient.	However,	they	had	no	idea	when	the	mystery	patient	would	call	
during	the	study	period,	so	anticipation	is	unlikely.
A	substantial	proportion	(43%)	of	the	improvement	plans	dealt	with	practice	
information	services.	This	can	be	very	effective	in	enhancing	a	patient’s	knowledge	
on	when	and	how	the	general	practice	is	accessible.	Increasingly,	practices	use	
websites	for	information	services,	which	can	be	easily	updated	with	the	latest	
information	on	access	and	availability.	Future	research	on	accessibility	could	
address	the	use	of	websites	and	other	alternative	information	services.	Future	
research	should	also	take	into	account	that	there	is	a	gap	between	the	percep-
tions	of	a	mystery	patient	and	an	actual	patient	concerning	accessibility.
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	 Abstract
Background	 International	interest	in	pay-for-performance	(P4P)	initiat	ives	to	
improve	quality	of	health	care	is	growing.	Current	programs	vary	in	the	methods	
of	performance	measurement,	appraisal	and	reimbursement.	One	may	assume	
that	involvement	of	health	care	professionals	in	the	goal	setting	and	methods	
of	quality	measurement	and	subsequent	payment	schemes	may	enhance	their	
commitment	to	and	motivation	for	P4P	programs	and	therefore	the	impact	of	
these	programs.	We	developed	a	P4P	program	in	which	the	target	users	were	
involved	in	decisions	about	the	P4P	methods.
Methods	 For	the	development	of	the	P4P	program	a	framework	was	used	
which	distinguished	three	main	components:	performance	measurement,	
appraisal	and	reimbursement.	Based	on	this	framework	design	choices	were	
discussed	in	two	panels	of	target	users	using	an	adapted	Delphi	procedure.	The	
target	users	were	65	general	practices	and	two	health	insurance	companies	in	
the	south	of	the	Netherlands.
Results	 Performance	measurement	was	linked	to	the	Dutch	accreditation	
program	based	on	three	domains	(clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	
experience).	The	general	practice	was	chosen	as	unit	of	assessment.	Relative	
standards	were	set	at	the	25th	percentile	of	group	performance.	The	incentive	
for	clinical	care	was	set	twice	as	high	as	the	one	for	practice	management	and	
patient	experience.	Quality	scores	were	to	be	calculated	separately	for	all	three	
domains,	and	for	both	the	quality	level	and	the	improvement	of	performance.	
The	incentive	for	quality	level	was	set	thrice	as	high	as	the	one	for	the	improve-
ment	of	performance.	For	reimbursement,	quality	scores	were	divided	into	seven	
levels.	A	practice	with	a	quality	score	in	the	lowest	group	was	not	supposed	to	
receive	a	bonus.	The	additional	payment	grew	proportionally	for	each	extra	
group.	The	bonus	aimed	at	was	on	average	5%	to	10%	of	the	practice	income.
Conclusions	 Designing	a	P4P	program	for	primary	care	with	involvement	of	
the	target	users	gave	us	an	insight	into	their	motives,	which	can	help	others	who	
need	to	discuss	similar	programs.	The	resulting	program	is	in	line	with	target	
users’	views	and	assessments	of	relevance	and	applicability.	This	may	enhance	
their	commitment	to	the	program	as	was	indicated	by	the	growing	number	
of	voluntary	participants	after	a	successfully	performed	field	test	during	the	
procedure.	The	elements	of	our	framework	can	be	very	helpful	for	others	who	
are	developing	or	evaluating	a	P4P	program.
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	 Background
International	interest	in	pay-for-performance	(P4P)	initiatives	to	improve	quality	
of	health	care	is	growing.	Despite	the	proliferation	of	P4P	programs,	the	evidence	
to	support	their	use	is	still	inconclusive.1,2	One	of	the	reasons	may	be	the	
differences	between	P4P	programs.	Incentives	in	current	programs	vary	in	terms	
of	number	and	type	of	indicators,	professional	standards	and	quality	domains	
(clinical	care,	patient	experience,	organisation	of	care).3-7	The	size	of	the	incen-
tive	and	the	unit	of	assessment	in	P4P	programs	can	influence	their	effectiveness.8	
Experiences	with	different	P4P	programs	led	to	a	framework	for	design	choices	
regarding	the	P4P	approach.	Three	essential	framework	components	to	design	
a	P4P	program	can	be	distinguished:	performance	measurement,	appraisal	and	
reimbursement.9-12	The	performance	measurement	should	include	valid	and	
reliable	indicators	that	make	sense	to	the	target	group.	Appraisal	in	a	P4P	
program	means	defining	the	unit	of	assessment	and	the	performance	standards,	
but	also	describing	the	analysis	and	interpretation	of	the	data.	Based	on	the	
analysis	and	interpretation	of	the	data	a	reimbursement	system	can	be	built.10
Another	remarkable	feature	of	current	P4P	programs	is	that	they	are	mostly	
designed	and	implemented	top-down	by	policy	makers	and	managers.13	P4P	
programs	can	be	seen	as	an	innovation	in	care,	and	it	is	known	that	the	sustain-
ability	of	an	innovation	can	be	improved	by	involving	target	users.14	It	has	also	
been	suggested	to	involve	target	users	in	the	developmental	process	of	a	P4P	
program,	because	this	can	contribute	to	the	effect	of	incentivised	indicators.15,16	
A	more	bottom-up	procedure	in	designing	a	P4P	program	may	improve	its	future	
implementation	and	its	effectiveness.
Evaluation	of	the	involvement	of	target	users	in	the	decisions	about	the	P4P	
program	may	contribute	to	the	growing	field	of	P4P	research.	One	may	assume	
that	involvement	of	health	care	professionals	in	the	goal	setting	and	methods	
of	quality	measurement	and	subsequent	payment	schemes	may	enhance	their	
commitment	to	and	motivation	for	P4P	programs	and	therefore	the	impact	of	
these	programs.	Nevertheless,	you	have	to	reckon	with	conflicts	of	interest	when	
involving	target	users.	Therefore	it	is	important	to	develop	the	P4P	program	in	
a	systematic	way,	such	as	the	Delphi	procedure.17	The	perspectives	of	all	target	
users	become	distinct,	and	the	decisions	made	are	transparent	for	the	target	
users.	The	aim	of	our	study	was	to	design	a	P4P	program	using	a	bottom-up	
procedure,	in	which	the	different	options	for	performance	measurement,	
appraisal	and	reimbursement	were	discussed	by	the	target	users	in	a	systematic	
consensus	procedure.	We	will	present	this	bottom-up	process	of	development	
of	the	P4P	program	and	its	resulting	design.
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	 Methods
	 The	design	options	in	the	P4P	framework
We	searched	the	literature	for	relevant	elements	for	our	P4P	program,	to	be	
discussed	by	the	target	users.	Table	1	gives	an	overview	of	the	elements	and	
design	options.
The	performance indicators	covered	three	domains,	clinical	care,	practice	manage-
ment	and	patient	experience,	and	were	derived	from	the	Dutch	National	
Accreditation	Program	for	general	practices.18	The	target	users	were	asked	
whether	these	three	domains,	the	subjects	and	the	indicators	were	appropriate	
for	the	P4P	program.	For	clinical	care	the	target	users	could	choose	from	
indicators	for	diabetes,	COPD,	asthma,	cardiovascular	risk	management,	influenza	
vaccination,	cervical	cancer	screening	and	prescribing	acid	suppressive	drugs	
and	antibiotics.	For	practice	management,	which	is	measured	with	the	validated	
Visitation	Instrument	Practice	management	(VIP)19,	they	could	approve	various	
indicators	for	infrastructure,	team,	information,	and	quality	and	safety.	The	
indicators	for	patient	experience	to	agree	on	were	based	on	the	internationally	
validated	EUROPEP	instrument20,	which	evaluates	both	the	general	practitioner	
and	the	organisation	of	care.	Furthermore,	target	users	could	decide	on	collec-
ting	data	for	all	three	domains	each	year	versus	a	trimmed-down	version	of	the	
program.
The	appraisal	and	reimbursement	elements	and	options	to	be	discussed	were	
derived	from	the	literature.1,8,10,11	The	following	design	elements	of	P4P	programs	
were	described:	unit	of	assessment,	performance	standards,	analysis	and	inter-
pretation	of	performance	data,	and	financial	rewards.		The	options	for	the	unit	of	
assessment,	either	the	general	practitioner,	the	general	practice	or	a	larger	
organisational	unit,	were	presented	together	with	evidence	that	the	smaller	the	
unit	the	stronger	the	stimulation	of	quality	improvement1,	and	the	practical	
consideration	that	the	general	practice	is	the	unit	of	assessment	within	the	
Dutch	National	Accreditation	program.	The	options	presented	for	performance	
standards	were	either	absolute	or	relative	performance	standards.10	Most	
existing	programs	are	based	on	absolute	standards.1,8,21	The	target	users	were	
asked	whether	performance	standards	should	vary	between	indicators/subjects.	
Some	indicators	might	need	lower	minimum	standards	because	they	are	more	
difficult	to	reach	than	others.	Concerning	the	analysis	and	interpretation	of	
performance	data	the	options	were	to	weigh	domains	and	indicators	either	
differently	or	to	weigh	them	equally.	In	the	Quality	and	Outcomes	Framework	
(QOF),	for	instance,	performance	on	clinical	indicators	receives	more	weight	
than	practice	management	or	patient	experience.7	For	calculating	quality	scores	
options	were	to	either	calculate	a	quality	score	for	each	domain	separately	or	
to	calculate	one	overall	domain-score.	Moreover	the	target	users	could	choose	
whether	both	the	quality	level	and	the	improvement	of	performance	should	
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be	incentivised	and	whether	to	weigh	the	scores	differently	or	equally.	A	combi-
nation	of	incentives	for	both	the	quality	level	and	improvement	of	performance	
will	encourage	both	low	and	high	performing	providers	to	improve	quality.1,16	
In	order	to	link	a	bonus	to	the	quality,	quality	scores	need	to	be	differentiated	
into	levels.	The	options	given	were:	4	levels	(quartiles),	5	to	7	levels,	or	8	to	10	
levels.	The	more	levels,	the	more	smaller	improvements	will	be	worth	the	
investment.	For	the	feedback	a	discussion	was	started	on	a	proper	benchmark	
and	on	risk	adjustment.	The	options	presented	for	a	benchmark	were	the	
median,	the	best	practice	(75th	percentile	or	90th	percentile)	or	a	combination.	
Improvement	can	best	be	stimulated	by	feedback	in	a	reachable	range22,	thus	
practices	with	relatively	low	scores	are	stimulated	by	the	average	of	the	peer	
group,	and	practices	with	high	scores	by	best	practices.	Comparing	practices	
with	others	without	appropriate	risk	adjustment	can	be	misleading.	Risk	factors	
include	patient	demographic	and/or	clinical	factors,	which	can	influence	out-
comes	of	care.	The	target	users	had	to	decide	on	risk	adjustment	of	the	indica-
tor	scores,	which	is	either	to	adjust	the	benchmark	(indirect	correction)	or	
the	indicator	scores	(direct	correction).	Concerning	the	feedback	the	target	
users	could	choose	either	a	one-step	procedure	or	a	two-step	procedure.	In	
the	one-step	procedure	practices	receive	feedback	and	bonus	together.	In	the	
two-step	procedure	practices	first	receive	feedback,	and	receive	the	bonus	
only	after	they	have	had	the	opportunity	to	respond	to	their	feedback.
Concerning	the	reimbursement	the	options	for	the	method	of	payment	were	
either	money,	human	resources,	a	sabbatical	leave	or	a	combination	of	these.	
For	the	size	of	the	bonus	we	asked	the	target	users	whether	an	average	bonus	of	
5000	to	10000	Euros	(depending	on	practice	size),	which	is	on	average	5% to 10%	
of	the	practice	income,	would	be	appropriate.	In	other	P4P	programs	the	size	of	
the	bonus	varied	between	US$	2	per	patient	and	US$	10000	per	practice.23	The	
size	of	the	bonus	should	not	be	too	small	as	this	may	limit	the	effects,	but	neither	
should	it	be	too	high	because	of	unintended	consequences	like	gaming.21,24,25	
The	options	for	spending	the	bonus	were	either	without	obligations	or	with	
obligations	(spending	for	the	practice	related	to	a	goal,	possibly	preset)	or	a	
combination	of	these	options.	
 Study	design
An	action	research	approach26	was	applied	with	participation	of	future	target	
users	in	the	development	of	the	P4P	program.	To	reach	consensus	an	adapted	
Delphi	procedure27	was	used	in	two	panels	of	target	users.	(Figure	1)	The	target	
users	in	question	were	general	practitioners	(GPs)	and	payers	(representatives	
of	health	insurance	companies).	General	practices	in	the	south	of	the	Nether-
lands	were	invited	by	the	two	regional	health	insurance	companies	to	participate	
voluntarily	in	this	P4P	experiment.	We	aimed	at	participation	of	20	to	25	general	
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practices,	and	at	least	one	representative	of	each	health	insurance	company.	To	
achieve	consensus	on	the	P4P	design,	two	rounds	were	organized	to	discuss	the	
methods	of	performance	measurements	(one	on	clinical	care,	and	one	on	prac-
tice	management	and	patient	experience)	and	one	round	to	discuss	the	methods	
of	appraisal	and	reimbursement.	The	participating	practices	were	also	invited	
to	volunteer	in	a	field	test	in	which	data	were	collected	based	on	the	previous	
choices	for	the	measurement	of	clinical	performance,	practice	management	and	
patient	experiences.	Feedback	to	the	practices	was	delivered	and	the	resulting	
bonus	was	paid	according	to	the	system	agreed	on.	After	the	field	test	the	panel	
was	extended	with	general	practices	that	were	also	willing	to	participate	in	this	
P4P	experiment.	In	this	second	panel	we	discussed	the	methods	of	appraisal	and	
reimbursement	based	on	the	results	of	the	field	test	(round	four)	and	the	design	
options	regarding	quality	level	and	improvement	of	performance	(round	five)	
to	fine-tune	the	P4P	program.
Figure	1	 Procedure	design	selection	of	a	P4P	program	by	target	users
Method and participants Discussion components and response rate
Panel 1
Consensus	procedure	with
questionnaires	and	meetings
N=27	practices,	
2	health	insurance	companies
Round 1	 Performance	measurement	clinical	care	
Questionnaire:	N=25	general	practitioners
         Meeting:	N=18	general	practitioners
Round 2	 Performance	measurement	practice	management	and	patient	
experience
Questionnaire:	N=25	GPs,	13	health	insurance	representatives
         Meeting:	N=20	GPs,			6	health	insurance	representatives
Round 3	Appraisal	and	reimbursement
Questionnaire:	N=25	GPs,	10	health	insurance	representatives
         Meeting: N=25	GPs,			7	health	insurance	representatives
Field	test
N=22	practices#
Panel 2
Consensus	procedure	with	
questionnaires	and	meetings
Questionnaire	
N=65	practices,	2	health	
insurance	companies
Meetings
N=30	practices,	2	health	
insurance	companies
Field test
N=24	practices
Round 4	 Fine-tuning	appraisal	and	reimbursement	
Questionnaire: N=51	GPs,	2	health	insurance	representatives
         Meeting: N=22	GPs,	2	health	insurance	representatives
Round 5	 Fine-tuning	regarding	quality	level	and	improvement	of	
performance
Questionnaire:	N=41	GPs
         Meeting:	N=		8	GPs,	2	health	insurance	representatives
#	Two	practices	dropped	out,	one	due	to	illness	and	the	other	due	to	disassociation	of	practice	owners
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 Consensus	procedure
In	each	round	a	written	questionnaire	with	the	design	options	for	the	P4P	
program	was	sent	to	the	target	users	two	weeks	before	the	planned	meeting.	In	
the	questionnaire	they	were	provided	with	background	evidence	on	the	options	
as	described	in	the	section	‘The	design	options	in	the	P4P	framework’	and	they	
were	asked	to	make	a	choice.	Each	meeting	started	with	explaining	the	aim	
of	the	discussion	and	feedback	on	the	results	of	the	questionnaires.	All	design	
options	were	discussed,	but	for	the	performance	indicators	the	project	team	
decided	not	to	discuss	indicators	with	high	consensus,	defined	as	less	than	30%	
or	more	than	70%	in	favour.	At	the	end	of	each	meeting	the	panel	members	
completed	the	same	questionnaire	again.	The	decision	rule	for	inclusion	of	
clinical	indicators	was	set	at	more	than	70%	in	favour,	and	for	the	other	design	
options	a	majority	rule	was	applied.
All	panel	meetings	were	held	in	the	region	in	question	to	enhance	participation.	
Payers	and	GPs	attended	the	same	discussion	meetings	which	lasted	2	hours.	The	
general	practices	in	the	first	panel	received	1500	Euros	for	participating	in	the	
panel	as	well	as	in	the	field	test.	Each	GP	in	the	second	panel	received	100	Euros	
for	attending	the	meetings.
	 Results
	 Study	population
The	number	of	general	practitioners	and	health	insurance	representatives	that	
filled	in	the	questionnaires	and	attended	the	meetings	for	the	specific	panels	are	
presented	in	Figure	1.	The	number	of	GPs	that	could	attend	the	meetings	in	
round	four	and	five	were	restricted	to	30	due	to	the	large	number	of	practices	
that	voluntarily	participated	in	the	P4P	program.	
In	panel	1	the	response	rate	for	the	GPs	was	on	average	93%	for	the	question-
naires	and	78%	for	the	meetings,	and	in	panel	2	71%	and	50%	respectively.	The	
health	insurance	representatives	decided	to	leave	the	discussion	on	the	perfor-
mance	indicators	to	the	experts	(GPs).	They	participated	amply	in	panel	1	and	
their	participation	decreased	in	panel	2.
 Design	choices
The	successive	panel	procedures	and	the	field	test	resulted	in	a	P4P	program	
which	is	presented	in	Table	1.
 Performance	measurement
The	target	users	thought	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experi-
ence	to	be	appropriate	domains	for	the	P4P	program,	as	well	as	the	subjects	
within	these	domains	(see	Table	1).	Some	GPs	remarked	that	the	clinical conditions	
to	be	assessed	were	mainly	focused	on	chronic	care,	though	GP	care	comprises	
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much	more.	Especially	communication	skills	were	missed.	Although	patient	
experiences	were	to	be	assessed,	some	GPs	stated	that	communication	was	not	
reflected	enough	in	the	indicators.	The	GPs	also	discussed	the	fact	that	choosing	
indicators	would	result	in	a	certain	focus	that	could	distract	them	from	the	more	
general	goal	of	quality	improvement.	Practices	may	concentrate	their	performance	
on	the	indicators	from	the	P4P	program.	It	was	proposed	that	in	the	long-term	a	
large	set	of	indicators	will	be	needed.	Then	the	P4P	program	could	have	different	
sets	for	different	years.	Some	GPs	even	suggested	that	the	practice	should	not	
be	aware	of	the	existing	set.	For	clinical	care,	GPs	were	convinced	that	the	out-
comes	were	a	mixed	result	of	patient	and	doctor’s	performance.	It	was	there-
fore	decided	that	the	payment	should	be	based	on	the	process	measures	only,	
but	the	GPs	would	like	to	receive	feedback	on	the	outcome	indicators	as	well.	
So,	data	for	both	process	and	outcome	indicators	were	collected.	
Although	the	health	insurance	representatives	stated	they	would	leave	the	
decisions	on	clinical	care	options	to	the	GPs,	they	joined	the	discussion	in	the	
meetings	on	the	prescription	indicators.	The	prescription	indicators	were	highly	
valued	by	the	health	insurance	representatives.	The	GPs	questioned	these	
indicators	which	resulted	in	not	including	the	acid	suppressive	drugs	indicators	
in	the	program,	and	including	indicators	on	prescribing	antibiotics.	Some	items	of	
practice management were	excluded	due	to	their	estimated	low	correlation	with	
the	quality	of	practice	management	such	as	financial	accounting.	The	EUROPEP	
instrument,	consisting	of	23	items	measuring	patient experience,	was	supplement-
ed	with	four	items	regarding	the	possibility	to	ask	for	a	longer	consultation,	
accessibility	by	phone,	getting	an	appointment	with	your	own	doctor	and	an	
accessible	procedure	for	complaints.	All	selected	quality	indicators	can	be	found	
in	the	additional	file.
The	target	users	agreed	that	at	baseline,	data	should	be	collected	for	all	three	
domains.	For	the	years to follow	the	data	collection	for	the	practice	management	
domain	was	judged	to	be	unnecessary	as	it	is	not	likely	that	this	will	change	
substantially	over	two	or	three	years	and	as	the	data	collection	in	this	domain	is	
very	labour	intensive.
 Appraisal
The	general	practice	was	chosen	as	unit of assessment,	because	in	the	context	of	
the	P4P	program	the	incentive	would	be	targeted	at	this	level.	Since	the	data	on	
clinical	performance	were	collected	at	individual	GP	level,	practices	asked	to	
receive	feedback	at	the	level	of	the	GP	as	well.	Relative standards	for	determining	
the	level	of	the	incentive	were	preferred	over	absolute	standards	by	most	target	
users.	Setting	an	absolute	standard	for	performance	was	considered	too	arbi-
trary.	They	preferred	performance	standards	for	both	indicators	and	subjects,	
but	as	this	would	not	contribute	to	the	clarity	of	the	calculations	it	was	decided	
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chapter 3
to	restrict	it	to	the	indicators	only.	They	agreed	to	set	the	relative	performance	
standard	at	the	25th	percentile	of	each	indicator.	This	responded	to	the	prefer-
ence	of	the	panel	members	to	vary	the	performance	standards	between	the	
indicators.	The	target	users	thought	that	all	individual	indicators	should	receive	
the	same	weight	because	a	good	criterion	for	different	iating	was	lacking.	How-
ever,	they	decided	that	clinical	care	should	receive	double	the	weight	of	practice	
management	and	patient	experience	(2:1:1)	because	clinical	care	is	the	major	
domain	of	quality	of	care.	The	data	from	the	22	practices	in	the	field	test	showed	
that	the	quality	scores	should	be	calculated	separately	for	each	domain	because	
otherwise	the	performance	on	clinical	care	would	dominate	the	overall	quality	
score.	Having	data	available	for	two	or	more	years	made	it	possible	to	calculate	
improvement	of	performance	as	well.	Panel	2	decided	to	reward	quality level as 
well as improvement of performance	in	a	ratio	of	3:1	for	the	bonus	payment	in	the	
next	year.	In	that	case	practices	with	high	scores	would	receive	a	bonus	for	
delivering	quality	and	practices	with	low	scores	would	be	stimulated	to	improve.	
In	the	following	years	two	separate	scores	will	be	calculated	for	each	practice;	
one	on	quality	level	and	one	on	improvement	of	performance	for	the	three	
domains	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experience.	The	panel	
thought	of	the	P4P	program	as	a	three	years	cycle	in	which	practice	management	
was	only	measured	at	the	beginning	of	each	cycle.	The	users	preferred	to	have	a	
detailed	division	in	levels	of	quality	scores	to	make	small	differences	in	quality	
visible	and	to	make	it	easier	to	achieve	next	levels.	The	range	of	quality	scores	of	
all	participating	practices	were	therefore	divided	into	seven equal levels	(relative	
‘thresholds’).	Practices	that	do	not	improve	will	be	rated	in	level	0	(no	bonus)	
and	practices	showing	improvement	will	be	rated	in	one	of	six	levels	with	a	
differentiation	in	bonus	accordingly.	For	feedback	the	target	users	preferred	a	
benchmark	with	the	25th	(minimum	standard),	50th	and	the	75th	percentile	
because	that	would	give	them	a	good	overview	and	stimulate	practices	at	the	
bottom	as	well	as	at	the	top.	Risk adjustment	for	the	process	indicators	was	
discussed.	The	target	users	preferred	stratification,	which	is	a	comparison	with	a	
benchmark	consisting	of	comparable	practices	instead	of	correction	of	their	
own	data.	However,	stratification	would	require	a	large	sample	of	practices,	so	
we	decided	not	to	include	this	aspect	in	the	experiment.	Following	the	experi-
ences	with	the	field	test,	a	two-step procedure	was	chosen	by	the	GPs.	Practices	
will	receive	feedback	(indicator	scores	and	benchmark)	and	the	bonus	after	
they	have	had	the	opportunity	to	respond	to	their	feedback.	The	feedback	was	
accompanied	with	clear	information	on	the	calculation	procedure.
 Reimbursement
The	discussion	on	the	type	of	financial	reward	resulted	in	the	conclusion:	‘Money	
is	the	best	method,	because	money	can	buy	you	anything’.	The	target	users	
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agreed	on	a	bonus	that	was	5%	to	10%	of	practice	income	with	a	minimum	of	0	
Euros	and	a	maximum	of	15000	Euros.	None	of	the	users	indicated	this	amount	
was	too	high	and	half	of	them	thought	this	was	too	low.	However,	agreement	
was	reached	with	the	argument	that	the	proposed	size	of	the	bonus	was	in	line	
with	bonuses	paid	in	trade	and	industry.	A	decline	in	the	bonus	for	the	years	
to	follow	had	to	do	with	the	budget	of	the	health	insurance	companies	who	
rationalized	it	by	arguing	that	the	data	collection	was	most	labour	intensive	at	
the	start	of	the	project.	According	to	the	discussion	on	the	appraisal	we	need	
two	formulas	to	calculate	the	bonus,	one	on	the	quality	level	and	one	on	quality	
improvement	level.	The	quality	improvement	level	can	only	be	calculated	after	
the	first	year.	The	formulas	are:
Bonus	practice	(i)	on	quality	level	(QL)	=	3(2	*	clinical	care	QL	(x)	+	
patient	experience	QL	(y)	+	practice	management	QL	(z))	*	number	of	
patients	in	practice	insured	by	payers
Bonus	practice	(i)	on	quality	improvement	level	(QIL)	=	(2	*	clinical	care	
QIL	(x)	+	patient	experience	QIL	(y))	*	number	of	patients	in	practice	
insured	by	payers
The	exact	bonus	at	baseline	and	in	following	years	is	presented	in	Table	2.	The	
maximum	bonus	in	year	1	is	6.890	Euros	per	1000	patients	(which	is	on	average	
7.500	Euros	for	a	practice	with	2350	patients)	and	in	the	following	years	2.880	
Euros.	Target	users	found	that	formulating	explicit	criteria	for	spending	the	
bonus	was	not	necessary.	Rewarding	good	quality	versus	penalizing	poor	quality	
was	discussed	in	the	panel	as	well,	but	proved	to	be	not	applicable	at	this	stage	
of	the	P4P	program.
Table	2	 Bonus	per	patient	for	the	first	year	and	the	following	years	for	each	domain	and
														quality	(improvement)	level
Baseline bonus for clinical care, practice management and patient experience per patient
1
€ 0.83
€ 0.41
€ 0.41
1
€ 0.25
€ 0.07
€ 0.12
€ 0.03
2
€ 1.33
€ 0.66
€ 0.66
2
€ 0.50
€ 0.14
€ 0.25
€ 0.07
3
€ 1.87
€ 0.94
€ 0.94
3
€ 0.75
€ 0.21
€ 0.30
€ 0.10
4
€ 2.37
€ 1.19
€ 1.19
4
€ 1.00
€ 0.28
€ 0.50
€ 0.14
5
€ 2.95
€ 1.47
€ 1.47
5
€ 1.25
€ 0.35
€ 0.62
€ 0.17
6
€ 3.45
€ 1.72
€ 1.72
6
€ 1.50
€ 0.42
€ 0.75
€ 0.21
Quality score
Quality	level
Quality	level
Quality	level
Quality score
Quality	level
Quality	improvement
Quality	level
Quality	improvement
Clinical	care
Practice	management
Patient	experience
Clinical	care
Patient	experience
Bonus in following years for clinical care and patient experience per patient
0
€ 0
€ 0
€ 0
0
€ 0
€ 0
€ 0
€ 0
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	 Discussion
P4P	proves	to	be	a	complex	innovation	and	knowledge	needs	to	be	acquired	
over	time.10	Assuming	a	greater	probability	of	acceptance	of	P4P	programs	and	
subsequent	quality	improvement,	our	study	contributes	to	this	field	by	describing	
the	design	choices	of	target	users	when	they	themselves	are	involved	in	develop-
ing	a	P4P	program.	We	succeeded	in	involving	the	target	users	in	the	lively	discus-
sions	about	design	options.	They	were	very	much	involved	in	the	discussions	and	
in	the	field	test;	the	response	rate	in	the	panels	was	high.	We	managed	to	reach	
consensus	and	to	define	a	P4P	program	for	primary	care	in	the	Netherlands.
In	line	with	other	P4P	programs	our	target	users	selected	performance	indicators	
for	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experience.	It	was	not	sur-
prising	that	the	chronic	diseases	were	chosen	for	the	program	concerning	the	
attention	for	these	diseases	and	concerning	the	health	care	costs	due	to	these	
diseases.	However,	our	program	seems	to	be	more	balanced	compared	to	other	
programs	with	regard	to	the	position	of	patient	experiences	in	the	program.3,5-7	
GPs	indicated	that	they	wanted	the	patient	to	be	more	central	in	the	program	
because	patient	communication	is	a	core	task.	Nevertheless,	they	wanted	clinical	
care	to	be	weighted	more	heavily	than	patient	experience	to	reduce	the	chance	
of	being	solely	judged	on	patient	experiences.	Here	the	consequences	of	the	
choices	seem	to	overrule	the	principles.
Mostly,	P4P	programs	are	designed	and	implemented	top-down	by	policy	makers	
and	service	managers.13	In	our	study	both	GPs	and	health	insurance	companies	
were	involved	in	the	development	of	the	program.	Interestingly,	the	health	
insurance	representatives	did	not	want	to	discuss	the	content	of	clinical	care	
and	allowed	the	GPs	to	decide	on	this	domain.	In	other	programs	the	payers	had	
a	more	decisive	role	in	the	development	of	a	P4P	program	or	were	not	involved	
in	any	way.	Though	the	effectiveness	of	P4P	programs	is	still	inconclusive,	we	
assume	that	our	approach	enhances	the	commitment	and	motivation	of	general	
practices	and	there	fore	the	impact	of	our	program.
The	target	users	had	a	realistic	estimate	of	the	required	size	of	the	bonus	in	
order	to	achieve	a	quality	stimulus.	According	to	the	target	users	a	bonus	of	on	
average	5% to	10%	of	practice	income	was	considered	to	be	appropriate.	The	
target	users	were	aware	of	the	risk	of	gaming	when	the	incentive	is	too	
high.21,24,25	Our	bonus	is	much	smaller	than	the	incentive	in	the	UK	which	makes	
up	approximately	25%	of	GPs’	income.4
The	target	users	opted	for	relative	P4P	standards.	Until	now,	programs	mainly	
base	their	incentives	on	absolute	performance	standards.1,3,5,6,8,28	An	advantage	
of	relative	standards	is	that	health	insurers	can	remain	within	their	budget.	This	is	
in	contrast	to	the	UK	P4P	program,	for	example.29	Furthermore	quality	scores	
of	all	participating	practices	were	divided	into	seven	levels.	These	series	of	tiered	
thresholds	have	attainable	goals	for	each	practice;	a	known	effective	stimulus	
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for	changing	behaviour.30	According	to	the	target	users	both	quality	level	and	
improvement	of	performance	need	to	be	incentivised.	This	will	stimulate	prac-
tices	with	a	high	performance	as	well	as	practices	with	a	low	performance.1	This	
is	in	contrast	with	other	P4P	programs	in	which	nearly	always	good	performance	
instead	of	improvement	is	rewarded.11
 Strengths	and	limitations	of	the	study
The	strength	of	our	study	lies	in	its	developmental	process,	assuming	a	greater	
probability	of	acceptance	of	the	program	and	subsequent	quality	improvement.	
Involving	the	target	users	resulted	in	good	discussions	and	consensus	about	the	
design	options.	The	field	test	was	performed	successfully	as	part	of	the	proce-
dure.	Many	practices	participated	in	the	field	test	as	well	as	in	the	panels,	which	
resulted	in	a	reasonably	balanced	P4P	program.
This	study	has	some	limitations.	First,	due	to	time	constraints	patients	were	not	
included	in	the	design	of	the	P4P	program.	However,	they	had	been	previously	
involved	in	discussions	about	the	objectives	of	the	Dutch	accreditation	program,	
which	was	part	of	the	initial	framework	of	our	program.	Second,	there	is	a	
drop	in	the	number	of	participants	in	panel	2.	A	possible	explanation	is	that	the	
subjects	we	discussed	in	panel	2	were	more	restricted	and	detailed	and	there-
fore	less	attractive	than	those	in	panel	1.	Third,	practices	could	voluntarily	
register	for	this	experiment,	which	may	have	resulted	in	overrepresentation	of	
early	adopters	of	a	P4P	program.	It	is	important	that	the	early	majority	as	well	as	
later	on	the	late	majority	support	the	P4P	program.	To	involve	them	in	design	
choices	that	are	acceptable	and	applicable	is	still	a	challenge.
 Strengths	and	limitations	of	the	design	choices
A	strength	of	the	design	choices	is	the	involvement	of	the	target	users.	The	
behavioural	change	of	the	P4P	program	is	therefore	grounded	in	extrinsic	(reim-
bursement)	as	well	as	intrinsic	motivation.	To	stimulate	the	motivation	further	
the	feedback	will	be	discussed	within	the	practice	supported	by	a	facilitator.
The	performance	measures	do	not	cover	all	aspects	of	general	practice.	Just	
stimulating	the	incentivised	parts	of	the	performance	can	result	in	a	possible	
decline	in	quality	of	care	of	the	non-incentivised	aspect.31	By	discussing	which	
aspects	will	be	stimulated	in	the	forthcoming	period,	we	assume	that	this	effect	
is	somewhat	lower	in	our	P4P	program.
GPs	have	decided	that	the	outcome	indicators	on	clinical	care	will	not	be	
incentivised,	and	the	health	insurance	companies	agreed.	We	have	to	study	the	
effect	of	this	decision	on	the	outcome	indicators.	By	incentivising	the	process	
indicators	an	indirect	effect	is	expected	on	the	reported	outcome	measures,	
but	that	still	has	to	be	proven.
As	in	other	P4P	programs	the	focus	of	the	clinical	performance	measures	is	on	
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the	chronic	conditions.	Policy	makers	show	a	lot	of	interest	in	the	performance	
on	these	conditions,	resulting	in	several	improvement	projects.	This	might	have	
an	effect	on	our	baselines	measures	in	which	case	the	room	for	improvement	
decreases.	In	our	effect	study	we	will	take	into	account	the	baseline	measures	
to	get	more	insight	into	this	problem.
The	relative	thresholds	might	evoke	calculating	behaviour,	that	is	if	no	one	
improves	the	bonus	will	still	be	dived.	The	question	is	which	practice	will	take	
this	risk.	This	design	choice	introduces	a	prisoner’s	dilemma	with	unclear	results.	
Although,	based	on	the	involvement	of	the	participating	GPs	in	quality	of	care	we	
would	assume	that	in	this	group	the	urge	of	improvement	is	larger.	The	sustain-
ability	of	the	relative	thresholds	can	become	tensed	in	a	broader	probably	less	
involved	group	of	GPs.
The	health	insurance	companies	decided	together	with	the	GPs	on	the	available	
budget	for	the	bonus.	However,	after	the	first	bonus	was	allocated,	the	health	
insurance	companies	started	the	discussion	on	the	bonus	again.	They	suggested	
that	the	data	collection	was	much	easier	in	the	following	year,	and	therefore	the	
bonus	could	be	reduced.	This	led	to	a	lot	of	turbulence	among	the	participating	
GPs.	No	consensus	was	reached,	but	the	practices	were	still	willing	to	partici-
pate.	This	is	a	demonstration	of	the	inequity	in	the	relation	between	payers	and	
GPs	that	is	hard	to	cover	with	a	consensus	procedure.
The	sustainability	of	the	P4P	program	is	also	stressed	if	the	performance	measures	
stay	the	same	each	cycle,	because	the	indicator	scores	increase	due	to	the	P4P	
program	to	a	certain	optimum.	This	phenomenon	has	been	described	with	the	
UK-QOF	data.4	To	prevent	this	effect	it	was	discussed	that	the	P4P	program	will	
need	constant	trimming,	recalibrating	and	balancing	to	ensure	that	the	objectives	
are	being	met	at	the	right	costs	and	without	too	many	unwanted	effects.	This	
means	that	subjects	and/or	indicators	will	be	replaced	with	others	when	perfor-
mance	on	the	subjects	reaches	a	certain	level.	This	will	also	prevent	a	narrow	
focus	on	quality	of	care	in	general	practice.	The	adjustments	of	the	P4P	program	
should	again	be	based	on	discussions	with	the	target	users.
 Conclusions
By	performing	a	procedure	to	involve	target	users	in	designing	a	P4P	program	
for	general	practice,	a	detailed	framework	to	define	design	choices	was	established.	
This	framework	as	well	as	the	insight	into	motives	for	design	choices	of	the	
target	users	can	be	helpful	for	others	who	are	developing	or	evaluating	a	P4P	
program.	The	resulting	design	resembled	the	P4P	programs	from	other	countries,	
but	ours	was	also	in	line	with	target	users’	views	and	assessments	of	relevance	
and	applicability.	As	already	shown	by	the	growing	number	of	voluntary	partici-
pants	during	the	study,	this	may	enhance	general	practitioner’s	commitment	to	
the	program.
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Diabetes
Information from the previous 12 months 
1	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	had	three	times	a	glucose	measurement
2	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	HbA1c
3	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	the	blood	pressure
4	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	total	cholesterol
5	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	use	cholesterol	medication
6	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	serum	creatinine	testing
7	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	with	a	record	of	neuropathy	testing
8	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	retinal	screening	in	the	previous	24	months
9	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	a	fully	completed	risk	profile
COPD
Information from the previous 12 months
1	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	COPD	in	whom	a	spirometry	has	been	done	ever
2	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	COPD	in	whom	a	spirometry	has	been	done	in	the	previous	12	months
3	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	COPD	with	which	there	has	been	contact
4	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	COPD	in	whom	there	is	a	record	of	smoking	status
5	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	COPD	who	smoke,	whose	notes	contain	a	record	that	smoking	cessation	
	 advice	has	been	offered
Asthma
Information from the previous 12 months
1	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	asthma	in	whom	a	spirometry	or	a	peak	flow	measurement	has	been	done		
	 ever
2	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	asthma	with	which	there	has	been	contact
3	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	asthma	in	whom	there	is	a	record	of	smoking	status
4	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	asthma	who	smoke,	and	whose	notes	contain	a	record	that	smoking	
	 cessation	advice	has	been	offered
Cardiovascular risk management
Information from the previous 12 months
1	 The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	whose	notes	have	a	record	of	blood	pressure
2	 The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	whose	notes	have	a	record	of	total	cholesterol	or	cholesterol	ratio
3	 The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	with	statins
4	 The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	whose	notes	record	smoking	status
5	 The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	who	smoke,	and	whose	notes	contain	a	record	that	smoking	cessation	
	 advice	has	been	offered
6	 The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	with	a	fully	completed	risk	profile
7	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	heart	disease	in	anamnesis	who	are	using	anticoagulant	drugs
8	 The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	whose	notes	record	a	glucose	measurement
Influenza vaccination
1	 The	percentage	of	vaccinated	high	risk	patients	in	practice
2	 The	percentage	of	vaccinated	patients	of	65	years	and	older
Cervical cancer screening
1	 Women	from	target	cohort	screening	whose	notes	record	a	cervical	smear
Additional	file	The	indicator	set	of	P4P	program
Clinical  care
Antibiotics
Data from the previous 12 months
1	 Narrow-spectrum	antibiotic	cures	in	relation	to	all	antibiotic	cure	prescriptions
2	 Number	of	antibiotic	prescriptions	per	1000	patients
Practice management 
(answering	scale	yes/no)
Infrastructure 
	 Items
Presence	of	adequate	space	 		2
Accessibility	and	availability	 		3
Presence	of	instruments	for	diagnosis	and	treatment	 11
Presence	of	instruments	for	laboratory	supplies	 		8
Presence	of	first	aid	facilities	 11
Presence	of	emergency	suitcase	with	required	content	 17
Presence	of	material	for	working	hygienic	 		9
Team 
	 Items
Executing	technical	and	diagnostic	tasks	 13
Executing	organisational	en	administrative	tasks	 		9
Executing	tasks	with	regard	to	chronic	diseases	and	prevention	 11
Having	structured	internal	arrangements		 		3
Meetings	within	HAGRO	(general	practitioner’s	group)	 		2
Having	structured	meetings	with	primary	caregivers	 		5
Having	structured	meetings	with	health	care	organisations	 11
Personnel	policy	 		1
Information 
	 Items
Medical	reporting	 		6
Medical	and	non-medical	information	for	patients	 		8
Presence	of	social	map	 		1
Quality and safety 
	 Items
Use	of	quality	system	with	pharmacist	 		1
Working	against	standards	and	protocols	 		2
Quality	policy	 		3
Education	of	practice	employees	 		5
Patient experience 
Patient experience with general practitioner’s functioning from the previous 12 months*
Items
1	 Making	you	feel	s/he	had	time	during	consultations
2	 Interest	in	your	personal	situation
3	 Making	it	easy	for	you	to	tell	him/her	about	your	problems
4	 Involving	you	in	decisions	about	medical	care
5	 Listening	to	you
6	 Keeping	your	records	and	data	confidential
	
7	 Quick	relief	of	your	symptoms
8	 Helping	you	to	feel	well	so	that	you	can	perform	your	normal	daily	activities
9	 Thoroughness
10	 Physical	examination
11	 Offering	you	services	for	preventing	diseases	(e.g.	screening,	health	checks,	immunizations)
12	 Explaining	the	purpose	of	tests	and	treatments
13	 Telling	you	what	you	wanted	to	know	about	your	symptoms	and/or	illness
14	 Help	in	dealing	with	emotional	problems	related	to	your	health	status
15	 Helping	you	understand	the	importance	of	following	his	or	her	advice
16	 Knowing	what	s/he	had	done	or	told	you	during	previous	contacts
*	 5-point	Likert	scale	questions	and	an	option	‘not	applicable’
Patient experience with organisation of care from the previous 12 months*
Items
  1	 Preparing	you	for	what	to	expect	from	specialists	or	hospital	care
  2	 The	helpfulness	of	the	staff	(other	than	the	doctor)
  3	 Getting	an	appointment	to	suit	you
  4	 Getting	through	to	the	practice	by	phone
  5	 Being	able	to	speak	to	the	GP	by	phone
  6	 Waiting	time	in	the	waiting	room
		7	 Providing	quick	services	for	urgent	health	problems
Accessibility in general practice and general practitioner#
		8	 It	is	possible	to	ask	for	a	longer	consultation
		9	 General	practitioner	is	good	accessible	by	phone
10	 Patient	gets	another	general	practitioner	regularly
Procedure for complaints#
11	 The	practice	has	an	accessible	procedure	for	complaints
*	 5-point	Likert	scale	questions	and	an	option	‘not	applicable’
#	 Answering	scale	yes/no
	
Un-incentivised clinical outcome indicators
Diabetes
Information from the previous 12 months 
1	 The	percentage	of	patients	in	whom	the	Hba1c	is	7	or	less
2	 The	percentage	of	patients	in	whom	the	blood	pressure	is	150/85	or	less
3	 The	percentage	of	patients	whose	measured	total	cholesterol	is	5.0	mmol/l	or	less
COPD
Information from the previous 12 months 
1	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	no	exacerbation
Asthma
Information from the previous 12 months 
1	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	no	exacerbation
Cardiovascular risk management
Information from the previous 12 months 
1	 The	percentage	of	patients	in	whom	the	blood	pressure	is	160/90 or	less
2	 The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	with	statins	whose	measured	cholesterol	is	5.0 mmol/l	or	less
50
chapter 2
51
evaluation
of clinical
indicators
Chapter 4
Evaluation	of	clinical
indicators.	Four
reliability	and	validity	
issues
Arna	van	Doorn
Kirsten	Kirschner
Margriet	Bouma
Jako	Burgers
Jozé	Braspenning
Richard	Grol
Huisarts en Wetenschap 2010; 53(3): 141-6
52
chapter 2
53
evaluation
of clinical
indicators 	 Abstract	
Aim	To	describe	four	reliability	and	validity	issues	regarding	the	clinical	indicators	
from	the	Visitation	Instrument	Accreditation	(VIA).	Based	on	this	information,	
practices	needed	to	start	improvement	plans	in	order	to	get	accreditation.	
Method	An	observational	study	based	on	the	medical	records	of	82	practices.	
Results	The	indicators	that	covered	chronic	disease	management	(diabetes,	
COPD,	asthma	and	cardiovascular	risk	management),	prevention	activities	
(influenza	vaccination,	cervical	cancer	screening)	and	antibiotics	policy	were	
correlated	weakly,	suggesting	that	the	instrument	provided	a	rather	broad	scope	
of	the	practice	when	it	comes	to	chronic	disease	management	and	prevention.	
Furthermore,	the	different	subjects	were	each	measured	by	indicators	that	had	
sufficient	coherence,	which	suggested	that	they	measured	a	clear	underlying	
concept.	To	achieve	a	reliable	indicator	score,	data	from	at	least	96	patients	were	
necessary	when	10%	error	is	allowed.	VIA	allows	to	take	a	sample	of	40	patients,	
but	in	that	case	the	error	margin	increases	to	15%.	To	establish	a	reliable	bench-
mark	we	needed	233	practices	when	5%	error	is	allowed.	
Conclusion	The	clinical	indicators	of	the	VIA	are	reliable	and	valid	and	can	be	
used	by	a	general	practice	to	gain	insight	into	their	own	performance	compared	
to	others.	For	practice	policy	on	quality	improvement	an	error	margin	of	10-15%	
around	the	indicator	score	on	practice	level	seems	to	be	acceptable.	We	would	
be	more	comfortable	with	a	smaller	error	margin	in	case	of	accountability	or	a	
‘pay-for-performance’	program.	A	sample	of	40	patients	would	not	do	in	such	
a	case.	Finding	a	balance	between	feasibility	and	justice	therefore	remains	a	
continuous	search.	
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	 Introduction	
Clinical	indicators	are	needed	to	measure	the	quality	of	care	in	order	to	create	
more	transparency	in	healthcare.1	To	achieve	this,	general	practices	use	the	
Visitation	Instrument	Accreditation	(VIA),	whereby	several	sets	of	indicators	
map	the	various	aspects	of	general	practice	care.2	Since	2005,	the	VIA	has	been	
used	for	the	Dutch	National	Accreditation	program	of	the	Dutch	College	of	
General	Practitioners,	which	consists	of	the	following	domains:	clinical	care,	
practice	management	and	patient	experience.	These	indicators	are	used	to	get	
more	insight	into	the	quality	of	care,	and	enable	each	general	practitioner	to	
compare	the	performance	within	their	practice	to	other	practices	(benchmark).	
This	way	of	giving	feedback	offers	general	practitioners	clues	for	improving	the	
quality	of	their	care.	This	type	of	information	is	increasingly	used,	for	instance	
within	the	framework	of	internal	quality	policies,	multidisciplinary	care	groups	
and	public	information.	Because	of	this,	questions	regarding	the	validity	and	
reliability	of	this	information	are	of	notable	importance.	
The	validity	and	reliability	of	the	domains	practice	management	and	patient	
experience	have	been	described	before.3,4	However,	little	is	yet	known	about	
clinical	care.	Even	so,	when	this	set	of	indicators	was	developed,	the	content 
validity	has	been	determined	for	the	individual	indicators,	meaning	that	a	panel	of	
experts	stated	that	the	indicators	are	a	good	reflection	of	clinical	care	and	can	
be	used	to	evaluate	this	domain.2,5	Now	that	data	have	been	collected	with	the	
instrument,	it	is	also	possible	to	examine	other	aspects	of	reliability	and	valid-
ity.6,7	This	research	examines	clinical	indicators	on	the	basis	of	four	reliability	and	
validity	issues.	
Firstly,	the	various	sets	of	indicators	of	the	instrument	should	describe	a	broad	
and	diverse	range	of	clinical	activities,	which	take	place	in	a	general	practice.	This	
means	that	the	sets	of	indicators	should	not	be	too	closely	connected	to	each	
other	(low	correlation	between	the	sets	of	indicators).	Secondly,	it	is	important	
that	there	is	a	certain	amount	of	coherence	between	the	indicators	within	one	
set,	but	the	information	should	not	overlap	too	much	(internal	consistency	
within	a	set).	Thirdly,	the	indicator	score	should	give	an	accurate	picture	of	the	
practice.	This	means	that	data	should	be	collected	from	a	sufficient	number	of	
patients	(reliable	indicator	score).	Fourthly,	in	order	to	give	a	stable	and	correct	
picture,	a	benchmark	should	be	based	on	a	sufficient	number	of	practices.	
Moreover,	the	practices	on	the	basis	of	which	the	benchmark	has	been	deter-
mined,	should	be	representative	of	the	practice	for	which	the	comparison	is	
needed	(adequate	and	reliable	benchmark).	We	studied	the	extent	to	which	the	
domain	clinical	care	of	the	VIA	meets	each	of	these	criteria.	2	
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	 Study	population	and	instrument
We	carried	out	an	observational	study	based	on	the	medical	records	of	82	
practices	that	took	part	in	the	Dutch	National	Accreditation	Program	during	
2005-2006	on	a	voluntary	basis.	The	practices	collected	data	on	three	wide-
spread	chronic	diseases	(diabetes,	asthma	and	COPD),	cardiovascular	risk	
management,	a	number	of	specific	prevention	activities	(influenza	vaccination	
and	cervical	cancer	screening)	and	antibiotics	policy.	The	instrument	consisted	of	
structure	indicators,	process	indicators	and	outcome	indicators.8	We	mostly	
concentrated	on	the	process	indicators	for	the	examination	of	the	criteria,	
because	these	are	the	most	reliable	when	it	comes	to	giving	information	on	the	
quality	of	practice	management	and	care.	
Table	1	shows,	by	way	of	example,	the	nine	process	indicators	that	were	used	for	
diabetes.	We	used	eight	process	indicators	for	cardiovascular	risk	management	
(CVRM),	five	for	COPD,	four	for	asthma,	and	one	indicator	each	for	influenza	
vaccination,	cervical	cancer	screening	and	antibiotics	policy.	We	also	included	
some	outcome	indicators	for	a	number	of	the	calculations,	in	order	to	get	an	
idea	of	this	type	of	information	(with	regard	to	diabetes	three	and	CVRM	two	
indicators).	An	overview	of	all	the	indicators	that	were	included	in	our	study	will	
be	presented	in	Table	6.
Box	1 Accreditation	of	general	practices	of	the	Dutch	College	of	General		
												Practitioners	(NHG-Praktijkaccreditering®)	
Since	2005,	general	practices	have	been	using	the	NHG-Praktijkaccreditering®	(Accreditation	
of	general	practices	of	the	Dutch	College	of	General	Practitioners).	GPs	collect	data	for	their	
accreditation	using	the	Visitation	Instrument	Accreditation	(VIA).	The	VIA	consists	of	quality	
indicators	with	regard	to	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experiences,	and	
measures	the	quality	of	(part	of)	the	activities	carried	out	in	the	general	practice.	Data	have	
been	extracted	from	medical	files	and	questionnaires.	In	addition,	observations	have	been	made	
by	a	consultant	of	NPA	Ltd,	the	organisation	that	carries	out	the	independent	review	on	behalf	
of	the	quality	mark	NHG-Praktijkaccreditering®.	On	the	basis	of	the	incorporated	data	the	
practice	is	able	to	compare	itself	to	other	practices,	and	will	consequently	be	able	to	draw	up	
plans	for	improvement.	Accreditation	of	the	practice	is	done	on	the	basis	of	these	plans	for	
improvement	and	on	their	subsequent	results,	provided	that	certain	conditions	(minimum	
requirements)	have	been	met.	This	will	be	checked	by	the	accreditation	officer	at	the	NPA	
during	an	audit.	Data	will	be	collected	using	the	VIA	in	the	first	year.	In	the	following	two	years	
another	audit	of	the	practice	will	take	place,	in	which	the	accreditation	officer	will	check	
whether	the	practice	has	achieved	the	results	aimed	at,	whether	the	plans	for	improvement	for	
the	upcoming	year	will	meet	the	requirements	and	whether	the	minimum	requirements	for	
that	particular	year	have	been	met.	The	cycle	will	repeat	itself	after	three	years.
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Table	1	 Process	indicators	within	the	subject	diabetes														
Indicator Description (information from the previous 12 months)
1	 The	percentage	of	diabetes	patients	with	a	fully	completed	high	risk	profile
2	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	had	three	times	a	glucose	
	 measurement
3	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	HbA1c
4	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	the	blood	pressure
5	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	total	cholesterol
6	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	serum	creatinine	
	 testing
7	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	retinal	screening	in	
	 the	previous	24	months
8	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	with	a	record	of	neuropathy	testing
9	 The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	use	cholesterol	medication
	 Data	collection
The	data	required	were	collected	by	a	staff	member	of	the	general	practice.	The	
medical	file	constituted	the	source	of	the	data.	However,	it	was	often	not	easy	
to	extract	data	from	the	electronic	medical	records	(EMR);	for	one	thing	because	
the	required	software	was	not	available,	but	also	because	data	had	not	been	
registered	in	a	uniform	way.	This	led	to	the	practices	being	offered	the	choice	
to	collect	data	from	a	sample	survey	of	40	patients.	If	the	total	number	of	
patients	with	the	disorder	concerned	did	not	exceed	40,	the	practices	were	
then	requested	to	collect	details	of	all	the	patients.	The	VIA	requested	details	to	
be	collected	only	for	that	part	of	the	patient	group	that	is	treated	by	the	GP.	
However,	reports	were	often	made	on	all	patients	with	the	disorder	concerned.	
With	regards	to	the	antibiotics	policy	data,	our	advice	was	to	contact	the	
preferential	pharmacist.	The	data	collection	could	refer	to	just	one	GP,	or	to	
more	GPs	if	they	shared	the	patient	population.	Of	the	82	practices,	we	included	
a	total	of	97	patient	populations;	we	had	details	on	all	subjects	of	every	popula-
tion.		
 Analysis
In	order	to	find	out	whether	the	practices	in	our	study	were	representative	of	
all	Dutch	practices,	we	compared	our	study	population	to	the	Dutch	general	
practices	concerning	type	of	practice,	degree	of	urbanization	and	to	what	extent	
practices	had	a	dispensary	as	well.	Moreover,	we	looked	at	the	number	of	
patients	per	FTE	GP.
In	order	to	check	whether	the	subjects	of	clinical	care	from	the	VIA	differed	
enough	from	each	other,	we	determined	the	level	of	correlation	between	the	
various	subjects	(criterion	1)	using	Pearson’s	correlation	coefficient.	To	assess	
the	internal	consistency	(criterion	2)	we	determined	the	correlation	between	
the	various	indicators	of	one	subject	by	using	Cronbach’s	α.9	A	Cronbach’s	α	
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indicators between	0.7	and	0.8	is	advisable,	although	an	α	higher	than	0.6	is	also	considered	
to	be	acceptable	for	these	types	of	indicators.10	Per	indicator	we	calculated	for	
each	patient	population	the	number	of	patients	needed	in	order	to	achieve	a	
reliable	score	(criterion	3).	This	calculation	was	based	on	the	indicator	score	we	
found.	We	kept	to	a	level	of	significance	of	95%	and	tested	for	an	error	margin	
of	both	5%	and	10%.	Per	indicator	we	then	calculated	the	maximum,	the	75th	
percentile	score,	the	mean	and	the	standard	deviation	of	the	numbers	found,	in	
order	to	get	a	clear	picture	of	the	scores	and	the	level	of	dispersion.	We	also	
used	a	power	calculation	to	estimate	the	number	of	patient	populations	needed	
to	get	a	reliable	benchmark	(criterion	4).11	For	this	we	kept	to	a	level	of	signifi-
cance	of	95%	and	tested	again	for	an	error	margin	of	both	5%	and	10%.	
	 Results
	 Study	population
Most	characteristics	of	the	general	practices	in	our	study	reasonably	correspond	
to	the	characteristics	of	the	Dutch	general	practices	(Table	2).	Yet	there	seem	to	
be	relatively	fewer	solo	practices	in	our	study.	Also,	the	number	of	patients	per	
FTE	GP	is	higher	in	our	study	population	than	the	national	number	of	residents	
per	fulltime	equivalent	(FTE)	GP.	
Table	2	 Practice	characteristics	of	the	study	population	in	comparison	with	all	Dutch
														practices	(2008)
Type of practice
Solo	practice
Duo	practice
Group	practice	or	health	centre
HOED
Other	type	of	practice
Degree of urbanization†
Very	strong/strong	urbanization
Moderate/little	urbanization
No	urbanization
Having a dispensary
Yes
No
Number	of	patients	per	FTE	GP
Number	of	inhabitants	per	FTE	GP					
Study	population	NHG	-	Accreditation
of	GP	Practices*	n	=	82	practices
All	Dutch	general	practices*
n	=	4,235	practices
				%
				42.3
				31.5
				26.1
				_
				_
				46.7
				41.1
				12.2
						7.3
				92.7
2322
    n
				18
				18
				24
				15
						7
				33
				38
				11
						3
				79
2444
%
22.0
22.0
29.3
18.3
		8.5
40.2
46.3
13.4
		3.7
96.3
*	 Data	provided	by	NIVEL,	1-1-200812;		† 	Very	strong/strong	urbanization	>1.500	addresses	per	km2;	moderate/little	urbanization	=	500-1.500 
addresses	per	km2;	no	urbanization	<500	addresses	per	km2
HOED:	Construction	where	multiple	GPs	have	their	separate	practices	under	one	roof
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 Criterion	1:	low	correlation	between	the	indicator	sets
There	were	no	strong	correlations	found	between	the	various	subjects	which	
were	dealt	with	within	clinical	care	(Table	3).	The	subject	of	antibiotics	did	
not	show	coherence	with	any	of	the	other	subjects.	Although	cervical	cancer	
screening	turned	out	to	be	slightly	cohered	to	cardiovascular	risk	management,	
this	correlation	was	rather	weak.	Of	the	other	five	subjects,	asthma	showed	the	
strongest	coherence	with	the	other	subjects	(diabetes,	COPD,	cardiovascular	
risk	management	and	influenza	vaccination).	Furthermore,	we	noticed	a	slight	
correlation	between	diabetes	and	both	cardiovascular	risk	management	and	
influenza	vaccination.
	 Criterion	2:	internal	consistency	of	the	indicator	sets
Table	4	shows	the	average	scores	on	the	indicators	for	each	subject,	the	stan-
dard	deviation	and	the	internal	consistency	of	the	indicators	for	each	subject	
(Cronbach’s	α).	The	nine	process	indicators	which	relate	to	diabetes	proved	to	
have	the	highest	internal	consistency.	These	indicators	had	a	Cronbach’s	α	of	
0.73.	This	score	can	vary	between	0	and	1,	whereby	0	stands	for	no	intercorrela-
tion	at	all	and	1	for	a	perfect	intercorrelation.	When	a	score	is	almost	0.9	or	
higher,	the	internal	consistency	is	so	strong	that	there	is	an	overlap	in	the	
information	provided	by	the	indicators.	An	option	then	would	be	to	leave	out	
indicators.	Scores	closer	to	0	suggest	that	the	indicators	deal	with	different	
subjects,	which	means	that	the	indicators	ought	not	to	be	taken	together.	The	
eight	process	indicators	relating	to	cardiovascular	risk	management	had	a	reason	-
ably	strong	internal	consistency,	just	as	the	five	indicators	relating	to	COPD	(α 
=	0.64	and	α	=	0.67	respectively).	The	internal	consistency	of	the	four	asthma	
indicators	proved	to	be	slightly	less	strong	(α	=	0.56).	Describing	the	internal	
consistency	using	Cronbach’s	α	is	only	possible	for	subjects	with	more	than	one	
indicator.	
Table	3	 Correlation	between	the	subjects	within	clinical	care,	expressed	through	Pearson’s
															correlation	coefficient	of	the	means
Diabetes			COPD			Asthma			CVRM			Influenza	 Cervical	cancer			Antibiotics
	 	 	 	 vaccination	 screening
X	 0.15	 0.31*	 0.43*	 0,29*	 		0.19	 -0.10
	 X	 0.40*	 0.09	 0.20	 -0.13	 		0.12
	 	 X	 0.48*	 0.30*	 		0.16	 		0.06
	 	 	 X	 0.08	 		0.27*	 		0.19
	 	 	 	 X	 		0.17	 		0.17
	 	 	 	 	 		X	 -0.07
	 	 	 	 	 	 		X
*	 Significant	correlation,	p	<0.01;	CVRM:	cardiovascular	risk	management
Diabetes
COPD
Asthma
CVRM
Influenza	vaccination
Cervical	cancer	screening
Antibiotics
	 Criterion	3:	reliable	indicator	scores	per	patient	population
Using	the	resulting	indicator	scores,	we	calculated	for	each	patient	population	
per	indicator	the	number	of	patients	needed.	Table	5	lists	the	minimum	number	
of	patients	needed	per	subject.	When	subjects	consisted	of	more	than	one	
indicator	we	made	our	calculation	for	each	indicator	separately;	Table	5	lists	the	
lowest	and	the	highest	number	of	patients	needed	for	each	subject.	Looking	at	
the	achieved	indicator	scores,	the	nine	diabetes	process	indicators	needed	at	
least	363	and	at	most	384	patients	to	calculate	a	reliable	score,	with	an	error	
margin	of	5%.	At	least	384	patients	are	needed	for	almost	all	subjects.	An	error	
margin	of	10%	means	that	we	would	need	to	assess	96	patients	to	achieve	a	
reliable	score.	The	average	population	size	of	the	participating	practices	was	
3,917	patients.	This	means	that	we	can	only	calculate	reliable	indicator	scores	
(with	an	error	margin	of	10%)	for	disorders	with	a	minimal	prevalence	of	2.4%.	
This	is	the	case	for	diabetes,	asthma	and	cardiovascular	risk	management	(RIVM	
site).	The	prevalence	of	COPD	is	just	below	2.4%.	There	is	a	possibility	not	all	
patients	are	registered	in	general	practices,	which	means	that	through	an	
improved	registration	we	will	also	be	able	to	include	enough	patients	for	COPD,	
to	achieve	reliable	indicator	scores.	
Table	4	 Internal	consistency	within	each	subject,	expressed	through	Cronbach’s	α (n	=	97)
Number	of	indicators	 Cronbach’s	α	 Mean	in	%	 SD	in	%
9	 0.73	 72.4	 11.2
5	 0.67	 63.1	 15.4
4	 0.56	 49.3	 17.1
8	 0.64	 49.6	 11.4
1	 –	 85.6	 		8.4
1	 –	 67.6	 16.5
1	 –	 14.3	 11.5
SD:	standard	deviation;	CVRM:	cardiovascular	risk	management
Subject
Diabetes
COPD
Asthma
CVRM
Influenza	vaccination
Cervical	cancer	screening
Antibiotics
Table	5	 Number	of	patients	needed	and	number	of	patient	populations	needed	for
														benchmark,	highest	and	lowest	number	for	each	subject
Number	of	patients	needed	for	each	 Number	of	populations	needed	for
indicator	 	 benchmark
Error margin 5% Error margin 10% Error margin 5% Error margin 10%
				363-384	 				91-96	 						8-233	 						2-58
				272-384	 				68-96	 						4-35	 						1-9
				384-384	 				96-96	 				46-146	 				11-37
				384-384	 				96-96	 				64-175	 				16-44
				384-384	 				96-96	 				28-161	 						7-40
				384-384	 				96-96	 				39-46	 				10-11
				372	 				93	 				11	 						3
				384	 				96	 				42	 				10
				383	 				96	 				20	 						5
p	=	process	indicators,	u	=	result	indicators;	CVRM:	cardiovascular	risk	management
Subject	(number)
Diabetes	(p,	9)
Diabetes	(u,	3)
COPD	(5)
Asthma	(4)
CVRM	(p,	8)
CVRM	(u,	2)
Influenza	vaccination	(1)
Cervical	cancer	screening	(1)
Antibiotics	(1)
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	 Criterion	4:	reliable	benchmark
The	number	of	patient	populations	needed	to	calculate	a	reliable	benchmark	
depends	on	the	dispersion	of	the	various	scores	on	the	indicator	concerned.	The	
standard	deviation	per	indicator	varied	between	5.1	for	the	diabetes	outcome	
indicator	‘percentage	of	diabetes	patients	with	an	HbA1C	above	8.5’	and	39.0	for	
the	diabetes	process	indicator	‘percentage	of	patients	with	a	fully	completed	
high	risk	profile.’	Due	to	the	fact	that	there	is	a	strong	dispersion	between	the	
various	indicators,	there	are	also	large	differences	in	the	number	of	patient	
populations	needed	per	indicator.	For	instance,	the	minimum	number	of	patient	
populations	needed	for	the	diabetes	indicators	varies	between	8	and	233	with	an	
error	margin	of	5%	(Table	5).	To	calculate	a	reliable	benchmark	for	all	indicators,	
233	patient	populations	are	needed	when	we	use	an	error	margin	of	5%	and	58	
populations	when	we	use	an	error	margin	of	10%.	The	current	benchmark	figures	
which	are	given	to	the	VIA	as	reference	material	have	been	based	on	259	popula-
tions,	which	is	more	than	sufficient	for	this	study	population	to	maintain	a	
maximum	error	margin	of	5%.	
Table	6	 Overview	of	all	indicators
Subject 
Diabetes
process	indicators
outcome	indicators	
COPD
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
2
3
1
2
3
4
5
Description (information from the previous 12 months)
The	percentage	of	diabetes	patients	with	a	fully	completed	high	risk	profile
The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	had	three	times	a	glucose	
measurement
The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	HbA1c
The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	the	blood	
pressure
The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	total	
cholesterol
The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	serum	
creatinine	testing
The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	have	a	record	of	retinal	
screening	in	the	previous	24	months
The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	with	a	record	of	neuropathy	testing
The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	who	use	cholesterol	medication
The	percentage	of	patients	with	diabetes	in	whom	the	Hba1c	is	8.5 or	more
The	percentage	of	patients	in	whom	the	blood	pressure	is	150/85	or	less
The	percentage	of	patients	whose	measured	total	cholesterol	is	5.0	mmol/l	
or	less
The	percentage	of	patients	with	COPD	in	whom	a	spirometry	has	been	
done	ever
The	percentage	of	patients	with	COPD	in	whom	a	spirometry	has	been	
done	in	the	previous	12	months
The	percentage	of	patients	with	COPD	with	which	there	has	been	contact
The	percentage	of	patients	with	COPD	in	whom	there	is	a	record	of	
smoking	status
The	percentage	of	patients	with	COPD	who	smoke,	whose	notes	contain	a	
record	that	smoking	cessation	advice	has	been	offered
	 Discussion
The	results	show	that	clinical	care,	being	part	of	the	VIA,	paints	a	relatively	broad	
and	diverse	picture	of	general	practice	care.	The	correlations	between	the	
subjects	that	have	been	included	therein	are	relatively	weak.	The	correlations	we	
did	find	can	be	explained	by	the	overlap	between	the	various	groups.	For	example,	
a	patient	who	had	been	included	in	the	indicators	concerning	cardiovascular	risk	
management	could	also	suffer	from	diabetes.	Such	a	patient	would	therefore	also	
qualify	for	an	influenza	vaccination.	More	subjects	can	be	added	to	the	instrument	
in	the	future,	making	the	evaluation	more	complete	and	covering	the	field	of	
general	practice	care	in	a	broader	way.	The	subjects	that	are	discussed	in	the	
present	version	are	assessed	by	means	of	a	set	of	indicators,	which	show	a	reason-
able	internal	consistency.	The	exception	was	the	Cronbach’s	α	score	relating	
Asthma
CVRM
process	indicators
outcome	indicators
Influenza	
vaccination
Cervical	cancer	
screening
Antibiotics
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
2
1
1
1
The	percentage	of	patients	with	asthma	in	whom	a	spirometry	or	a	peakflow	
measurement	has	been	done	ever
The	percentage	of	patients	with	asthma	with	which	there	has	been	contact
The	percentage	of	patients	with	asthma	in	whom	there	is	a	record	of	
smoking	status
The	percentage	of	patients	with	asthma	who	smoke,	and	whose	notes	
contain	a	record	that	smoking	cessation	advice	has	been	offered
The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	whose	notes	have	a	record	of	blood	
pressure
The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	whose	notes	have	a	record	of	total	
cholesterol	or	cholesterol	ratio
The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	with	statins
The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	whose	notes	record	smoking	status
The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	who	smoke,	and	whose	notes	contain		
a	record	that	smoking	cessation	advice	has	been	offered
The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	with	a	fully	completed	risk	profile
The	percentage	of	patients	with	heart	disease	in	anamnesis	who	are	using	
anticoagulant	drugs
The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	whose	notes	record	a	glucose	
measurement
The	percentage	of	patients	with	CVRM	in	whom	the	blood	pressure	is	
160/90 or	less
The	percentage	of	high	risk	patients	with	statins	whose	measured		
cholesterol	is	5.0	mmol/l	or	less
Percentage	of	vaccinated	high	risk	patients	in	the	practice	or	percentage	of	
vaccinated	patients	of	65	years	and	older*
Percentage	of	women	from	the	target	cohort	whose	notes	record	a	cervical	
smear
Percentage	of	narrow-spectrum	antibiotic	cures	in	relation	to	all	antibiotic	
cure	prescriptions
*	We	decided	to	use	the	highest	value	of	these	two	indicators	to	serve	as	indicator	score	
for	this	item,	because	practices	were	often	not	able	to	fill	in	both	indicators
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to	asthma,	which	showed	a	rather	low	coherence.	A	possible	explanation	for	a	
lower	coherence	between	asthma	indicators	is	the	fact	that	the	checkup	policy	
is	maintained	on	a	less	stricter	basis	for	asthma,	especially	when	the	patient	is	on	
little	or	no	medication.	A	reasonable	to	good	coherence	between	indicators	
serves	as	an	indication	that	we	are	measuring	one	underlying	concept.	Often	the	
same	maximum	number	of	patients	needed	emerged	with	the	various	indicators	
with	respect	to	establishing	reliable	scores.	The	reason	for	this	was	that	with	
almost	all	indicators	at	least	one	patient	population	had	a	score	of	50%;	with	this	
score	the	largest	number	of	patients	is	statistically	needed	for	a	reliable	score.	
The	number	of	patients	needed	decreases	the	closer	a	score	gets	to	0%	or	100%.	
The	reliability	of	the	scores	is	also	dependent	on	the	reliability	of	the	data	on	
the	basis	of	which	these	scores	have	been	calculated.	The	scores	will	never	be	
reliable	when	the	data	have	not	been	collected	in	a	reliable	way,	for	instance	
because	of	problems	with	the	data	collection.	Uniform	reporting	is	therefore	of	
the	utmost	importance.	Moreover,	the	data	that	will	be	included	or	excluded	
should	be	determined	in	advance.
The	question	of	how	many	patients	are	needed	to	arrive	at	a	reliable	score	and	
which	level	of	error	would	be	acceptable,	depends	to	a	large	extent	on	the	
purpose	of	the	measurement.	The	score	does	not	have	to	be	accurate	to	one	
percent	in	order	to	give	a	good	picture	of	possible	points	for	improvement	if	it	is	
used	for	internal	quality	improvements	only.	Drawing	a	line	with	respect	to	this	
is	rather	arbitrary	and	partly	determined	by	feasibility	factors.	A	general	practice	
only	has	a	limited	number	of	patients	with	a	certain	condition.	There	is	also	a	
limit	to	the	time	investment	by	the	general	practitioner.	The	sample	survey	of	40	
patients	which	is	permitted	at	the	moment	by	the	VIA	is	reliable	as	long	as	an	
error	margin	of	15%	is	accepted.	In	the	absence	of	large	amounts	of	data,	these	
scores	could	indeed	be	used	as	a	reasonable	indication	for	internal	quality	
improvement.	Stricter	demands	are	put	upon	the	instrument	when	it	should	be	
able	to	differentiate	between	practice	scores	or	when	it	should	report	scores	
more	accurately.	If	the	instrument	is	used	to	distinguish	between	practices,	for	
instance	as	part	of	a	pay-for-performance-system,	larger	numbers	of	patients	will	
have	to	be	included.	An	error	margin	of	5%	or	less	is	advisable	for	this	purpose,	
which	means	a	distinction	can	only	be	made	on	the	level	of	the	care	group	or	
between	larger	practices.	
In	our	study	we	did	not	calculate	indicator	scores	on	a	practice	level,	but	on	the	
level	of	the	patient	population.	In	most	cases	a	practice	contained	only	one	
population.	When	practices	supply	data	for	several	populations,	these	data	can	
be	taken	together	in	order	to	give	a	better	picture	of	the	practice	as	a	whole.	
When	interpreting	data	it	should	be	taken	into	consideration	that	the	division	
between	‘reliable’	and	‘not	reliable’	is	not	as	clear	as	it	might	seem.	Even	if,	on	
the	basis	of	the	number	of	patients	included,	the	conclusion	is	that	an	indicator	
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indicators score	is	not	reliable,	such	a	score	could	still	give	a	reasonably	good	picture	of	the	
practice.	However,	we	are	not	95%	sure	that	the	score	is	indeed	representative,	
meaning	that	care	must	be	taken	when	conclusions	are	drawn	on	the	basis	of	
the	scores	found.	The	number	of	patients	or	patient	populations	needed	will	
decrease	by	raising	the	error	margin	to	15%.	Depending	on	the	purpose,	the	error	
margin	chosen	and	the	number	of	patients	included	can	be	varied	upon	in	order	
to	arrive	at	a	score	which	is	as	reliable	as	possible.	
Our	study	shows	that	clinical	care,	being	part	of	the	VIA,	is	reliable	and	valid	with	
regard	to	the	four	criteria	studied.	However,	it	is	important	in	this	respect	to	
take	an	acceptable	error	margin	into	account	when	interpreting	data.	Uniform	
reporting	is	of	the	utmost	importance	to	improve	the	reliability	of	the	data	
collection.	It	has	proved	itself	to	be	a	valuable	instrument	for	the	GP	to	get	more	
insight	into	his	own	way	of	acting,	compared	with	national	reference	figures.	On	
the	basis	of	this	instrument,	GPs	can	formulate	plans	to	improve	the	quality	of	
clinical	care.	The	instrument	can	also	be	useful	when	looking	at	the	quality	of	
clinical	care	on	a	national	scale.	However,	the	number	of	patients	on	whom	data	
should	be	collected	would	then	need	to	be	larger	than	for	use	of	the	instrument	
within	the	practice,	due	to	the	higher	demands	on	reliability.	
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Background	 Evidence	for	pay-for-performance	(P4P)	has	been	searched	for	in	
the	last	decade	as	financial	incentives	increased	to	influence	behaviour	of	health	
care	professionals	to	improve	quality	of	care.	The	effectiveness	of	P4P	is	incon-
clusive,	though	some	reviews	reported	significant	effects.
Objective	To	assess	changes	in	performance	after	introducing	a	participatory	
P4P	program.
Design	An	observational	study	with	a	pre-	and	post-measurement.
Setting	and	subjects	 Sixty-five	general	practices	in	the	south	of	the	Nether-
lands.
Intervention	A	P4P	program	designed	by	target	users	containing	indicators	for	
chronic	care,	prevention,	practice	management	and	patient	experience	(general	
practitioner’s	[GP]	functioning	and	organisation	of	care).	Quality	indicators	were	
calculated	for	each	practice.	A	bonus	with	a	maximum	of	6890	Euros	per	1000	
patients	was	determined	by	comparing	practice	performance	with	a	benchmark.
Main	outcome	measures	 Quality	indicators	for	clinical	care	(process	and	
outcome)	and	patient	experience.
Results	We	included	60	practices.	After	1	year,	significant	improvement	was	
shown	for	the	process	indicators	for	all	chronic	conditions	ranging	from	+7.9%	
improvement	for	cardiovascular	risk	management	to	+11.5%	for	asthma.	Five	
outcome	indicators	significantly	improved	as	well	as	patients’	experiences	with	
GP’s	functioning	and	organisation	of	care.	No	significant	improvements	were	
seen	for	influenza	vaccination	rate	and	the	cervical	cancer	screening	uptake.	The	
clinical	process	and	outcome	indicators,	as	well	as	patient	experience	indicators	
were	affected	by	baseline	measures.	Smaller	practices	showed	more	improve-
ment.
Conclusions	A	participatory	P4P	program	might	stimulate	quality	improvement	
in	clinical	care	and	improve	patient	experiences	with	GP’s	functioning	and	the	
organisation	of	care.
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	 Introduction
The	effectiveness	of	pay-for-performance	(P4P)	programs	is	still	inconclusive,1,2	
despite	the	proliferation	of	these	programs.	Reviews	give	some	suggestions	for	
possible	successful	elements.1,3	One	of	these	might	be	the	thorough	and	direct	
involvement	of	target	users	throughout	development,	implementation	and	
evaluation	phases.4	In	four	studies	that	involved	target	users,	three	different	P4P	
programs	were	evaluated	by	using	3-11	clinical	indicators,	reporting	an	average	
improvement	of	20%	over	3-5	years.5-8	The	studies	mentioned	no	details	of	the	
decision	process	concerning	the	design	choices	of	the	P4P	program	in	terms	
of	performance	measures,	appraisal	and	reimbursement.	To	contribute	to	the	
knowledge	of	the	effectiveness	of	P4P	programs	involving	target	users,	we	
initiated	an	experiment.	General	practitioners	(GPs)	and	deputies	from	two	
financing	health	insurance	companies	were	invited	to	reach	consensus	on	the	
design	choices	of	a	P4P	model	based	on	a	summary	of	available	literature	on	the	
effectiveness	of	P4P	programs.9	The	target	users	took	into	account	five	out	of	
the	seven	lessons	from	behavioural	economics	that	might	enhance	the	effective-
ness	of	P4P	programs.10	First,	to	enhance	the	psychological	motivation	by	
introducing	smaller	and	more	frequent	incentives	instead	of	a	large	single	lump-
sum	incentive,11	performance	on	clinical	indicators	and	on	practice	management	
and	patient	experience	were	rewarded	separately.	Second,	a	series	of	tiered	
thresholds	was	introduced	to	have	attainable	goals	for	each	practice.12	Third,	the	
payment	was	realized	in	relatively	short	time,	4	months	after	the	data	collection,	
to	highlight	the	value	of	the	money	(hyperbolic	discounting).13	Fourth,	the	
payment	was	disconnected	from	usual	reimbursement	to	get	a	more	effective	
mental	accounting	of	the	incentive.14	Fifth,	as	objectives	and	services	may	be	
a	stronger	driver	for	behavioural	change	than	money,	these	types	of	incentives	
were	considered.14	The	two	other	lessons	from	behavioural	economics	were	
discussed,	but	target	users	chose	different	options.	A	bonus	was	chosen	instead	
of	a	possible	more	effective	withhold,	but	in	behavioural	economics	itself,	it	is	
unclear	if	the	stimulus	of	the	withhold	outweighs	the	negative	psychological	
reaction	to	unfairness.15	Furthermore,	relative	instead	of	absolute	thresholds	
were	chosen	although	these	might	provoke	uncertainty	and	complexity	that	can	
negatively	influence	the	effectiveness	of	a	P4P	program.10,16	The	design	choices	
are	described	in	Box	1.
After	the	design	was	completed,	the	P4P	program	was	implemented	in	the	
general	practices.	During	the	implementation	phase,	intensive	contact	with	the	
target	users	was	continued	to	evaluate	facilitators	and	barriers	of	the	program.	
In	this	paper,	we	describe	the	influence	of	the	participatory	P4P	program	on	
clinical	indicators	as	well	as	on	patient	experience.	In	an	observational	study,	we	
compared	baseline	measurement	with	performance	after	1	year.	In	addition,	we	
examined	whether	the	change	in	performance	differed	between	different	types	
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program of	practices.17-19	In	the	UK,	group	practices	delivered	higher	Quality	and	Out-
come	Framework	(QOF)	scores.17	Furthermore,	Ashworth	et	al.	found	smaller	
practices	more	likely	to	be	‘poor	performers’,18	but	better	in	access	to	care.19	
Preventive	care	proved	to	be	worse	in	practices	located	in	areas	with	lower	
socioeconomic	status.18	We	expect	these	factors	to	be	of	influence	on	quality	
improvement	and	will	explore	their	impact.
	 Methods
	 Study	design	and	population
An	observational	study	with	a	pre-	and	post-measurement	was	conducted	in	a	
group	of	general	practices	in	the	south	of	the	Netherlands,	which	also	partici-
pated	in	deciding	on	the	design	of	the	P4P	program.
 Intervention
The	general	practices	participated	in	designing	the	P4P	program,	see	Box	1,19	
and	its	implementation.	In	the	program,	the	participating	general	practices	had	
to	collect	data	for	a	set	of	quality	indicators	that	described	their	performance	
in	the	past	year	in	the	areas	of	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	
experience.	The	indicators	were	systematically	developed	based	on	evidence-
based	guidelines	and	international	literature.	Clinical	data	were	collected	for	
diabetes,	chronic	obstructive	pulmonary	disease	(COPD),	asthma,	cardiovascular	
risk	management,	influenza	vaccinations	and	cervical	cancer	screening	by	
Box	1	 Design	choices	of	the	participatory	P4P	program
Performance measurement
•	 Data	collection	for	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experience
	 –	 Clinical	care:	diabetes	(n	=	9	indicators),	COPD	(n	=	5	indicators),	asthma	(n	=	4	indicators),	cardio-
	 	 vascular	risk	management	(n	=	8	indicators),	influenza	vaccination	(n	=	2	indicators),	cervical	cancer	
	 	 screening	(n	=	1	indicator)
	 –	 Practice	management	(n	=	4	indicators):	infrastructure	(n	=	7	items),	team	(n	=	8	items),	information	
	 	 (n	=	3	items),	quality	and	safety	(n	=	4	items)
	 –	 Patient	experience	(n	=	2	indicators):	experience	with	general	practitioner	(n	=	16	items)	and	
	 	 organisation	of	care	(n	=	11	items)
Appraisal
	 –	 Separate	appraisal	of	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experience,	weighting	the	
	 	 domains	as	2:1:1
	 –	 A	benchmark	with	relative	standards	was	set	at	the	25th	percentile	of	group	performance	
	 –	 For	the	appraisal	a	series	of	tiered	thresholds	was	used	(7	levels)
	 –	 Practices	received	short-term	feedback	(4	months	after	data	collection)
	 –	 Both	quality	level	and	the	improvement	of	performance	were	valued,	with	these	levels	weighted	as	3:1
Reimbursement
	 –	 A	bonus	of	5%	to	10%	of	the	practice	income,	not	linked	to	the	usual	reimbursement
	 –	 Bonus	was	paid	in	money,	and	not	in	goods	or	services	
	 –	 Bonus	to	spend	freely
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extracting	data	from	electronic	medical	records.	If	routine	extraction	was	not	
possible,	general	practices	could	take	a	random	sample	of	40	patients	for	each	
chronic	condition.	Reports	from	secondary	databases	could	be	used	for	infor-
mation	on	influenza	vaccination	and	cervical	cancer	screening.	Practice	manage-
ment	data	were	collected	through	questionnaires	filled	in	by	the	practice	
manager.	These	data	were	checked	by	an	independent	consultant	as	part	of	the	
Visitation	Instrument	to	assess	practice	management.20	
To	assess	patient	experiences	of	organisation	of	care,	each	practice	had	to	
distribute	40	questionnaires	randomly.	To	assess	patient	experiences	of	the	
GP’s	functioning,	each	individual	GP	had	to	distribute	40	questionnaires	as	well.	
The	participants	were	given	3	months	to	collect	their	data.	Based	on	these	data,	
the	research	team	calculated	quality	indicators	for	each	practice.	The	general	
practices	received	feedback	and	were	given	the	opportunity	to	respond	to	the	
feedback.	Four	months	after	submitting	the	data,	the	practices	received	a	bonus	
according	to	their	performance,	based	on	comparing	their	quality	indicator	
scores	of	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experience	separately	
with	the	relative	thresholds,	that	is	the	25th	percentile	of	the	average	indicator	
scores	of	all	the	participants.	For	clinical	care	only	the	process	indicators	were	
incentivised.	
The	quality	scores	for	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experience	
were	divided	into	seven	levels	(tiered	thresholds).	A	practice	with	a	quality	
score	in	the	lowest	group	did	not	receive	a	bonus.	The	payment	was	paid	per	
patient	and	grew	proportionally	for	each	extra	level,	see	Table	1.	The	maximum	
bonus	was	about	5% to	10%	of	the	practice	income,	that	is,	about	6890	Euros	per	
1000	patients.
	 Variables	and	measurements
Clinical	process	indicators	were	calculated	for	diabetes	(n =	9),	COPD	(n =	5),	
asthma	(n =	4),	cardiovascular	risk	management	(n =	8),	influenza	vaccination	
(n =	2)	and	cervical	cancer	screening	(n =	1).	Clinical	outcome	indicators	were	
collected	for	diabetes	(n =	3),	COPD	(n =	1),	asthma	(n =	1)	and	cardiovascular	
risk	management	(n =	2).	The	indicators	were	calculated	by	dividing	the	nomina-
tor	(frequency	of	recommended	process	per	patient)	by	the	denominator	
(number	of	target	patients)	and	were	expressed	in	a	percentage	between	0	and	
Table	1	 Bonus	for	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experience	
														per	1000 patients
1
€ 830
€ 410
€ 410
2
€ 1330
€   660
€   660
3
€ 1870
€   940
€   940
4
€ 2370
€ 1190
€ 1190
5
€ 2950
€ 1470
€ 1470
6
€ 3450
€ 1720
€ 1720
Quality score
Quality	level
Quality	level
Quality	level
Clinical	care
Practice	organisation
Patient	experience
0
€ 0
€ 0
€ 0
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program 100.	The	dichotomous	practice	management	scores	were	summarized	at	prac-
tice	level	and	presented	as	percentages	of	the	total	maximum	possible	score.21	
Patient	experience	was	measured	with	the	internationally	validated	EUROPEP	
instrument22	and	evaluated	the	GP	(16	items)	as	well	as	the	organisation	of	care	
(11	items).	Patients	scored	the	responses	on	a	five-point	Likert	scale	ranging	
from	‘very	poor’	to	‘excellent’	and	a	category	‘not	applicable’.	To	calculate	the	
item	scores	for	patient	experience,	we	used	the	percentage	of	patients	who	used	
the	two	most	positive	answering	categories	(four	and	five)	of	all	patients	who	
answered	the	question	(other	than	‘not	applicable’).23	The	indicator	scores	were	
calculated	by	averaging	the	item	scores	for	the	evaluation	of	the	GP	and	the	
organisation	of	care	separately.	For	each	practice,	data	on	practice	type	(solo,	
duo	and	group)	and	urbanization	level	(large	city,	small	city	and	rural	area)	were	
collected.	A	year	after	the	baseline	measurements,	the	general	practices	were	
again	asked	to	collect	data	pertaining	to	clinical	care	and	patient	experiences.	
Data	for	practice	management	were	not	collected	again	due	to	the	workload	
associated	with	this	data	collection.
 Analysis
Descriptive	analysis	(mean,	range	and	standard	deviations)	were	used	to	summa-
rize	the	indicator	scores.	For	the	chronic	conditions	such	as	diabetes,	COPD,	
asthma	and	cardiovascular	risk	management,	mean	sum	scores	were	calculated	
by	adding	the	process	indicators	for	each	condition	and	dividing	them	by	the	
number	of	indicators.	Mean	sum	scores	were	only	calculated	for	the	practices	
with	no	missing	values	on	all	indicators	for	a	specific	chronic	condition.	In	the	
analyses,	the	dependent	variables	were	the	clinical	process	and	outcome	indica-
tors	for	diabetes,	COPD,	asthma,	cardiovascular	risk	management,	influenza	
vaccination	and	cervical	cancer	screening,	the	mean	sum	scores	of	the	four	
chronic	conditions,	the	items	of	patient	experience	individually	and	the	two	
indicators	of	patient	experience.	The	covariates	were	the	baseline	measurement	
(centralized	for	mean	performance	in	year	1	of	all	practices),	practice	type	(solo,	
duo	and	group)	and	urbanization	level	(rural	area,	small	city	and	large	city).	
Because	of	the	hierarchical	structure	of	our	study	(repeated	measurements	
nested	within	practice),	the	analyses	were	based	on	a	linear	mixed	effect	model,	
with	a	random	intercept	and	all	other	variables	fixed.	First,	mixed	effect	models	
were	conducted	to	assess	the	differences	in	change	between	the	performance	
in	year	1	and	2	for	all	clinical	process	and	outcome	indicators	and	for	the	items	
of	patient	experience	with	GP’s	functioning	and	organisation	of	care.	Second,	we	
analysed	whether	the	differences	in	change	were	caused	by	the	above	mentioned	
covariates	by	including	a	covariate	by	effect	interaction	term	in	the	model.	We	
will	only	present	the	significant	interactions	and	their	main	effect	terms.	All	
analyses	were	conducted	using	SPSS	18.0.
72
chapter 5
	 Results
 Study	population
Sixty	general	practices	in	the	south	of	the	Netherlands	participated	in	the	
evaluation	of	the	P4P	program.	Solo	practices	were	underrepresented	as	were	
practices	in	large	cities,	see	Table	2.	Figure	1	shows	the	number	of	practices	that	
collected	data	in	year	1	and	2.
 Improvement	on	incentivised	indicators
Significant	improvements	were	shown	on	all	clinical	process	indicators	for	
diabetes	care,	four	out	of	five	indicators	for	COPD	care,	three	out	of	four	
indicators	for	asthma	care	and	three	out	of	eight	indicators	for	cardiovascular	
risk	management,	see	Table	3.	The	improvements	ranged	from	+4.2%	to	+26.3%.	
No	improvements	of	influenza	vaccination	rate	or	the	uptake	rate	in	cervical	
cancer	screening	were	observed.	
The	differences	in	change	were	affected	by	baseline	measures,	that	is,	higher	
baseline	scores	were	associated	with	lower	improvement	scores	(Table	4).	The	
effects	of	practice	type	and	urbanization	level	on	the	improvement	are	shown	in	
Table	4	and	will	be	explained	for	the	COPD	process	indicators	in	detail.	Group	
practices	with	an	average	baseline	score	showed	a	mean	decline	of	0.9%.	The	
zero	coefficients	for	solo	and	duo	practice	showed	that	the	baseline	values	were	
equal	for	all	types	of	practices.	Furthermore,	for	every	percentage	point	that	
Figure	1	 Flow	diagram	of	participating	general	practices	and	data	collection	
															in	the	P4P	program
65	volunteering	general	practices	in	2	regions
Data	collection	on	indicators	for
clinical	care,	practice	management
and	patient	experience	(n=65)
Feedback
Incentive	payment
Drop-out	5	practices
practice	migration	(n=2),	administrative
workload	data	collection	(n=2)
other	priorities	(n=2)
Drop-out	3	extra	practices
only	on	clinical	care	indicators
too	late	collecting	clinical	data	(n=3)
Data	collection	on	indicators	for
clinical	care	(n=57)
and	patient	experience	(n=60)
a	practice	scored	higher	than	the	average	baseline	score,	the	practice	showed	an	
extra	decline	of	0.4%.	Solo	practices	improved	15.4%	more	and	duo	practices	
14.0%	more	than	group	practices.	On	the	asthma	indicators,	solo	practices	
improved	18.3%	more	and	duo	practices	improved	15.8%	more	than	group	
practices.	Urbanization	level	had	no	influence	on	the	differences	in	change	between	
year	1	and	2.	
Patients	were	very	positive	about	GP’s	functioning	and	organisation	of	care	in	
year	1,	nevertheless	they	were	significantly	more	positive	in	year	2	(Table	5).	
Looking	in	more	detail,	improvements	occurred	on	26	of	27	items.	The	improve-
ments	in	patient	experience	were	affected	by	baseline	measures,	that	is,	higher	
baseline	scores	were	associated	with	lower	improvement	scores	(Table	4).	For	
organisation	of	care,	group	practices	with	an	average	baseline	score	showed	a	
mean	improvement	of	3.1%.	Solo	practices	improved	5.2%	more	than	group	
practices.
 Improvement	on	non-incentivised	clinical	outcome	indicators
Five	out	of	seven	outcome	indicators	showed	significant	improvements,	ranging	
from	+5.9%	to	+14.7%	(Table	3).	Baseline	measures	had	a	significant	effect	on	
these	improvements,	that	is,	higher	baseline	scores	were	related	to	lower	
improvement	scores.	Practices	in	large	cities	improved	14.4%	less	than	practices	
in	rural	areas	on	the	diabetes	outcome	indicator	on	HbA1c	(Table	4).	Solo	
practices	improved	15.5%	and	14.4%	more	on	the	cardiovascular	risk	management	
outcome	indicators	of	blood	pressure	and	cholesterol	than	group	practices.
Table	2	 Practice	characteristics	of	the	study	population	in	comparison	with	all	Dutch				
														general	practices
	 Study	population	 All	Dutch	general	practices*
	 60	practices	 4235	practices
 Number % Number %
Practice	type
Solo	 				16	 26.7	 	 42.3
Duo	 				20	 33.3	 	 31.5
Group	/	health	centre	 				24	 40.0	 	 26.1
Urban	area
Large	city,	>1500	addresses	per	km2	 				17	 28.3	 	 46.7
Small	city,	500-1500 addresses	per	km2	 				36	 60.0	 	 41.1
Rural	area,	<500 addresses	per	km2	 						7	 11.7	 	 12.2
Practice	size
Mean	patient	population	per	practice		 4685
Mean	patient	population	per	full-time	equivalent
general	practitioner	 2470
Mean	population	per	full-time	equivalent	
general	practitioner	 	 	 2322
*	 Since	1/1/2008.	Source:	NIVEL38
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chapter 5
	 Discussion
	 Principal	findings
Introduction	of	a	participatory	P4P	program	yielded	significant	improvements	in	
care	delivery.	Clinical	care	indicators,	pertaining	to	both	process	and	outcome,	
concerning	diabetes,	COPD,	asthma	and	cardiovascular	risk	management	
improved,	though	only	the	process	indicators	were	incentivised.	The	influenza	
vaccination	rate	and	uptake	of	cervical	cancer	screening	did	not	improve	signifi-
cantly.	Patients’	positive	experience	with	GP’s	functioning	increased	significantly	
on	all	but	one	item	(n =	16	items),	and	their	positive	experience	with	organisa-
tion	of	care	increased	significantly	on	9	out	of	11	items.	The	room	for	improve-
ment	had	a	significant	impact	on	actual	improvements	for	both	the	clinical	
process	and	outcome	indicators	and	patient	experience.	
Practice	type	had	an	influence	on	the	change	in	care	processes	of	COPD	and	
asthma,	on	the	change	in	cardiovascular	risk	management	outcomes	and	on	the	
change	in	patient	experience	with	organisation	of	care;	higher	baseline	scores	
were	related	to	lower	improvement	scores.	Practices	in	large	cities	improved	
less	than	practices	in	rural	area	on	controlled	HbA1c	for	diabetes	patients.
 Strengths	and	weaknesses	of	our	study
Strength	of	our	study	is	the	high	follow-up	rate	of	the	60	general	practices	
(92.3%)	that	participated	voluntarily	in	the	P4P	program.	Nonetheless,	the	
attribution	of	the	improvements	to	the	intervention	is	complex.	The	attribution	
would	be	much	easier	if	the	study	design	was	a	randomized	controlled	trial	
(RCT).	Studies	on	the	effect	of	P4P	often	do	not	meet	these	criteria.24	Introduc-
ing	a	control	group	for	a	RCT	is	difficult	because	collecting	data	on	performance	
measurements	is	an	intervention	strategy	on	quality	improvement	in	itself	and	
most	practices	do	not	like	to	be	in	the	control	arm	of	such	an	experiment.	This	
makes	our	results	responsive	to	other	activities	in	general	practice	focusing	on	
improving	the	quality	of	care	of	the	chosen	subjects.	However,	finding	different	
measures	that	all	changed	in	the	same	direction	gives	us	circumstantial	evidence	
that	underlines	the	effect	of	the	program.	We	did	not	measure	change	in	practice	
management	as	the	target	users	decided	to	measure	practice	management	only	
once	in	3	years	due	to	the	labour	intensive	data	collection.	Earlier	research	
showed	that	the	practice	management	items	did	not	change	significantly	over	a	
year	even	if	supportive	quality	improvement	projects	had	been	started.25	So,	we	
may	assume	that	leaving	this	domain	out	of	the	follow-up	measurement	would	
not	have	had	large	repercussions	for	the	reimbursement.
 Comparison	with	other	studies
An	accurate	comparison	with	other	studies	is	difficult	because	performance	
measures,	appraisal	and	reimbursement	differ	between	P4P	programs.	The	size	of	
79
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program the	improvements	in	chronic	care	resembles	other	P4P	studies	in	primary	care	
with	stakeholder	involvement	that	showed	effect	sizes	above	10%.4	Our	study	
shows	less	improvements	with	regard	to	HbA1c	testing,	probably	due	to	high	
baseline	scores	and	a	limited	follow-up	period	of	1	year.6,8	We	show	that	baseline	
measures	have	a	huge	impact	on	the	improvements.	The	lack	of	improvement	
in	our	study	in	the	uptake	rate	of	cancer	screening	and	influenza	vaccination	is	
probably	also	related	to	the	very	high	baseline	in	comparison	to	other	studies.26,27	
The	comprehensiveness	of	our	indicator	set	bears	a	resemblance	to	the	one	
used	in	the	QOF,	but	the	appraisal	and	reimbursement	are	quite	different.	The	
QOF	bonus	is	also	much	higher	than	the	incentive	in	our	intervention.	Moreover,	
in	comparison	to	the	QOF,	the	patient	experiences	are	more	related	to	the	
payment	because	the	target	users	decided	that	patient	experiences	should	
become	an	ample	part	of	quality	of	care.	And	as	a	matter	of	fact,	we	did	find	a	bit	
more	improvement	on	patient	experience	than	the	QOF,28	but	this	statement	
should	be	handled	with	care	because	the	measurements	differed	a	lot.	By	incen-
tivising	the	process	indicators,	an	indirect	effect	is	expected	on	the	reported	
outcome	measures.	Our	study	shows	improvements	on	both	clinical	process	
and	outcome	indicators.	This	is	in	line	with	research	of	Ryan	and	Doran	(2011),	
which	showed	that	improving	processes	of	care	affect	patient	outcomes.29	
Although	the	target	users	decided	not	to	incentivise	the	outcome	indicators,	
because	a	robust	judgment	on	risk	adjustment	was	lacking,	the	outcome	indica-
tors	improved	as	well.	This	result	can	contribute	to	a	renewed	discussion	on	
the	necessity	of	risk	adjustment,	which	is	part	of	some	P4P	programs.30	
Solo	and	duo	practices	improved	more	with	regard	to	COPD	and	asthma	than	
group	practices,	which	is	in	line	with	the	literature	in	which	group	practices	
perform	better17,18	and	therefore	have	less	room	for	improvement.	When	taking	
into	account	the	underrepresentation	of	solo	practices,	this	study	shows	that	an	
even	larger	effect	is	possible.	Patient’s	experience	with	GP’s	functioning	and	
the	organisation	of	care	in	the	participating	practices	was	very	positive,	which	is	
in	line	with	other	studies.23,31	The	improvement	in	patient	experience	due	to	P4P	
is	hardly	studied.	In	a	Cochrane	review,24	only	one	study	could	be	included	in	
which	no	effect	of	P4P	on	patient	experience	was	shown.32
 Implications	for	general	practice,	policy	makers	and	
	 future	research
Though	the	effectiveness	of	P4P	is	inconclusive	in	the	literature,	we	conclude	
that	a	bottom-up	developed	P4P	program	might	stimulate	improvement	in	
clinical	care	and	patient	experience	with	GP’s	functioning	and	the	organisation	of	
care.
More	studies	are	needed	in	which	the	appraisal	and	reimbursement	are	based	
on	drivers	taken	from	behavioural	economics.	Implementation	problems	as	
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discussed	in	QOF	research33,34	such	as	ceiling	effects,	reversal	effects	due	to	the	
withdrawal	of	the	payment	and	the	narrow	focus	on	care	that	is	paid	for	are	
probably	not	solved	by	introducing	a	participatory	P4P	program.	However,	having	
the	target	users	involved	makes	it	possible	to	deal	with	these	problems,	for	
instance	by	renewing	the	set	periodically,	which	might	enlarge	the	potential	effect	
of	P4P.	This	involvement	might	even	help	to	reduce	unintended	consequences	
like	gaming	and	neglecting	the	conditions	that	are	not	incentivised.35-37
81
assessment
of a p4p
program References
 1
Petersen	LA,	Woodard	LD,	Urech	
T,	Daw	C,	Sookanan	S.	Does	
pay-for-performance	improve	the	
quality	of	health	care?	Ann Intern 
Med 2006;	145:	265-72.
 2
Rosenthal	MB,	Frank	RG.	What	is	
the	empirical	basis	for	paying	for	
quality	in	health	care?	Med Care 
Res Rev 2006;	63:	135-57.
 3
Frølich	A,	Talavera	JA,	Broadhead	P,	
Dudley	RA.	A	behavioral	model	of	
clinician	responses	to	incentives	
to	improve	quality.	Health Policy 
2007;	80:	179-93.
 4
Van	Herck	P,	De	Smedt	D,	
Annemans	L,	Remmen	R,	
Rosenthal	MB,	Sermeus	W.	
Systematic	review:	effects,	design	
choices,	and	context	of	pay-for-
performance	in	health	care.	BMC 
Health Serv Res 2010;	10:	247.
 5
Amundson	G,	Solberg	LI,	Reed	M,	
Martini	EM,	Carlson	R.	Paying	for	
quality	improvement:	compliance	
with	tobacco	cessation	guidelines.	
Jt Comm J Qual Saf 2003;	29:	59-65.
 6
Chung	RS,	Chernicoff	HO,	Nakao	
KA,	Nickel	RC,	Legorreta	AP.	A	
quality-driven	physician	compen-
sation	model:	four-year	follow-up	
study.	J Healthc Qual 2003;	25:	31-7.
 7
Gilmore	AS,	Zhao	Y,	Kang	N	et al. 
Patient	outcomes	and	evidence-
based	medicine	in	a	preferred	
provider	organization	setting:	a	
six-year	evaluation	of	a	physician	
pay-for-performance	program.	
Health Serv Res 2007;	42(6	Pt	1):	
2140-59
 8
Larsen	DL,	Cannon	W,	Towner	S.	
Longitudinal	assessment	of	a	
diabetes	care	management	system	
in	an	integrated	health	network.	J 
Manag Care Pharm 2003;	9:	552-8.
 9
Kirschner	K,	Braspenning	J,	Jacobs	
JE,	Grol	R.	Design	choices	made	by	
target	users	for	a	pay-for-perfor-
mance	program	in	primary	care:	
an	action	research	approach.	BMC 
Fam Pract 2012;	13:	25.
 10
Mehrotra	A,	Sorbero	ME,	
Damberg	CL.	Using	the	lessons	of	
behavioral	economics	to	design	
more	effective	pay-for-perfor-
mance	programs.	Am J Manag Care 
2010;	16:	497-503.
 11
Thaler	RH.	Mental	accounting	and	
consumer	choice.	Marketing Sci 
1985;	4:	199-214.
 12
Heath	C,	Larrick	RP,	Wu	G.	Goals	
as	reference	points.	Cogn Psychol 
1999;	38:	79-109.
 13
Loewenstein	G,	Prelec	D.	
Anomalies	in	intertemporal	
choice:	evidence	and	an	inter-
pretation.	Q J Econ 1992;	107:	
573-97.
 14
Thaler	RH.	Mental	accounting	
matters.	J Behav Decis Making 1999;	
12:	183-206.
 15
Chung	S,	Palaniappan	LP,	Trujillo	
LM,	Rubin	HR,	Luft	HS.	Effect	of	
physician-specific	pay-for-perfor-
mance	incentives	in	a	large	group	
practice.	Am J Manag Care 2010;	16:	
e35-42.
 16
Kahneman	D,	Tversky	A.	Prospect	
theory:	an	analysis	of	decision	
under	risk.	Econometrica 1979;	47:	
263-92.
 17
Ashworth	M,	Armstrong	D.	The	
relationship	between	general	
practice	characteristics	and	quality	
of	care:	a	national	survey	of	quality	
indicators	used	in	the	UK	Quality	
and	Outcomes	Framework,	
2004-5.	BMC Fam Pract 2006;	7:	68.
 18
Ashworth	M,	Schofield	P,	Seed	P,	
Durbaba	S,	Kordowicz	M,	Jones	R.	
Identifying	poorly	performing	
general	practices	in	England:	a	
longitudinal	study	using	data	from	
the	quality	and	outcomes	
framework.	J Health Serv Res Policy 
2011;	16:	21-7.
 19
Campbell	SM,	Hann	M,	Hacker	J	
et al. Identifying	predictors	of	high	
quality	care	in	English	general	
practice:	observational	study.	BMJ 
2001;	323:	784-7.
 20
Van	den	Hombergh	P.	Practice Visits. 
Assessing and Improving Manage-
ment in General Practice. Nijmegen:	
Catholic	University	of	Nijmegen,	
1998.
 21
Grol	R,	Dautzenberg	M,	
Brinkmann	H,	eds.	Quality 
Management in Primary Care. 
European Practice Assessment. 
Gutersloh:	Verlag	Bertelsmann	
Stiftung,	2004.
 22
Grol	R,	Wensing	M,	Mainz	J	et al. 
Patients’	priorities	with	respect	
to	general	practice	care:	an	inter-
national	comparison.	European	
Task	Force	on	Patient	Evaluations	
of	General	Practice	(EUROPEP).	
Fam Pract 1999;	16:	4-11.
 23
Grol	R,	Wensing	M,	Mainz	J	et al. ;	
European	Task	Force	on	Patient	
Evaluations	of	General	Practice	
Care	(EUROPEP).	Patients	in	
Europe	evaluate	general	practice	
82
chapter 5
care:	an	international	comparison.	
Br J Gen Pract 2000;	50:	882-7.
 24
Scott	A,	Sivey	P,	Ait	Ouakrim	D	et 
al. The	effect	of	financial	incentives	
on	the	quality	of	health	care	
provided	by	primary	care	
physicians.	Cochrane Database Syst 
Rev 2011;	9:	CD008451.
 25
Engels	Y,	van	den	Hombergh	P,	
Mokkink	H,	van	den	Hoogen	H,	
van	den	Bosch	W,	Grol	R.	The	
effects	of	a	team-based	continu-
ous	quality	improvement	
inter-vention	on	the	management	
of	primary	care:	a	randomised	
controlled	trial.	Br J Gen Pract 2006;	
56:	781-7.
 26
Loerbroks	A,	Stock	C,	Bosch	JA,	
Litaker	DG,	Apfelbacher	CJ.	
Influenza	vaccination	coverage	
among	high-risk	groups	in	11	
European	countries.	Eur J Public 
Health 2012;	22:	562-8.
 27
Van	Ballegooijen	M,	van	den	
Akker-van	Marle	E,	Patnick	J	et al. 
Overview	of	important	cervical	
cancer	screening	process	values	in	
European	Union	(EU)	countries,	
and	tentative	predictions	of	the	
corresponding	effectiveness	and	
cost-effectiveness.	Eur J Cancer 
2000;	36:	2177-88.
 28
Campbell	SM,	Kontopantelis	E,	
Reeves	D,	Valderas	JM,	Gaehl	E,	
Small	N	et al. Changes	in	patient	
experiences	of	primary	care	
during	health	service	reforms	in	
England	between	2003	and	2007.	
Ann Fam Med 2010;	8:	499-506.
 29
Ryan	AM,	Doran	T.	The	effect	of	
improving	processes	of	care	on	
patient	outcomes:	evidence	from	
the	United	Kingdom’s	quality	and
outcomes	framework.	Med Care 
2012;	50:	191-9.
 30
Zaslavsky	AM,	Hochheimer	JN,	
Schneider	EC	et al. Impact	of	
sociodemographic	case	mix	on	
the	HEDIS	measures	of	health	
plan	quality.	Med Care 2000;	38:	
981-92
 31
Allan	J,	Schattner	P,	Stocks	N,	Ram-
say	E.	Does	patient	satisfaction	of	
general	practice	change	over	a	
decade?	BMC Fam Pract 2009;	10:	
13.
 32
Gosden	T,	Sibbald	B,	Williams	J,	
Petchey	R,	Leese	B.	Paying	doctors	
by	salary:	a	controlled	study	of	
general	practitioner	behavior	in	
England.	Health Policy 2003;	64:	
415-23.
 33
Campbell	SM,	Reeves	D,	
Kontopantelis	E,	Sibbald	B,	Roland	
M.	Effects	of	pay	for	performance	
on	the	quality	of	primary	care	in	
England.	N Engl J Med 2009;	361:	
368-78.
 34
Roland	M,	Campbell	S,	Bailey	N,	
Whalley	D,	Sibbald	B.	Financial	
incentives	to	improve	the	quality	
of	primary	care	in	the	UK:	
predicting	the	consequences	of	
change.	Prim Health Care Res Dev 
2006;	7:	18-26.
 35
Campbell	S,	Reeves	D,	Kontopan-
telis	E,	Middleton	E,	Sibbald	B,	
Roland	M.	Quality	of	primary	care	
in	England	with	the	introduction	
of	pay	for	performance.	N Engl J 
Med 2007;	357:	181-90.
 36
Doran	T,	Fullwood	C,	Reeves	D,	
Gravelle	H,	Roland	M.	Exclusion	of	
patients	from	pay-for-performance
targets	by	English	physicians.	
N Engl J Med 2008;	359:	274-84.
 37
Conrad	DA,	Perry	L.	Quality-
based	financial	incentives	in	health	
care:	can	we	improve	quality	by	
paying	for	it?	Annu Rev Public 
Health 2009;	30:	357-71.
 38
Hingstman	L,	Kenens	RJ.	Cijfers uit 
de registratie van huisartsen. Peiling 
2008.	[Figures	from	the	general	
practitioners,	2008].	Utrecht:	
NIVEL,	2008.
83
experiences
of general
practices
Chapter 6
Experiences	of	general	
practices	with	a	
participatory	pay-for-
performance	program:	
a	qualitative	study	
in	primary	care
Kirsten	Kirschner
Jozé	Braspenning
JE	Annelies	Jacobs
Richard	Grol
Australian Journal of Primary Health 2013; 19(2): 102-106
84
chapter 2
85
experiences
with p4p
program 	 Abstract
The	involvement	of	target	users	in	the	design	choices	of	a	pay-for-performance	
program	may	enhance	its	impact,	but	little	is	known	about	the	views	of	partici-
pants	in	these	programs.	To	explore	general	practices’	experiences	with	pay-
for-performance	in	primary	care	we	conducted	a	qualitative	study	in	general	
practices	in	the	Netherlands.	Thirty	out	of	65	general	practices	participating	in	a	
pay-for-performance	program,	stratified	for	bonus,	were	invited	for	a	semistruc-
tured	interview	on	feasibility,	feedback	and	the	bonus,	spending	of	the	bonus,	
unintended	consequences,	and	future	developments.	Content	analysis	was	used	
to	process	the	resulting	transcripts.	We	included	29	practices.	The	feasibility	of	
the	pay-for-performance	program	was	questioned	due	to	the	substantial	time	
investment.	The	feedback	on	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	
experience	was	mostly	discussed	in	the	team,	and	used	for	improvement	plans,	
but	was	also	qualified	as	annoying	for	one	GP	and	for	another	GP	it	brought	
feelings	of	insecurity.	Most	practices	considered	the	bonus	a	stimulus	to	improve	
quality	of	care,	in	addition	to	compensation	for	their	effort	and	time	invested.	
Distinctive	performance	features	were	not	displayed,	for	instance,	on	a	website.	
The	bonus	was	mainly	spent	on	new	equipment	or	team	building.	Practices	
referred	to	gaming	and	focusing	on	those	aspects	that	were	incentivised	(‘tunnel	
vision’)	as	unintended	consequences.	Future	developments	should	be	directed	
to	absolute	thresholds,	new	indicators	to	keep	the	process	going,	and	an	inde-
pendent	audit.	Linking	a	part	of	the	bonus	to	innovation	was	also	suggested.	The	
participants	thought	the	pay-for-performance	program	was	a	labour	intensive	
positive	breakthrough	to	stimulate	quality	improvement,	but	warned	of	unin-
tended	consequences	of	the	program	and	the	sustainability	of	the	indicator	set.
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	 Introduction
In	recent	decades	health	policy	makers	in	various	countries	have	introduced	
pay-for-performance	(P4P)	programs	with	the	aim	to	enhance	the	quality	of	care.	
However,	the	evidence	for	their	effectiveness	is	still	lacking.1	Most	studies	have	
deficiencies	in	their	design	and	the	payment	schemes	(content	and	amount)	are	
very	heterogeneous.1,2	A	review	showed	that	involving	target	users	could	increase	
a	P4P	program’s	effectiveness.3	We	conducted	a	project	in	the	Netherlands	in	
which	we	involved	GPs	in	the	development	of	a	P4P	program	for	primary	care.	
The	resulting	program	included	indicators	for	clinical	care,	practice	management	
and	patient	experience.4	Its	key	elements	are	presented	in	Box	1.	
The	clinical	indicators	were	related	to	chronic	care,	prevention	and	prescribing	
and	are	largely	similar	to	those	initiated	in	the	USA5-10,	Australia11,	New	Zealand12	
and	the	UK13.	The	appraisal	and	reimbursement	features	of	our	P4P	program	
were	tailored	to	the	target	group	and	differ	from	other	programs	on	the	perfor-
mance	thresholds	(relative),	the	size	of	the	bonus,	and	incentivising	both	quality	
level	and	improvement	of	performance.	The	question	was	how	the	target	users	
evaluated	the	actual	use	of	the	P4P	program	that	they	helped	to	design,	and	if	it	
met	their	expectations.	Studies	about	the	experiences	of	target	users	with	P4P	
programs	are	scarce.	Physicians	participating	in	P4P	programs	in	Massachusetts	
and	California	showed	positive	attitudes	towards	P4P,	but	were	ambivalent	about	
specific	features	of	these	programs.14	General	practices	participating	in	the	
Box	1	 Design	choices	of	the	participatory	P4P	program
Performance measurement
•	 Data	collection	for	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experience
	 –	 Clinical	care:	diabetes	(n	=	9	indicators),	COPD	(n	=	5	indicators),	asthma	(n	=	4	indicators),	cardio-
	 	 vascular	risk	management	(n	=	8	indicators),	influenza	vaccination	(n	=	2	indicators),	cervical	cancer	
	 	 screening	(n	=	1	indicator)
	 –	 Practice	management	(n	=	4	indicators):	infrastructure	(n	=	7	items),	team	(n	=	8	items),	information	
	 	 (n	=	3	items),	quality	and	safety	(n	=	4	items)
	 –	 Patient	experience	(n	=	2	indicators):	experience	with	general	practitioner	(n	=	16	items)	and	
	 	 organisation	of	care	(n	=	11	items)
Appraisal
	 –	 Separate	appraisal	of	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experience,	weighting	the	
	 	 domains	as	2:1:1
	 –	 A	benchmark	with	relative	standards	was	set	at	the	25th	percentile	of	group	performance	
	 –	 For	the	appraisal	a	series	of	tiered	thresholds	was	used	(7	levels)
	 –	 Practices	received	short-term	feedback	(4	months	after	data	collection)
	 –	 Both	quality	level	and	the	improvement	of	performance	were	valued,	with	these	levels	weighted	as	3:1
Reimbursement
	 –	 A	bonus	of	5%	to	10%	of	the	practice	income,	not	linked	to	the	usual	reimbursement
	 –	 Bonus	was	paid	in	money,	and	not	in	goods	or	services	
	 –	 Bonus	to	spend	freely
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program Australian	Practice	Incentives	Program	(PIP)	were	asked	about	their	views	on	
PIP’s	contribution	to	quality	of	care	and	improved	access.	Their	views	were	
mixed,	with	27%	of	providers	responding	that	PIP	gave	significant	benefit	to	their	
practice,	36%	responding	that	there	was	medium	benefit,	and	27%	responding	
that	the	benefit	was	minor.15	Campbell	et	al.16	interviewed	GPs	and	nurses	about	
their	views	on	changes	in	health	care	as	a	result	of	the	Quality	and	Outcomes	
Framework.16	The	respondents	believed	that	the	financial	incentives	had	been	
sufficient	to	change	behaviour	and	to	achieve	targets,	but	they	also	mentioned	
some	unintended	consequences,	such	as	a	decline	in	personal	continuity	of	care.	
Furthermore,	the	interviewees	worried	about	an	ongoing	culture	of	performance	
monitoring	in	the	UK.	Little	is	known	about	how	target	users	who	are	involved	
in	designing	a	P4P	program	evaluate	that	program	after	implementation.	In	our	
study	we	asked	representatives	of	participating	practices	to	provide	their	
experiences.
	 Methods
 Study	design	and	study	population
Sixty-five	general	practices	participated	voluntarily	in	the	development	and	use	
of	a	P4P	program,	and	received	a	financial	incentive	afterwards.	We	performed	
a	qualitative	study	based	on	individual	semistructured	interviews	with	represen-
tatives	of	these	general	practices.	We	randomly	invited	30	of	the	65	general	
practices	for	the	interviews,	stratified	for	the	bonus	they	received	(low	versus	
high).
 Interview
The	interview	guide	contained	questions	about	the	feasibility	of	the	data	collec-
tion,	behavioural	change	concerning	the	feedback	on	the	indicators	and	the	
bonus,	spending	of	the	bonus,	possible	unintended	consequences	of	the	program	
and	future	developments.	The	interview	was	semistructured,	with	open	questions,	
but	the	interviewers	were	prepared	and	trained	to	address	the	different	topics	
in	more	detail.	The	interviews	were	performed	by	three	trained	professionals	
who	collected	data	from	April	to	June	2008.
	 Data	analysis
The	interviews	were	audio	recorded	and	transcribed	verbatim.	The	topics	in	the	
interview	guide	were	used	as	a	coding	frame.	Codes	were	linked	to	the	data	
using	the	software	package	ATLAS	ti.17 	The	trained	professionals	performed	one	
interview	to	test	its	length	and	to	make	sure	the	information	drawn	from	the	
interview	was	sufficient.	After	three	interviews	the	interview	guide	was	reas-
sessed,	but	adjustments	were	not	deemed	necessary.	Quotes	from	the	general	
practices	(P)	are	added	to	the	description	of	the	results,	with	the	practice	
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number	accompanied	by	an	‘a’	for	practices	that	received	a	low	bonus	and	a	‘b’	
for	practices	with	a	high	bonus.
	 Results
	 Study	population
An	appointment	was	scheduled	for	each	of	30	general	practices.	We	succeeded	
in	interviewing	representatives	of	29	general	practices,	14	of	which	received	a	
low	bonus	and	15	a	high	bonus.	In	28	practices	the	GP	was	interviewed,	some-
times	together	with	another	GP	(n	=	4)	or	a	practice	nurse	(n	=	2).	In	one	
practice	the	interview	was	held	with	a	practice	nurse.
 Feasibility
For	most	of	the	practices	the	data	collection	for	the	P4P	program	meant	a	
substantial	time	investment,	especially	for	the	measures	of	clinical	care.	General	
practices	experienced	difficulties	with	extracting	data	from	their	electronic	
medical	records	(EMR)	caused	by	a	lack	of	extraction	software	for	the	EMR	and	
their	deficiency	in	the	uniformity	of	registration.
We experienced many problems with extracting the data from the electronic 
medical records, it took a lot of time. We developed many plans to improve 
recording. (P21a)
At baseline, putting together the figures of our practice, we spent at least 4 
weekends between the two of us. (P1b)
If	practices	could	not	extract	the	data	from	their	EMR	automatically	they	had	to	
take	a	random	sample	of	40	patients	for	each	chronic	condition,	which	took	
even	more	time.
We had to do everything manually. I think the assistants used a hundred hours 
on top of their normal working hours for this. The time investment was disap-
pointing. (P5a)
Although	practices	complained	about	the	time	investment,	we	noticed	that	some	
practices	provided	complete	data	manually	on	all	patients	instead	of	a	sample.
 Behavioural	change
Feedback	showed	general	practices	their	performance	for	clinical	care,	practice	
management	and	patient	experience.	One	GP	reported:
I thought I was doing well, but now I got more insight into what really happens. 
(P1b)
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concluded	that	they	were	performing	reasonably	well.	Some	parts	of	the	feed-
back	were	unexpected	and	at	times	difficult	to	deal	with.	This	usually	resulted	in	
plans	for	improvement.	One	GP	told	us	he	became	more	insecure,	because	
the	feedback	of	patients	was	negative.	Another	GP	thought	it	was	annoying	that	
some	things	were	not	optimal	in	his	practice.	GPs	discussed	the	feedback	within	
their	teams,	which	resulted	in	good	team	climates.	Discussing	the	feedback	was	
seen	as	good	closure	after	an	intensive	period	of	data	collection	in	which	the	
whole	team	participated.
The	bonuses	varied	from	900	to	40.000	Euros.	Not	all	GPs	knew	whether	they	
had	received	the	bonus.	The	perceived	impact	of	the	bonus	differed	between	
GPs.	Some	GPs	stated	that	the	bonus	had	had	no	influence	on	performance,	but	
most	GPs	saw	the	bonus	as	a	stimulus	to	improve	quality	and	to	perform	better	
the	next	year.	Most	GPs	felt	appreciated	by	the	bonus.	‘We	always	need	to	go	
faster	and	do	more’	one	explained,	‘We	have	to	deliver	quality	but	it	should	not	
cost	more.	So,	the	incentive	is	a	nice	stimulus	to	do	this	all’	(P17b).
The	practices	reported	performance	information	at	an	aggregated	level,	that	is	
separate	scores	on	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experiences.	
Although	public	reporting	was	not	part	of	the	program	we	asked	GPs	to	reflect	
on	being	transparent	to	other	parties.	Most	GPs	discussed	their	performance	
scores	in	detail	with	their	colleagues	within	the	practice,	but	very	few	practices	
made	their	distinctive	features	public	outside	the	practice.	About	being	transpar-
ent	to	colleagues	outside	the	practice,	one	GP	said:
Well, that is a sensitive topic. When it is about whether there is enough privacy 
in our practice, everyone should know. When it is about how many consultations 
the GP has per week and about waiting time in the waiting room, I do not think 
others should know. That is non-public. (P21a)
About	half	of	the	GPs	stated	that	they	do	not	want	to	give	detailed	information	
on	their	performance	to	insurers,	fearing	that	the	information	might	be	used	
for	sanctions	or	penalties.	Others	were	fine	with	providing	such	information.	A	
major	concern	about	transparency	to	patients	was	related	to	whether	patients	
would	understand	the	information	presented:
Well, I am not sure whether it is information for the newspaper. When 
a patient wants to see it, he or she has to be able to judge it on the content. 
(P16b)
GPs	were	convinced	that	patients	should	be	informed	about	quality	of	care,	but	
how	this	information	should	be	presented	was	not	clear.
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	 Spending	of	the	bonus
The	practices	could	spend	the	bonus	in	any	way	they	liked,	because	there	were	
no	restrictions.	The	bonus	was	seen	as	a	reward,	a	gift.	Most	practices	used	the	
bonus	as	extra	practice	income	and	bought	equipment	for	the	practice.	Some	
practices	used	the	bonus	for	a	dinner	or	a	weekend	trip	for	the	whole	team.	
One	GP	bought	a	coffee	machine	for	the	patients	in	the	waiting	room.	In	some	
practices	the	incentive	ended	up	with	an	individual	GP	and	was	used	for	private	
matters.
 Unintended	consequences	of	P4P
One	of	the	unintended	consequences	mentioned	was	‘gaming’	the	system.	
Gaming	can	be	caused	by	a	fear	of	lost	reputation,	but	also	by	financial	reasons.	
Many	GPs	imagined	other	practices	gaming	the	data	by	saying:
Oh, that will happen for sure. (P5a) 
For sure, yes. I am convinced. (P14a)
But	when	asked	if	they	gamed	their	own	data,	most	of	them	said	resolutely	‘no’.	
One	GP	admitted	that:
We manipulated those data of which we thought that they were not correct at 
first. You try to get the most out of it. (P18b)
Most	participants	thought	data	should	also	be	verified	by	an	external	party.
If there are any consequences, data should definitely be checked by an 
external party. When there is a financial reward I think the figures should be 
correct. (P12b)
Others	thought	it	a	matter	of	trust	and	the	responsibility	of	the	GPs	to	make	
sure	their	figures	were	correct.
You are only getting yourself into trouble if you do not provide data that is 
correct. (P21a)
Another	unintended	consequence	mentioned	was	developing	‘tunnel	vision’,	
which	meant	that	GPs	focussed	on	those	aspects	of	care	that	were	incentivised.	
For	example:
If you reward me for rinsing ears, I will do that more often even though it is not 
useful. (P22a)
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answered it. If they did not, we gave them a call and asked them to come over 
for a venipuncture because that was missing for example. Eventually, we got 
a fully completed risk profile. You could label it as cheating. We had a goal on 
which we wanted to perform well and therefore we invited those patients. 
When there was no goal we would not have invited that patient. (P4b)
Another	GP	said:
If a diabetic sits in front of me, I now think of prescribing a statin. (P19a)
Respondents	thought	that	focusing	on	those	aspects	of	care	that	were	incenti-
vised	might	be	done	at	the	expense	of	other	aspects	that	might	be	more	impor-
tant,	like	personal	attention.
 Future	developments
In	deciding	on	the	P4P	design	choices,	the	majority	of	respondents	preferred	
relative	performance	thresholds,	i.e.	a	relative	benchmark	retrieved	from	partici-
pants’	scores.	In	the	interviews,	however,	we	saw	a	switch	towards	a	preference	
for	absolute	thresholds.	Some	GPs	thought	the	relative	thresholds	were	set	at	a	
high	level.	Comparison	with	absolute	thresholds	might	be	more	honest,	assuming	
that	these	will	not	be	raised	when	group	performance	improves.	Nevertheless,	
the	interviewees	expected	a	lot	of	debate	in	setting	absolute	thresholds,	for	
example	on	how	to	determine	the	thresholds	and	who	to	involve	in	this	process.	
According	to	the	respondents	the	thresholds	should	definitely	not	be	set	by	the	
government	or	by	health	insurance	companies	and	the	professionals	should	be	
involved	in	that	process.
The professional group should determine the thresholds. The thresholds can be 
raised gradually to see if everyone can reach them. If that is the case, the 
thresholds can be raised again. In this way quality improves while everyone can 
meet the thresholds. (P11b)
GPs	were	positive	about	the	further	development	of	P4P.	P4P	was	seen	as	a	
breakthrough	in	the	Netherlands.	Most	GPs	thought	that	both	quality	level	and	
improvement	of	performance	should	be	rewarded	and	that	there	should	be	an	
incentive	to	continue	improving	patient	care.	Linking	the	incentive	to	innovation	
was	also	suggested.	Some	GPs	reported	that	practices	that	did	not	perform	well	
should	be	penalised	in	future.	Transparency	was	a	positive	thing	to	most	GPs,	
because	it	can	instigate	discussion	on	the	quality	of	care	given.	Some	concerns	
were	mentioned,	for	instance	regarding	the	focus	of	the	incentive.	According	to	
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the	GPs	the	incentive	should	focus	on	a	wide	variety	of	aspects	of	care	to	avoid	
‘tunnel	vision’.	One	GP	was	concerned	about	the	UK	P4P	program	in	which	GPs	
are	paid	for	asking	a	patient	if	they	smoke,	but	not	for	motivating	them	to	stop	
smoking.
	 Discussion
	 Summary	of	main	findings
One	year	after	the	introduction	of	the	P4P	program	we	gathered	feedback	from	
29	general	practice	representatives	who	participated	in	designing	the	program.	
They	considered	the	feedback	and	the	bonus	as	stimuli	to	improve	quality	and	
perform	better	the	next	year,	though	the	data	collection	proved	to	be	a	huge	
time	investment.	The	GPs	felt	appreciated	by	the	bonus	and	invested	the	bonus	
mostly	in	their	practice.	Very	few	practices	made	their	figures	public	outside	the	
practice.	The	GPs	were	positive	about	further	development	of	the	P4P	program,	
but	unintended	consequences	like	gaming	and	developing	‘tunnel	vision’	should	
be	taken	into	account.	GPs	have	little	confidence	in	the	health	insurance	compa-
nies	and	fear	that	their	information	will	be	used	for	sanctions	or	penalties.
 Strengths	and	limitations	of	the	study
The	strength	of	this	study	lies	in	its	qualitative	approach,	which	allowed	us	to	
get	a	clear	picture	of	GPs’	experiences	with	the	participatory	P4P	program.	
Our	sampling	method	was	designed	to	collect	the	views	of	those	GPs	who	had	
actually	worked	with	the	P4P	program,	but	as	we	assumed	that	the	amount	of	
bonus	received	might	influence	the	views	of	the	participating	GPs,	we	included	
an	equal	number	of	high	and	low	bonuses	paid	to	GPs.	There	were	no	differences	
in	views	between	the	two	groups.
Limitations	arose	because	time	restrictions	hindered	the	discussion	of	each	
topic	in	detail.	On	more	general	topics,	like	the	future	of	P4P,	there	was	some	
discussion	but	concrete	ideas	were	not	brought	up.	Another	limitation	was	the	
lack	of	a	comparative	group	that	was	not	involved	in	designing	the	program,	and	
that	did	not	participate	voluntarily	in	the	program.	It	would	be	of	interest	to	
learn	about	the	experiences	of	such	a	group.	It	can	be	argued	that	this	group	
would	probably	be	less	enthusiastic.	However,	based	on	our	results	we	could	
also	argue	that	an	implementation	strategy	would	benefit	the	involvement	of	
target	users	in	designing	the	program	and	lead	to	positive	experiences.
 Comparison	with	existing	literature
To	date	no	study	has	published	the	experiences	of	GPs	who	were	actually	
involved	in	the	development	of	a	P4P	program.	The	involvement	of	the	target	
users	resulted	in	a	high	awareness	of	the	P4P	program	and	the	target	contents.	
This	may	seem	obvious,	yet	we	found	major	differences	in	the	extent	to	which	
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program physicians	in	other	countries	were	aware	of	the	targets	of	a	P4P	program.18-20	
The	positive	attitude	of	the	target	users	towards	P4P	in	our	study	is	in	line	with	
the	results	in	the	study	of	Young	et	al.14	The	criticisms	of	our	program	in	terms	
of	the	administrative	workload,	relative	performance	thresholds	and	unintended	
consequences	were	also	found	in	the	study	of	Campbell	et	al.16	and	in	a	review	
of	the	administrative	burden	of	the	PIP.22	On	the	whole,	the	participating	GPs	
were	positive	about	the	P4P	program.	However,	involvement	of	the	target	users	
in	the	development	process	did	not	ensure	that	there	were	no	concerns	about	
the	future	of	P4P.
 Implications	for	future	research	or	clinical	practice
The	experiences	of	general	practices	with	P4P	have	taught	us	some	lessons.	
There	is	a	tension	between	incentivising	improvement	of	performance	on	
specific	indicators	and	a	P4P	program	with	a	broad	scope	of	aspects	on	the	one	
hand	and	less	administrative	workload	and	securities	(less	variety	in	aspects)	in	
the	long	run	on	the	other	hand.	It	is	important	to	have	a	balanced	P4P	program	
to	avoid	‘tunnel	vision’	and	to	maintain	and	improve	quality	of	care	in	as	many	
aspects	as	possible.	The	administrative	workload	can	be	reduced	by	not	measur-
ing	the	domain	of	practice	management	every	year	but	only	once	every	3-5	
years.	Furthermore,	the	problem	of	time	investment	in	data	extraction	from	
medical	records	can	be	resolved	by	introducing	suitable	equipment,	as	was	done	
in	the	UK.13	For	general	practices	to	have	more	confidence	in	the	health	insur-
ance	companies	longer-term	contracts	might	be	a	solution.	Currently,	agreements	
with	the	health	insurance	companies	are	still	made	as	1-year	contracts.	This	issue	
might	be	specific	to	the	Dutch	situation,	but	having	confidence	in	payers’	policies	
will	be	an	issue	in	other	countries	as	well.
According	to	the	GPs,	absolute	thresholds	are	preferred.22,23	They	have	the	
advantage	that	there	is	no	uncertainty	whether	a	threshold	has	been	met24	and	
GPs	know	exactly	which	thresholds	to	meet	and	to	which	aspects	of	care	to	
improve.	A	disadvantage	of	absolute	thresholds	is	that	the	motivational	effects	
are	uncertain.25	However,	this	argument	can	be	made	for	relative	thresholds	as	
well,	that	is	being	at	the	very	top	or	bottom	discourages	quality	improvement.	
So,	the	difference	between	relative	and	absolute	thresholds	is	mainly	in	how	
clear	the	goals	are.
	 Conclusion
The	participants	thought	the	P4P	program	was	a	labour	intensive	positive	
breakthrough	to	stimulate	quality	improvement,	but	warned	of	unintended	
consequences	of	the	program	and	the	sustainability	of	the	indicator	set	
of	the	P4P	program.
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The	main	objective	of	this	thesis	was	to	study	the	effects	of	a	participatory	
pay-for-performance	(P4P)	program	on	the	improvement	of	the	quality	of	care.	
This	chapter	presents	the	main	results	of	the	different	projects,	their	strengths	
and	weaknesses,	and	the	key	implications	for	practice	and	research.
	 Main	findings
	 Effect	of	practice-based	improvement	plans	on	accessibility	
	 and	availability	in	general	practice	(Chapter	2)
•	 Feedback	and	best	practice	examples	can	stimulate	improvement	in	the	
organisation	of	general	practice	care,	but	their	overall	effects	on	change	were	
modest.	
	 The	design	choices	of	P4P:	performance	measures,	appraisal		
	 and	reimbursement	(Chapter	3)
• A	P4P	program	can	be	designed	by	involving	the	target	groups	of	practitioners	
and	the	payers	(health	insurance	companies)	at	the	same	time.	The	target	
users	discussed	performance	measures,	appraisal	and	reimbursement.	The	
final	design	choices	are	described	in	Box	1.
•	 The	resulting	design	resembled	the	P4P	programs	in	other	countries,	but	
seemed	to	be	more	balanced	with	regard	to	the	position	of	patient	experi-
ences	in	the	program.
Box	1	 Design	choices	of	the	participatory	P4P	program
Performance measurement
•	 Data	collection	for	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experience
	 –	 Clinical	care:	diabetes	(n	=	9	indicators),	COPD	(n	=	5	indicators),	asthma	(n	=	4	indicators),	cardio-
	 	 vascular	risk	management	(n	=	8	indicators),	influenza	vaccination	(n	=	2	indicators),	cervical	cancer	
	 	 screening	(n	=	1	indicator)
	 –	 Practice	management	(n	=	4	indicators):	infrastructure	(n	=	7	items),	team	(n	=	8	items),	information	
	 	 (n	=	3	items),	quality	and	safety	(n	=	4	items)
	 –	 Patient	experience	(n	=	2	indicators):	experience	with	general	practitioner	(n	=	16	items)	and	
	 	 organisation	of	care	(n	=	11	items)
Appraisal
	 –	 Separate	appraisal	of	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experience,	weighting	the	
	 	 domains	as	2:1:1
	 –	 A	benchmark	with	relative	standards	was	set	at	the	25th	percentile	of	group	performance	
	 –	 For	the	appraisal	a	series	of	tiered	thresholds	was	used	(7	levels)
	 –	 Practices	received	short-term	feedback	(4	months	after	data	collection)
	 –	 Both	quality	level	and	the	improvement	of	performance	were	valued,	with	these	levels	weighted	as	3:1
Reimbursement
	 –	 A	bonus	of	5%	to	10%	of	the	practice	income,	not	linked	to	the	usual	reimbursement
	 –	 Bonus	was	paid	in	money,	and	not	in	goods	or	services	
	 –	 Bonus	to	spend	freely
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 Validity	and	reliability	of	the	indicator	set	(Chapter	4)
•	 The	evaluation	of	the	clinical	measures	showed	that:
	 –	 A	broad	set	of	aspects	of	clinical	care	were	measured
	 –	 Each	topic	was	described	by	a	coherent	set	of	indicators
	 –	 To	allow	a	10%	error	margin	at	least	96	patients	should	be	assessed
	 –	 A	reliable	benchmark	(5%	error	allowed)	should	be	based	on	at	least	
	 	 233	practices.
•	 The	measures	for	practice	management	(Visitation	Instrument	Practice	
Management	(VIP)	and	patient	experience	(EUROPEP	instrument)	were	
validated	in	previous	research.	
 Effect	of	the	P4P	program:	assessment	of	indicators	and	
	 experiences	(Chapter	5	and	6)
•	 The	performance	of	clinical	care	and	patients’	experience	of	GP	functioning	
and	the	organisation	of	care	significantly	improved	following	the	introduction	
of	the	P4P	program.	Significant	improvements	were	observed	for	the	process	
indicators	for	diabetes	(+10.4%),	COPD	(+8.1%),	asthma	(+11.5%)	and	cardio-
vascular	risk	management	(+7.9%).	Patients’	experience	of	GP	functioning	
statistically	improved	by	5.9%	and	patients’	experience	of	the	organisation	of	
care	by	5.6%.
•	 Five	out	of	seven	outcome	indicators	showed	significant	improvements,	
ranging	from	+5.9%	(blood	pressure	diabetes)	to	+14.7%	(blood	pressure	
CVRM).
•	 General	practitioners	considered	the	feedback	and	the	bonus	to	be	a	stimulus	
for	improving	quality	and	performance	in	the	next	year,	although	the	data	
collection	involved	a	substantial	time	investment.	The	participants	were	
positive	about	the	further	development	of	the	P4P	program,	but	unintended	
consequences	like	manipulating	behaviour	at	work	in	response	to	the	program	
(gaming)	and	too	narrow	a	focus	on	program	objectives	(‘tunnel	vision’)	
should	also	be	taken	into	account.
	 Quality	improvement:	intrinsic	versus	extrinsic	
	 motivation
To	improve	the	quality	of	care	in	general	practice,	it	is	necessary	to	change	the	
behaviour	of	care	providers.	Different	interventions	are	known	to	stimulate	
quality	improvement.	These	interventions	can	be	divided	into	those	that	adopt	
educative,	informative	and	facilitative	methods	aimed	at	enhancing	the	intrinsic	
motivation	for	quality	improvement	of	the	healthcare	providers,	and	those	that	
use	methods	that	are	more	controlling	where	the	aim	is	to	raise	the	extrinsic	
motivation	of	healthcare	providers.1	Giving	professionals	feedback	about	their	
performance	is	an	example	of	stimulating	the	intrinsic	motivation,	whereas	
99
general
discussion
financial	or	material	rewards,	promoting	competition	and	the	public	reporting	
of	performance	are	common	methods	for	stimulating	extrinsic	motivation.	
Audit	and	feedback	are	widely	used	as	strategies	to	improve	professional	
practice,	either	on	their	own	or	as	components	of	multifaceted	quality	improve-
ment	interventions.2	The	Cochrane	review	by	Ivers	et	al.	showed	that	audit	and	
feedback	generally	lead	to	small	but	potentially	important	improvements	of	
about	4.3%	in	the	targetted	behaviour.	Feedback	may	be	more	effective	when	it	
includes	both	explicit	targets	and	an	action	plan.2	To	increase	the	effects	of	audit	
and	feedback,	benchmarks	and	information	about	best	practice	can	be	added.3	
In	our	first	study	we	stimulated	the	accessibility	to	general	practice	by	giving	
the	practices	feedback	accompanied	by	benchmarking	against	their	peers	and	
information	about	best	practice.	This	approach	led	to	practice-based	improve-
ment	plans	mostly	concerning	the	information	service,	waiting	times	in	the	
waiting	room	and	phone	accessibility.	These	plans	were	experienced	as	a	stimu-
lus	for	improving	accessibility	and	availability,	although	the	overall	impact	of	the	
interventions	on	the	patient	experience	was	small.
Disappointed	by	these	results	of	stimulating	intrinsic	motivation	on	quality	
improvement,	interventions	may	focus	on	extrinsic	motivation	factors	such	as	
financial	incentives.	In	this	new	generation	of	interventions	financial	incentives	
are	linked	to	audit	and	feedback.	Adding	a	financial	incentive	to	the	childhood	
immunization	coverage	rate	in	a	setting	where	there	is	audit	and	feedback	led	to	
a	significant	improvement	(from	29%	to	54%	coverage)	in	the	bonus	group	after	
eight	months.4	However,	no	effect	was	found	in	a	study	on	implementing	guide-
lines	for	cancer	screening.5	Overall,	the	effectiveness	of	interventions	that	are	
focused	on	raising	extrinsic	motivation	for	quality	improvement,	such	as	pay-for-
performance	(P4P)	programs,	is	inconclusive.6,7	Scott	et	al.	(2011)	found	seven	
studies	showing	the	modest	and	variable	effects	of	P4P	on	the	quality	of	health-
care.8	There	are	reviews	that	give	some	suggestions	about	the	possible	elements	
of	a	successful	P4P.	Petersen	et	al.	(2006)	and	Van	Herck	et	al.	(2010)	suggest	the	
use	of	combined	incentives	for	both	overall	improvement	and	the	achievement	
of	a	threshold,	and	that	use	should	be	made	of	process	and	outcome	indicators	
as	target	measures.6,9	Furthermore,	P4P	targets	should	be	based	on	defined	
baseline	data	and	the	room	for	improvement,	the	implementation	of	a	uniform	
P4P	design	across	payers,	the	distribution	of	incentives	at	the	individual	and/or	
team	level,	and	communication	of	the	program	widely	and	directly	during	
development,	implementation	and	evaluation.9	The	successes	depend	on	the	
design	of	the	P4P	program	in	which	decisions	need	to	be	made	about	perfor-
mance	measures,	the	appraisal	(unit	of	assessment,	performance	standards)	and	
the	reimbursement	(size	of	the	bonus).10	
Stakeholder	involvement	can	play	a	promising	role	in	the	designing	of	an	optimal	
P4P	program.9	We	assumed	that	involving	GPs	in	our	program	would	improve	
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intrinsic	motivation,	and	that	adding	an	incentive	to	performance	would	stimu-
late	extrinsic	motivation.	This	hypothesis	seems	to	be	confirmed	to	a	large	
extent.	Our	P4P	program	resulted	in	significant	improvements	of	an	average	of	
6%	in	the	patient	experience	and	10%	in	clinical	care.	Compared	to	other	
programs	aimed	at	either	intrinsic	or	extrinsic	motivation,	the	results	of	our	P4P	
experiment	resulted	in	greater	changes.	The	review	by	Van	Herck	et	al.	showed	
that	P4P	programs	resulted	in	about	5%	improvement	on	average,	but	with	a	
wide	variation	in	the	amount	of	change	depending	on	the	measure	and	the	
program.9	They	also	found	that	studies	with	stakeholder	involvement	had	more	
positive	effects	(above	10%	effect	size)	than	those	that	did	not	involve	stake-
holders,	which	is	in	line	with	our	results.9	
	 Stakeholder	involvement	in	designing	a	P4P	program
A	unique	experiment	was	conducted	in	65	general	practices	in	the	south	of	
the	Netherlands.	In	this	experiment	financial	incentives	were	thus	linked	to	a	set	
of	performance	indicators.	The	P4P	program	was	designed	systematically	with	
the	involvement	of	the	stakeholders	(health	insurance	companies	and	GPs).11	In	
panel	discussions	we	discussed	the	content	of	the	P4P	program,	more	specifically	
the	performance	measures,	appraisal	and	reimbursement.	An	important	question	
to	ask	is:	Is	the	design	of	a	P4P	program	actually	affected	by	stakeholder	involve-
ment?
	 Performance	measures
The	involvement	of	stakeholders	in	the	design	of	the	P4P	program	had	only	a	
partial	effect	on	the	type	of	quality	indicators	chosen.	Based	mainly	on	the	
national	accreditation	program	for	primary	care	and	the	Quality	and	Outcomes	
Framework	(QOF)	in	the	UK,	the	panel	was	quite	clear	that	three	domains	of	
performance	measures	should	be	distinguished:	clinical	care,	practice	manage-
ment	and	patient	experience.12,13	Other	P4P	programs	have	featured	comparable	
domains.	
In	the	QOF,	income	is	linked	to	performance	based	on	76	clinical	quality	indica-
tors	and	a	further	70	indicators	relating	to	the	organisation	of	care	and	patient	
experience.	The	clinical	indicators	mainly	relate	to	processes	–	for	example	
measuring	disease	parameters	and	giving	treatment	–	with	only	10	of	the	76	
original	clinical	indicators	relating	to	outcomes.12	The	Practice	Incentive	Program	
(PIP)	in	Australia	includes	incentives	for	11	aspects	of	care	including	the	quality	
of	prescribing,	diabetes,	asthma,	cervical	cancer,	indigenous	health,	e-health,	
after-hours	care,	teaching,	rural	loading,	aged	care	access,	and	a	financial	incentive	
aimed	at	ensuring	access	to	surgical,	anaesthetic,	and	obstetric	services	in	rural	
areas.14	The	Integrated	Healthcare	Association	(IHA)	P4P	program	in	the	United	
States	contains	four	measurement	domains	(measurement	year	2012):	clinical	
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quality	(prevention,	cardiovascular,	diabetes,	maternity,	musculoskeletal,	and	
respiratory	conditions),	patient	experience,	meaningful	use	of	health	IT	and	
appropriate	resource	use.15
In	these	programs	clinical	care	measures	focus	on	chronic	care	and	prevention,	
as	in	our	program.	Not	all	programs	involve	patients’	experiences.	In	Australia,	
for	example,	patients’	experiences	are	no	part	of	the	PIP.	With	respect	to	patient	
centred	care	it	is	important	to	know	patients’	experiences.	This	makes	it	possible	
to	actually	listen	to	your	patient	and	act	accordingly.	Furthermore,	our	program	
seems	to	be	more	balanced	than	other	programs	with	regard	to	the	weighting	
of	clinical	care,	practice	management	and	patient	experiences	(2:1:1)	in	the	
program.12,14,16,17	For	example,	in	the	QOF	the	weighting	of	patient	experiences	
is	much	lower	than	in	our	program.	
The	involvement	of	stakeholders	led	to	the	inclusion	of	a	smaller	number	of	
indicators	in	our	program	than	the	UK’s	program,	but	to	a	greater	number	than	
in	Australia	and	the	US.	This	result	possibly	reflects	the	struggle	to	obtain	
meaningful	information	in	a	feasible	manner.	Obtaining	meaningful	information	
appeals	to	intrinsic	motivation,	but	it	can	be	restricted	by	the	data	collection,	
which	needs	to	be	feasible	and	not	too	labour	intensive.	The	panel	suggested	
that	the	performance	measures	could	be	rotated	every	couple	of	years	to	
include	indicators	that	cover	a	wide	range	of	aspects	of	care	while	still	keeping	
the	data	collection	feasible.
	 Appraisal	and	reimbursement
The	involvement	of	the	stakeholders	in	the	design	of	the	P4P	program	resulted	
in	three	main	differences	with	other	programs,	which	are:	(1)	the	use	of	relative	
performance	standards,	(2)	rewarding	both	quality	level	and	performance	
improvement,	and	(3)	the	size	of	the	bonus.	
The	thresholds	that	were	set	were	‘relative’,	based	on	the	25th	percentile	of	group	
performance,	which	is	in	contrast	to	other	P4P	programs	that	mainly	determine	
their	incentives	on	the	basis	of	absolute	performance	standards.6,8,14,16-19	In	the	
UK	minimum	thresholds	were	set	at	an	indicator	compliance	score	of	40%,	
although	a	few	at	25%,	and	maximum	thresholds	were	set	at	an	indicator	score	
of	90%.17	Practices	earned	points	based	on	the	proportion	of	eligible	patients	
for	whom	the	quality	targets	were	achieved.12	Relative	thresholds	can	provoke	
uncertainty	and	complexity,	which	can	negatively	influence	the	effectiveness	
of	the	P4P	program.20	In	our	panel	discussion	a	slight	majority	preferred	the	
relative	threshold	applied	in	a	way	that	could	prevent	low	achievers	from
dropping	out	because	they	thought	that	the	benchmark	outranged	their	per-
formance	capabilities.	In	the	interviews	with	the	GPs	that	took	place	after	
awarding	the	bonus,	the	majority	seemed	to	prefer	absolute	thresholds,	which	
were	perceived	as	more	honest,	because	they	would	not	be	raised	when	group	
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performance	improves.	Lessons	from	behavioural	economics	also	tend	to	favour	
the	formulation	of	absolute	thresholds	in	P4P	programs	to	enhance	their	effec-
tiveness.20	It	is	stated	that	a	program	with	absolute	performance	standards	is	
more	secure	for	the	participants,	because	the	level	of	performance	required	to	
earn	the	incentive	is	known.	
Our	stakeholders	chose	to	incentivise	both	the	quality	level	and	the	level	of	
performance	improvement,	while	most	other	programs	reward	only	good	
performance	but	not	improvement.21	The	Integrated	Healthcare	Association	
(IHA)	P4P	program	also	rewards	improvement	based	on	changes	in	the	perfor-
mance	between	two	consecutive	years.15	A	combination	of	both	quality	level	and	
performance	improvement	was	considered	to	be	more	likely	to	gain	acceptance.	
Furthermore,	this	mix	of	reward	criteria	stimulates	improved	practices	at	the	
bottom	as	well	as	at	the	top.	It	reflects	the	focus	on	intrinsic	motivation	very	
well.	It	was	considered	that	all	participants	should	have	something	to	strive	for,	
otherwise	the	interest	in	the	program	would	fade	away	and	quality	improvement	
would	be	hard	to	achieve.	
The	discussion	with	the	target	users	about	the	size	of	the	bonus	resulted	in	a	
bonus	of	on	average	5% to	10%	of	practice	income.	The	size	of	the	bonus	should	
not	be	too	small	as	this	may	limit	its	effects,	nor	too	high	because	of	unintended	
consequences	like	gaming.	It	was	agreed	that	the	proposed	size	of	the	bonus	
should	be	in	line	with	the	bonuses	paid	in	trade	and	industry.	GPs	and	insurers	
could	easily	reach	a	consensus	about	a	bonus	of,	on	average,	5% to	10%	of	
practice	income	once	the	argument	for	this	was	put	on	the	table.	Our	bonus	
was	much	smaller	than	the	incentive	in	the	UK	which	makes	up	approximately	
25%	of	GPs’	income.22	In	other	programs	bonuses	vary	between	US$	2	per	
patient	and	US$	10000	per	practice.23	Our	practices	could	earn	between	
€	0	and	€	6890	(about	US$	8800)	per	1000	patients.24	
	 Stakeholder	involvement	and	P4P:	critical	remarks
Stakeholder	involvement	in	the	design	of	a	P4P	program	that	combines	intrinsic	
and	extrinsic	motivation	seems	to	have	influenced	the	effectiveness	of	the	P4P	
program	in	a	positive	way.	Nevertheless,	critical	remarks	can	be	made	as	well.	
First	of	all,	questions	can	be	raised	about	the	selection	of	the	stakeholders.	
Chronic	diseases	played	a	prominent	role,	therefore	it	might	have	been	worth-
while	to	invite	(and	assess)	other	caregivers	such	as	the	practice	nurse,	the	
dietician,	the	physical	therapist	and	the	pharmacist.	The	patients	were	invited	to	
give	written	responses	during	the	determination	of	the	set	of	indicators	in	the	
context	of	the	Dutch	National	GP	Accreditation	program,	but	they	were	not	
invited	to	the	panel	discussion.	Perhaps,	their	contribution	could	have	helped	
avoid	the	omission	of	inviting	other	caregivers.	Two	of	the	five	largest	health	
insurance	companies	took	part	in	the	design	of	the	P4P	program.	During	the	
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panel	discussions	the	insurers	were	a	little	hesitant,	especially	when	the	clinical	
indicators	were	discussed.	It	might	have	been	worthwhile	involving	other	health	
insurers	as	well,	and	to	involve	insurers	better	in	some	decisions,	especially	to	
enhance	the	national	roll	out.	Concerning	national	roll	out,	the	sustainability	and	
wider	implementation	of	the	program	largely	failed:	doubts	were	raised	about	
the	long-term	effects,	the	side-effects	as	well	as	the	registration	burden.	The	
P4P	program	was	seen	as	an	interesting	project	but	there	was	a	lack	of	drive	
to	implement	it	any	further.	The	various	stakeholders	did	not	want	to	take	the	
initiative,	but	were	waiting	for	a	national	initiative	by	the	government.	
We	interviewed	GPs	about	their	experience	with	the	P4P	program	and	the	
decisions	made	after	they	participated	in	it.	The	involvement	of	target	users	
in	the	developmental	process	proved	to	be	no	guarantee	that	there	was	no	
criticism	of	the	program.	Participating	in	a	P4P	program	does	not	necessarily	
mean	that	participants	are	fully	aware	of	the	program.	Major	differences	were	
found	in	the	extent	to	which	physicians	in	other	countries	were	aware	of	the	
(targets	of	a)	P4P	program,	which	is	an	issue	that	can	affect	the	impact	of	the	
program.25-27	At	least	their	involvement	in	designing	our	program	has	led	to	a	
higher	awareness	of	its	existence	among	the	participating	practices.	So	far	no	
studies	have	been	published	about	experiences	of	GPs	who	were	actually	involved	
in	the	development	of	a	P4P	program.	However,	studies	about	the	experiences	
of	participation	in	a	P4P	program	are	available.	Physicians	in	the	study	of	Young	et	
al.	agreed	that	physicians	should	be	financially	rewarded	for	providing	a	higher	
quality	of	care:	P4P	could	improve	quality	and	it	is	more	effective	than	peer	
recognition	alone.28	Participants	of	the	QOF	believed	the	financial	incentives	
had	been	sufficient	to	change	behaviour	and	to	enable	targets	to	be	achieved.29
Criticism	of	our	P4P	program	and	its	unintended	consequences	mostly	con-
cerned	gaming	the	system,	developing	‘tunnel	vision’,	the	administrative	work-
load	and	the	relationship	between	provider	and	payer.	Gaming	can	be	caused	by	
the	fear	of	losing	one’s	reputation,	but	also	by	financial	considerations.	The	risk	
of	gaming	is	lurking	wherever	exception	reporting	is	allowed,	which	was	not	the	
case	in	our	program.	Nevertheless,	a	qualitative	study	in	the	UK	has	shown	that	
the	use	of	exception	reporting	is	acceptable.30	Another	unintended	consequence	
mentioned	was	developing	a	‘tunnel	vision’,	which	means	that	GPs	focus	most	on	
those	aspects	of	care	that	are	incentivised.	In	the	UK,	performance	improvements	
in	those	conditions	that	were	not	included	in	the	QOF	were	significantly	less	
than	for	the	incentivised	indicators,	and	these	differences	increased	over	time.31	
Focusing	on	the	aspects	of	care	that	are	incentivised	might	occur	at	the	expense	
of	other	aspects	that	could	be	more	important,	such	as	personal	attention.	The	
results	of	a	study	in	the	UK	suggest	that	the	program	has	changed	the	nature	of	
the	practitioner-patient	consultation.29	Another	concern	was	the	data	collection,	
which	was	very	labour	intensive.	As	mentioned	before,	the	stakeholders	found	a	
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good	compromise	in	obtaining	meaningful	information	in	a	feasible	manner.	The	
Australian	Medical	Association	also	described	the	high	administrative	burden	
that	was	created	by	their	PIP	program.32	Attaching	performance	to	payments	
can	generate	suspicion	and	resentment,	undermining	the	mutual	trust	between	
payer	and	provider	that	is	essential	for	any	P4P	program	to	operate	effectively.33	
About	half	of	the	GPs	participating	in	our	program	did	not	want	to	give	detailed	
information	about	their	performance	to	insurers,	for	fear	that	the	information	
might	be	used	for	sanctions	or	penalties.	
	 Methodological	considerations
This	thesis	contains	five	studies,	each	of	which	has	specific	strengths	and	limita-
tions,	as	has	been	mentioned	in	the	separate	chapters.	Here	we	summarize	the	
main	methodological	considerations.
Overall	the	development	and	evaluation	of	the	P4P	program	can	be	considered	
an	exploratory	study.	Attributing	the	improvements	to	the	P4P	program	would,	
for	instance,	have	been	easier	if	the	study	design	had	been	a	randomised	control-
led	trial	(RCT).	However,	most	studies	on	the	effect	of	P4P	do	not	meet	RCT	
criteria.8	Introducing	a	control	group	for	such	a	RCT	is	difficult	because	collec-
ting	data	on	performance	measurement	is	an	intervention	strategy	in	itself.	Also,	
most	practices	do	not	like	to	be	in	the	control	arm	of	such	an	experiment.	This	
makes	our	results	responsive	to	other	activities	in	general	practice	focused	on	
improving	the	quality	of	care	of	the	chosen	subjects.	However,	finding	different	
measures	that	all	changed	in	the	same	direction	gives	us	circumstantial	evidence	
that	supports	the	effect	of	the	program.	
Practices	were	able	to	register	voluntarily	for	this	experiment,	which	may	have	
resulted	in	overrepresentation	of	early	adopters	of	the	P4P	program.	It	is	
important	that	other	GPs	support	the	program	as	well.	Whether	the	designed	
P4P	program	reflects	the	majority	of	the	general	practices	nationally	is	uncertain.	
This	might	have	affected	the	further	implementation	of	the	P4P	program.	It	
would	be	of	interest	to	learn	about	the	experiences	of	a	comparative	group	of	
people	who	were	not	involved	in	designing	the	program	and	who	were	not	
participating	as	volunteers.	It	can	be	argued	that	this	group	would	probably	have	
been	less	enthusiastic	as	a	control	group	in	the	P4P	program.	
The	link	with	the	national	accreditation	program	for	primary	care	can	be	
considered	both	a	strength	and	a	weakness.	The	intervention	would	have	been	
totally	bottom-up	if	we	had	started	from	scratch	with	the	domains	and	indicators	
for	the	development	of	the	P4P	program.	As	the	stakeholders	considered	the	
accreditation	program	an	acceptable	foundation	for	the	P4P	program,	a	lot	of	
time	was	saved	in	the	discussions	about	design	choices,	which	meant	the	data	
collection	phase	was	accelerated.
The	time	span	of	the	evaluation	of	the	P4P	program	allowed	one	post-measure-
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ment	both	for	clinical	care	and	patient	experience.	If	we	could	have	done	more	
measurements	we	would	have	been	able	to	learn	more	about	the	long-term	
effects	of	the	program.	Furthermore,	more	improvement	plans	would	in	all	
likelihood	have	been	completed	after	a	longer	period.	Therefore,	the	conclusions	
of	this	study	should	be	interpreted	with	caution.
	 Implications
In	our	project	we	have	obtained	indications	that	our	approach	to	P4P	and	quality	
improvement,	which	is	focused	on	both	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	motivation,	may	
be	more	effective	than	a	system	that	is	focused	on	either	intrinsic	or	extrinsic	
motivation.	However,	we	do	not	know	whether	this	can	be	sustained	over	a	
longer	period	of	time.	Therefore,	we	have	presented	some	of	the	implications	of	
a	national	roll	out	of	the	P4P	program.	To	a	certain	extent,	the	implications	are	
based	on	some	conversations	we	had	with	stakeholders	several	years	after	
finishing	the	P4P	experiment.	These	stakeholders	were	representatives	of	the	
two	financing	health	insurers	and	a	general	practitioner	who	all	actively	took	
part	in	the	former	project	team.	The	conversations	resulted	in	hypotheses	
concerning	the	national	roll	out	of	the	P4P	program	which	will	be	discussed	in	
more	detail	below.	For	national	roll	out,	it	is	important	that	the	program	is	
embedded	in	daily	activities,	is	not	seen	as	a	project	that	will	end	and	is	feasible.	
Given	the	development	of	integrated	care,	embedding	the	program	in	daily	
activities	means	that	integrated	care	needs	to	be	incentivised.	Furthermore,	the	
program	needs	to	be	affordable	and	arrangements	need	to	be	made	regionally	
in	which	the	key	figures	of	the	region	are	involved.
	 Performance	measures	for	integrated	care
In	our	P4P	program,	performance	measures	for	general	practice	were	developed	
and	incentivised.	In	the	Netherlands	integrated	care	programs	have	now	been	
developed	for	diabetes,	COPD	and	cardiovascular	diseases.34-36	In	these	pro-
grams	different	healthcare	providers	are	jointly	responsible	for	the	care	that	is	
delivered,	not	just	the	GP	and	medical	specialist	but	also	the	physiotherapist,	
the	pharmacist	and	other	allied	healthcare	providers.	Given	this	development	in	
chronic	care,	the	performance	measures	in	our	P4P	program	should	be	adapted	
to	a	set	of	performance	measures	for	each	healthcare	provider	and	to	integrated	
care	as	a	whole.	It	is	important	that	the	data	collection	is	feasible:	having	a	good	
infrastructure	for	data	collection	is	very	important,	even	more	so	when	collecting	
data	for	integrated	care	that	is	delivered	by	more	than	one	provider	in	more	than	
one	setting.	Therefore,	extracting	data	automatically	via	the	electronic	medical	
record	(EMR)	system	is	preferred,	like	for	example	that	in	the	UK.12	The	EMR	
was	one	of	the	barriers	to	national	roll	out	mentioned	by	the	stakeholders.	For	
large	scale	implementation	of	the	P4P	program	it	is	necessary	that	the	EMR	is	
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well	organised	for	retrieving	data,	and	that	software	to	support	this	process	
becomes	available.	Even	the	early	adopters	of	the	P4P	program	did	not	necessar-
ily	have	a	good	ICT	infrastructure;	therefore,	to	get	this	right,	additional	invest-
ment	is	needed.	Furthermore,	the	validity	and	reliability	of	the	data	are	a	
concern	when	extracting	data	automatically.
When	developing	performance	measures	in	a	participatory	way	it	is	a	challenge	
to	involve	all	stakeholders,	such	as	the	organisations	for	dieticians,	physiothera-
pists,	pharmacists	and	so	on.	Furthermore,	it	is	a	challenge	to	decide	who	can	
make	the	final	decisions.	We	also	suggest	putting	in	place	a	system	for	revising	
indicators	through	which	indicators	can	be	deliberately	added	or	removed.	
In	healthcare	in	general,	and	in	quality	improvement	in	particular,	leadership	is	
very	important.37,38	Research	is	needed	to	explore	leadership	in	the	field	of	
performance	measures	for	integrated	care	in	a	P4P	program.
	 Payment	for	integrated	care
The	introduction	of	a	P4P	program	with	performance	measures	for	integrated	
care	has	consequences	for	the	payment	system.	Purchasers	wonder	how	much	
to	pay	for	quality,	which	aspects	of	care	should	be	involved,	and	what	source	
should	be	used	for	this	re-investment.	The	main	question	is	where	to	find	the	
‘new’	money	for	this	kind	of	experiment.	That	is	why	new	payment	programs	
have	been	introduced,	especially	in	the	USA.	One	of	the	more	comprehensive	
models	is	the	Alternative	Quality	Contract	(AQC)	from	Blue	Cross	Blue	Shield	
of	Massachusetts	(BCBS).39	The	AQC	is	a	contracting	model	that	is	based	on	
global	payment	(capitation)	and	pay-for-performance.	The	AQC	contains	three	
main	features	that	distinguish	it	from	traditional	fee-for-service	contracts.	
Physician	groups,	in	some	cases	together	with	a	hospital,	enter	into	5-year	global	
budget	contracts	(rather	than	1-year	contracts).	AQC	groups	are	eligible	for	P4P	
bonuses	of	up	to	10%	of	their	budget,	with	performance	measures	for	ambula-
tory	care	and	hospital	care	each	contributing	up	to	half	of	the	calculation	of	the	
bonus.	AQC	groups	receive	technical	support	from	BCBS,	including	reports	
on	spending,	utilization,	and	quality,	to	assist	them	in	managing	their	budget	and	
improving	quality.	Such	a	model	suggests	management	of	care	on	a	population	
level.	
A	shared	saving	program	could	be	another	alternative.	These	programs	are	
defined	in	a	fee-for-service	system.	In	these	payment	models	a	group	of	care-
givers	is	made	responsible	for	a	certain	population	(chronically	ill,	elderly),	and	
they	can	share	payer	savings	if	they	meet	quality	and	cost	performance	bench-
marks.40	Shared	savings	models	can	differ	in	the	degree	of	risk	shifting.	Some	
models	entail	no	performance	risk	to	providers	even	if	they	experience	higher	
costs	or	if	they	do	not	achieve	quality	performance	goals.	Other	models	require	
providers	to	share	the	financial	risk	by	accepting	some	accountability	for	costs	
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that	greatly	exceed	the	goals.	The	latter	gives	providers	an	opportunity	to	
receive	proportionately	larger	bonuses	in	exchange	for	this	risk.41	A	fundamental	
question	in	a	shared	saving	program	is	the	extent	to	which	feasible	improvements	
in	performance	by	themselves	can	be	expected	to	produce	substantial	savings.	
Furthermore	high	performers	with	low	average	costs	create	value	for	the	system	
but	might	not	demonstrate	‘new’	savings.42	
	 Regional	payment	of	integrated	care
In	the	Netherlands	the	payment	system	for	chronic	care	and	prevention	benefits	
from	a	payment	for	a	certain	population	within	a	region	when	specific	criteria	
for	quality	are	achieved.	A	combination	of	the	alternative	quality	contract	and	
shared	savings	could	be	a	payment	system	that	supports	quality	improvement	
in	an	affordable	way.	The	payments	for	each	region	can	be	used	for	improving	
the	healthcare	in	the	region	with	specific	agreements	about	what	and	how	to	
improve.	It	is	important	to	involve	the	key	figures	in	the	region	to	make	these	
agreements.	Furthermore,	a	sound	monitoring	system	is	important	for	all	
payment	systems	involving	quality	parameters	and	costs.	No	clear	answers	can	
be	given	about	its	effectiveness:	this	payment	structure	needs	to	be	tested	and	
evaluated	scientifically.
	 Conclusion
We	have	developed	a	participatory	P4P	program	for	primary	care,	the	results	of	
which	were	encouraging.	New	payment	models	have	been	suggested,	but	evidence	
for	them	is	still	lacking.	We	argue	for	a	systematic	evaluation	and	implementation.	
Specific	lessons	can	be	learned	from	this	experiment,	especially	since	P4P	seems	
to	play	a	prominent	role	in	these	new	payment	models.	These	lessons	concern	
the	positive	effect	of	the	involvement	of	stakeholders	in	designing	the	P4P	
program,	the	necessity	of	having	a	well-organised	infrastructure	including	access-
ible	electronic	medical	records,	and	beginning	with	a	national	roll	out	procedure	
with	strong	leadership	to	ensure	long-term	positive	effects.
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Changing	the	behaviour	of	healthcare	professionals	is	necessary	to	improve	
quality	of	care.	Audit	and	feedback	is	a	common	intervention	that	has	proven	
to	be	effective,	although	the	success	rate	is	sometimes	marginal.	In	a	new	genera-
tion	of	interventions	audit	and	feedback	is	extended	by	setting	financial	incen-
tives	in	prospect.	These	pay-for-performance	(P4P)	programs	have	emerged	in	
many	forms,	but	effect	studies	presented	inconclusive	results.	One	of	the	reasons	
is	probably	the	difference	in	designs	of	the	programs	compared.	A	clear	frame-
work	for	the	design	of	a	P4P	program	was	lacking	in	the	initial	period.	Also,	the	
financial	incentives	themselves	varied	significantly.	A	small	bonus	may	have	little	
incentive	effect,	but	a	large	bonus	may	provoke	negative	side	effects.	Linked	to	
this	dilemma	is	consideration	whether	P4P	programs	that	are	directed	more	
towards	raising	the	intrinsic	motivation	for	quality	improvement	may	enhance	
their	effectiveness.	This	intrinsic	motivation	can	be	stimulated	by	involving	the	
target	users	in	designing	the	P4P	program.	The	present	thesis	focuses	on	the	
structural	development	and	evaluation	of	a	participatory	pay-for-performance	
program,	in	which	target	users	are	involved	in	designing	the	P4P	program.
Chapter 1	describes	the	objective	and	the	following	research	questions:
1	 What	is	the	impact	of	feedback	on	performance	accompanied	by	information	
on	best	practices	on	the	accessibility	and	availability	in	general	practice?
2	 Which	design	choices	are	made	by	the	target	users	for	a	P4P	program,	in	
which	the	different	options	for	performance	measurement,	appraisal	and	
reimbursement	were	discussed	in	a	systematic	consensus	procedure?
3	 What	is	the	validity	of	the	clinical	care	domain?
4	 What	is	the	effect	of	the	P4P	program	on	clinical	indicators	as	well	as	on	the	
patient	experience	after	one	year?
5	 Has	the	involvement	of	target	users	in	designing	the	P4P	program	led	to	
positive	evaluations	and	confidence	in	its	future	use?
In	chapter 2,	we	present	a	quality-improvement	study	examining	the	impact	of	
feedback	on	performance	accompanied	by	information	on	best	practices	on	
the	accessibility	and	availability	in	general	practice.	A	pre-intervention	and	post-
intervention	data	collection	was	conducted	in	36	general	practices	in	the	south	
of	the	Netherlands.	Many	patients	were	not	satisfied	with	the	accessibility	and	
availability	of	general	practice,	and	would	like	to	see	improvement.	The	practices	
received	feedback	about	their	accessibility	and	availability	compared	with	data	
from	practices	of	colleagues.	The	practices	developed	practice-based	improve-
ment	plans	using	these	feedback	results.	Eighty	percent	of	the	improvement	
plans	were	completed	or	almost	completed	in	five	months.	Feedback	and	
practice-based	improvement	plans	were	a	stimulus	to	work	on	and	to	improve	
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accessibility	and	availability.	All	practices	started	improvement	plans,	but	the	
overall	effect	of	the	changes	was	modest.	
Chapter 3	describes	the	choices	of	the	target	users	for	a	design	of	a	P4P	pro-
gram	in	primary	care.	By	adopting	a	framework	for	designing	P4P	programs,	a	
distinction	has	been	made	between	performance	measurement,	appraisal	and	
reimbursement.	Using	an	adapted	Delphi	procedure,	the	design	choices	were	
discussed	in	two	panels	of	target	users.	The	target	users	were	representatives	of	
65	general	practices	and	of	two	health	insurance	companies	in	the	south	of	the	
Netherlands.	The	panels	discussed	the	performance	measures,	that	is,	the	
domains,	subjects	and	indicators,	as	well	as	the	period	of	data	collection.	The	
appraisal	issues	discussed	were	the	unit	of	assessment	(GP,	general	practice	or	
larger	organisational	unit),	performance	standards	(absolute	versus	relative),	
weighing	the	domains	and	indicators,	exact	calculations,	weighing	quality	level	
and	quality	improvement	scores,	number	of	levels	of	quality	scores	and	feedback.	
Discussion	of	the	reimbursement	included	the	form	of	remuneration	(money,	
human	resources,	sabbatical),	the	size	of	the	bonus	and	agreements	on	the	
spending	of	the	bonus	(with	or	without	obligations).	It	was	decided	that	the	
performance	measures	were	linked	to	the	Dutch	National	Accreditation	
program	that	was	established	by	The	Dutch	College	of	General	Practitioners.	
The	performance	measures	concern	three	domains:	clinical	care,	practice	manage-
ment	and	patient	experience.	The	topics	presented	in	clinical	care	involve	mainly	
indicators	that	describe	chronic	care	(diabetes	care,	COPD	and	asthma	care,	
cardiovascular	risk	management),	some	issues	on	prescription	management	and	
uptake	rates	on	influenza	vaccination	and	cervical	cancer	screening.	Practice	
management	and	patient	experience	were	measured	by	validated	questionnaires.	
For	the	appraisal,	the	general	practice	was	chosen	as	unit	of	assessment.	Relative	
standards	were	set	at	the	25th	percentile	of	group	performance.	The	incentive	
for	clinical	care	was	set	twice	as	high	as	the	one	for	practice	management	and	
patient	experience.	The	incentives	for	clinical	care	were	only	related	to	the	
process	indicators	and	not	to	the	outcomes.	Quality	scores	were	to	be	calcu-
lated	separately	for	all	three	domains,	and	for	both	quality	level	and	quality	
improvement.	The	incentive	for	quality	level	was	set	thrice	as	high	as	the	one	
for	the	improvement	of	performance.	For	reimbursement,	quality	scores	were	
divided	into	seven	levels.	The	bonus	aimed	at	was	on	average	5%	to	10%	of	the	
practice	income	with	a	maximum	of	6890	Euros	per	1000	patients.	The	final	
design	choices	were	consented	to	by	often	a	large	majority,	except	for	the	
prescription	indicators.	The	prescription	indicators	were	highly	valued	by	the	
health	insurance	representatives,	but	the	GPs	questioned	these	indicators,	which	
resulted	in	not	including	the	acid	suppressive	drugs	indicators	in	the	program,	
and	including	only	indicators	on	prescribing	antibiotics.	No	clear	decision	could	
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be	made	about	thresholds	of	the	performance	measures.	Only	a	slight	majority	
preferred	the	relative	thresholds.	It	was	argued	that	relative	thresholds	would	
prevent	low	achievers	from	dropping	out	as	the	benchmark	was	realistic,	and	
that	absolute	thresholds	could	be	thought	of	as	outranging	their	performance	
capabilities.	Overall,	this	P4P	program	designed	by	involving	the	target	users	
contained	elements	of	the	different	P4P	programs	in	other	countries	in	a	unique	
combination.	The	more	balanced	position	of	patient	experiences	in	our	program	
is	rather	exceptional.
In	chapter 4,	we	present	an	observational	study	based	on	the	medical	records	
of	82	general	practices	to	evaluate	the	clinical	indicators	of	our	P4P	program.	We	
evaluated	four	reliability	and	validity	issues,	that	is	(1)	the	correlation	between	
the	indicator	sets,	(2)	internal	consistency	of	the	indicator	sets,	(3)	reliability	of	
indicator	scores	per	patient	population	and	(4)	the	reliability	of	the	benchmark.	
The	indicators	that	covered	chronic	disease	management	(diabetes,	COPD,	
asthma	and	cardiovascular	risk	management),	prevention	activities	(influenza	
vaccination,	cervical	cancer	screening)	and	antibiotics	policy	were	correlated	
weakly,	suggesting	that	the	instrument	provided	a	rather	broad	scope	of	the	
practice	performance	on	these	issues.	Furthermore,	the	different	subjects	were	
each	measured	by	indicators	that	had	sufficient	coherence,	which	suggested	that	
they	measured	a	clear	underlying	concept.	It	was	calculated	that	to	achieve	a	
reliable	indicator	score,	data	from	at	least	96	patients	were	necessary	when	10%	
error	is	allowed.	To	establish	a	reliable	benchmark	233	practices	are	needed	
when	5%	error	is	allowed.	The	clinical	indicators	of	the	P4P	program	are	reliable	
and	valid	on	the	tested	properties,	but	the	number	of	patients	and	practices	
needed	suggests	that	public	information	on	single	indicators	lacks	meaning.
Chapter 5	describes	the	effect	of	our	P4P	program	on	clinical	indicators	as	well	
as	on	the	patient	experience	after	introducing	the	participatory	P4P	program.	
An	observational	study	was	conducted	with	a	pre-	and	post-measurement	in	60	
general	practices	in	the	south	of	the	Netherlands.	The	assessment	was	measured	
by	the	indicators	on	clinical	care	and	patient	experience	that	could	have	been	
incentivised	according	to	the	practice	performance.	These	measures	were	
process	indicators	of	chronic	care	(diabetes,	COPD,	asthma	and	cardiovascular	
risk	management),	indicators	of	antibiotic	prescription	and	uptake	rates	(influenza	
vaccination	and	cervical	cancer	screening)	as	well	as	indicators	of	patient	
experience	(GP’s	functioning	and	practice	organisation).	Outcome	measures	of	
chronic	care	were	also	collected	although	they	were	not	incentivised.	A	linear	
mixed	effect	model	was	calculated	including	the	above	measures	after	remunera-
tion	based	on	benchmarking	as	dependent	variables,	and	the	baseline	measures,	
practice	type	and	urbanisation	level	as	covariates.	After	one	year,	significant	
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improvements	were	observed	for	the	process	indicators	for	diabetes	(+10.4%),	
COPD	(+8.1%),	asthma	(+11.5%)	and	cardiovascular	risk	management	(+7.9%).	
Patients’	experience	of	GP’s	functioning	statistically	improved	by	5.9%	and	
patients’	experience	of	the	organisation	of	care	by	5.6%.	Five	out	of	seven	out-
come	indicators	showed	significant	improvements,	ranging	from	+5.9%	(blood	
pressure	diabetes)	to	+14.7%	(blood	pressure	CVRM).	No	significant	improve-
ments	were	seen	for	influenza	vaccination	rate	and	the	cervical	cancer	screening	
uptake.	The	clinical	process	and	outcome	indicators,	as	well	as	patient	experience	
indicators,	were	affected	by	baseline	performance.	Smaller	practices	showed	
more	improvement.	We	concluded	that	a	participatory	P4P	program	might	
stimulate	quality	improvement	in	clinical	care	and	improve	patient	experiences	
with	GP’s	functioning	and	the	organisation	of	care.	
In	chapter	6,	we	present	a	qualitative	study	about	the	experiences	of	general	
practices	with	the	P4P	program.	The	involvement	of	target	users	in	the	design	
choices	of	a	P4P	program	was	supposed	to	enhance	its	impact,	but	little	is	known	
about	the	views	of	participants	in	these	programs.	Thirty	out	of	65	general	
practices	participating	in	the	P4P	program,	stratified	for	bonus,	were	invited	to	
a	semistructured	interview	on	feasibility,	feedback	of	the	indicator	scores,	the	
bonus,	spending	of	the	bonus,	unintended	consequences	and	future	develop-
ments.	Content	analysis	was	used	to	process	the	resulting	transcripts.	One	
practice	dropped	out	as	it	proved	impossible	to	reach	an	appointment	during	
the	predefined	period.	Feasibility	of	the	P4P	program	was	questioned	due	to	the	
substantial	time	investment.	The	feedback	on	clinical	care,	practice	management	
and	patient	experience	was	mostly	discussed	in	the	team,	and	used	for	improve-
ment	plans.	One	GP	considered	the	feedback	as	annoying,	and	for	another	GP	
it	brought	feelings	of	insecurity.	Most	practices	considered	the	bonus	to	be	a	
stimulus	to	improve	quality	of	care,	and	as	compensation	for	their	effort	and	
time	invested.	Distinctive	performance	features	were	not	displayed	on,	for	
instance,	a	website.	The	bonus	was	mainly	spent	on	new	equipment	or	team-
building.	As	unintended	consequences,	practices	referred	to	gaming	and	focusing	
on	those	aspects	that	were	incentivised	(‘tunnel	vision’).	Speaking	about	future	
developments	it	was	suggested	changing	relative	standards	into	absolute	ones.	
Absolute	standards	have	the	advantage	that	practices	can	prepare	themselves	
better	on	expected	performance	standards.	Other	proposals	included	that	the	
audit	could	profit	from	more	standardisation,	and	new	indicators	had	to	be	
developed	to	keep	the	process	going.	Linking	a	part	of	the	bonus	to	innovation	
was	also	suggested.	General	practitioners	considered	the	feedback	and	the	
bonus	to	be	a	stimulus	for	improving	quality	and	performance	in	the	next	year,	
although	the	data	collection	involved	a	substantial	time	investment.	The	
participants	were	overall	positive	about	the	P4P	program,	but	unintended	
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consequences	like	gaming	and	too	narrow	a	focus	on	program	objectives	should	
be	taken	into	account.
In	chapter	7,	we	present	the	general	discussion	of	this	thesis,	summarising	the	
main	findings	of	our	study,	its	strengths	and	weaknesses	and	main	implications	
for	practice	and	research.	We	assumed	that	involving	GPs	in	designing	a	P4P	
program	in	a	structured	manner	would	improve	intrinsic	motivation,	and	that	
adding	an	incentive	to	performance	would	stimulate	extrinsic	motivation.	This	
hypothesis	was	largely	supported	by	our	data.	Our	P4P	program	resulted	in	
significant	improvements	of,	on	average,	6%	in	the	patient	experience	and	10%	
in	clinical	care.	Compared	with	other	programs	aimed	at	either	intrinsic	or	
extrinsic	motivation,	the	results	of	our	P4P	experiment	resulted	in	greater	
changes.	
In	general,	the	involvement	of	GPs	and	representatives	of	the	health	insurance	
companies	in	designing	the	P4P	program	resulted	in	a	program	with	a	smaller	
number	of	indicators	than	in	the	UK’s	program	(Quality	and	Outcome	Frame-
work),	but	a	larger	number	of	indicators	than	in	programs	that	run	in	the	US	
or	Australia.	The	three	main	differences	between	our	P4P	program	and	other	
programs	are:	(1)	the	use	of	relative	performance	standards,	(2)	rewarding	both	
quality	level	and	performance	improvement	and	(3)	the	size	of	the	bonus.	
Despite	the	quality	improvement	demonstrated	and	the	fairly	positive	evaluations	
of	the	P4P	program	by	the	GPs,	national	roll	out	was	delayed.	In	the	meantime	
a	national	discussion	started	on	integrated	primary	care.	Again,	chronic	care	was	
chosen	as	the	prior	topic	in	these	programs	that	made	use	of	the	same	indicators	
as	our	P4P	program.	However,	the	remuneration	was	not	expressed	in	a	bonus	
but	in	bundled	payments.	In	some	experimental	settings	population	management	
will	be	introduced	in	which	a	bonus	may	play	a	certain	role.	The	lessons	learned	
from	our	P4P	program	showed	that	the	involvement	of	target	users	in	designing	
these	programs	in	a	structured	manner	does	pay	off	in	the	impact	on	quality	of	
care	improvement.
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Om	de	kwaliteit	van	zorg	te	verbeteren,	is	het	veranderen	van	het	gedrag	van	
beroepsbeoefenaren	in	de	gezondheidszorg	noodzakelijk.	Audit en	feedback	is	
een	veel	voorkomende	interventie	die	bewezen	effectief	is,	alhoewel	het	effect	
soms	marginaal	is.	In	een	nieuwe	generatie	van	interventies	op	het	gebied	van	
audit	en	feedback	worden	consequenties	verbonden	aan	de	feedback.	Zo	wordt	
bijvoorbeeld	een	financiële	prikkel	gekoppeld	aan	prestaties.	Deze	pay-for-
performance	(P4P)	programma’s	zijn	ontstaan		in	vele	vormen,	maar	effectstudies	
laten	geen	duidelijke	resultaten	zien.	Het	aantonen	van	resultaten	wordt	bemoei-
lijkt,	omdat	de	programma’s	zeer	verschillend	van	inhoud	zijn.	Een	duidelijk	kader	
voor	het	ontwerp	van	een	P4P	programma	ontbrak	in	de	eerste	periode.	Maar	
ook	de	omvang	van	de	financiële	prikkel	zelf	verschilde	sterk	tussen	de	diverse	
programma’s.	Wel	bleek	dat	in	het	algemeen	een	lage	bonus	minder	effect	had,	
maar	dat	een	hoge	bonus	het	gevaar	in	zich	draagt	van	negatieve	bijwerkingen.	
Gekoppeld	aan	deze	discussie	kan	men	zich	afvragen	of	P4P	programma’s	
die	meer	op	intrinsieke	motivatie	zijn	gericht	de	effectiviteit	verbeteren.	De	
intrinsieke	motivatie	kan	worden	gestimuleerd	door	het	betrekken	van	de	
doelgroep	bij	het	ontwerp	van	het	P4P	programma.	Dit	proefschrift	richt	zich	
op	de	gestructureerde	ontwikkeling	en	evaluatie	van	een	pay-for-performance	
programma	waarin	beoogde	gebruikers	betrokken	zijn	bij	het		ontwerp	van	
het	programma.
	
Hoofdstuk 1	beschrijft	het	doel	en	de	volgende	onderzoeksvragen:
1 Wat	is	de	invloed	van	feedback	én	informatie	over	best practices	op	de	
	 toegankelijkheid	en	de	beschikbaarheid	in	de	huisartsenpraktijk?
2 Welke	keuzes	maken	beoogde	gebruikers	voor	de	invulling	van	een	P4P	
programma	wat	betreft	de	te	meten	prestaties,	de	waardering	daarvan	en	de	
daarbij	passende	vergoeding	in	een	systematische	consensus	procedure?
3 Wat	is	de	validiteit	van	het	domein	medisch	handelen	in	het	P4P	programma?
4 Wat	is	het	effect	van	het	P4P	programma	op	het	medisch	handelen,	alsmede	
op	de	patiëntervaringen	na	een	jaar?
5 Heeft	de	betrokkenheid	van	de	beoogde	gebruikers	bij	het	ontwerp	van	
	 het	P4P	programma	geleid	tot	positieve	evaluaties	en	vertrouwen	in	het	
toekomstig	gebruik?
In	hoofdstuk 2	presenteren	we	het	effect	van	feedback	én	informatie	over	
de	best practices	op	de	toegankelijkheid	en	de	beschikbaarheid	in	de	huisartsen-
praktijk.	Een	voor-	en	nameting	werd	uitgevoerd	in	36	huisartsenpraktijken	
in	het	zuiden	van	Nederland.	Veel	patiënten	waren	niet	tevreden	over	de	toe-
gankelijkheid	en	beschikbaarheid	van	de	huisartsenpraktijk	en	ze	zouden	graag	
verbetering	zien.	De	praktijken	kregen	feedback	over	hun	toegankelijkheid	
en	beschikbaarheid	waarbij	een	vergelijking	is	gemaakt	met	praktijken	van	
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collega’s.	Gebaseerd	op	de	feedback	maakten	de	praktijken	verbeterplannen	
voor	hun	praktijk	waarbij	gebruik	gemaakt	kon	worden	van	best practices	uit	
andere	praktijken.	Tachtig	procent	van	de	verbeterplannen	werd	afgerond	of	
bijna	afgerond	in	5	maanden	tijd.	Feedback	en	praktijkgerichte	verbeterplannen	
waren	een	stimulans	om	te	werken	aan	de	toegankelijkheid	en	de	beschikbaar-
heid	en	het	verbeteren	hiervan.	Alle	praktijken	zijn	gestart	met	verbeterplannen,	
maar	het	overall	effect	op	de	toegankelijkheid	en	de	beschikbaarheid	was	gering.
	
Hoofdstuk 3	beschrijft	de	keuzes	voor	het	ontwerp	van	het	P4P	programma	
voor	de	eerstelijns	gezondheidszorg	die	zijn	gemaakt	door	de	beoogde	
gebruikers	van	het	programma.	Bij	het	opstellen	van	het	P4P	programma	is	
systematisch	gewerkt.	Eerst	is	gesproken	over	welke	prestaties	gemeten	worden.	
Vervolgens	is	nagegaan	hoe	deze	prestaties	worden	gewaardeerd.	Tot	slot	is	
gekoppeld	aan	deze	waardering	gesproken	over	de	(hoogte	van	de)	vergoeding.	
De	ontwerpkeuzes	werden	in	twee	panels	van	gebruikers	voorgelegd	met	
behulp	van	een	aangepaste	Delphi-procedure.	De	beoogde	gebruikers	waren	
65	huisartsenpraktijken	en	vertegenwoordigers	van	de	twee	zorgverzekeraars	
in	het	zuiden	van	Nederland.	De	panels	bediscussieerden	de	prestatiemeting,	dat	
wil	zeggen	de	domeinen,	de	onderwerpen	en	de	indicatoren,	alsmede	wanneer	
welke	gegevens	verzameld	worden.	De	onderwerpen	die	in	het	kader	van	de	
waardering	van	de	prestaties	werden	bediscussieerd	waren	de	eenheid	van	de	
waardering	(huisarts,	huisartsenpraktijk	of	grotere	organisatorische	eenheid),	
het	wegen	van	de	domeinen	en	indicatoren,	de	prestatienormen	(absoluut	
versus	relatief),	de	weging	tussen	de	prestatie	op	het	niveau	van	de	geleverde	
kwaliteit	en	de	kwaliteitsverbetering,	en	het	aantal	niveaus	waarin	de	kwaliteits-
score	tot	uitdrukking	wordt	gebracht.	Wat	betreft	de	vergoeding	is	gesproken	
over	de	vorm	van	de	beloning	(geld,	personele	ondersteuning,	sabbatical),	de	
hoogte	van	de	bonus	en	de	besteding	van	de	bonus	(met	of	zonder	verplichtingen).	
In	de	consensusbespreking	is	besloten	dat	de	prestatie-indicatoren	worden	
gekoppeld	aan	een	bestaand	instrument	van	de	beroepsgroep,	dat	gebruikt	
wordt	in	de	NHG-Praktijkaccreditering®.	Deze	prestatiemeting	bestaat	uit	drie	
domeinen:	het	medisch	handelen,	praktijkmanagement	en	patiëntervaringen.	
De	onderwerpen	voor	het	medisch	handelen	betreffen	voornamelijk	indicatoren	
met	betrekking	tot	de	chronische	zorg	(diabetes,	COPD	en	astma,	cardio-
vasculair	risicomanagement),	voorschrijfgedrag	en	opkomstcijfers	voor	griep-
vaccinatie	en	baarmoederhalskankerscreening.	Praktijkmanagement	en	patiënt-
ervaringen	worden	gemeten	met	gevalideerde	vragenlijsten.	
Voor	de	waardering	van	de	prestaties	is	besloten	om	net	als	in	de	NHG-Praktijk-
accreditering®	de	huisartsenpraktijk	als	eenheid	van	de	analyse	te	nemen.	
Verder	is	vastgesteld	dat	er	relatieve	normen	worden	gehanteerd	waarbij	
beloning	kan	plaatsvinden	vanaf	het	25ste	percentiel	van	de	groepsprestatie.	
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De	bonus	voor	het	medisch	handelen	zal	twee	keer	zo	hoog	zijn	als	die	voor	
praktijkmanagement	en	de	patiëntervaringen.	De	bonus	voor	het	medisch	
handelen	wordt	alleen	gebaseerd	op	de	procesindicatoren	en	niet	op	de	uitkomst-
indicatoren.	Kwaliteitsscores	worden	voor	de	drie	domeinen	afzonderlijk	
berekend	en	zowel	voor	het	niveau	van	de	kwaliteit	als	voor	kwaliteitsverbetering.	
De	bonus	voor	het	kwaliteitsniveau	zal	driemaal	zo	hoog	zijn	als	die	voor	de	
kwaliteitsverbetering.	Voor	de	betaling	worden	kwaliteitsscores	verdeeld	in	
zeven	niveaus.	
De	bonus	gaat	gemiddeld	5%	tot	10%	van	het	praktijkinkomen	bedragen	met	een	
maximum	van	6.890	euro	per	1000	patiënten.	Deze	uiteindelijke	keuzes	zijn	met	
grote	consensus	bereikt,	met	uitzondering	van	de	prestatie	over	het	medicatie-
beleid.	De	prescriptie-indicatoren	zijn	positief	gewaardeerd	door	de	afgevaardig-
den	van	de	zorgverzekeraar,	maar	de	huisartsen	stelden	hun	vraagtekens	bij	de	
inhoudelijke	betekenis	van	deze	indicatoren.	Dit	resulteerde	in	het	niet	includeren	
van	de	indicatoren	over	het	gebruik	van	maagzuurremmers	in	het	programma;	
de	indicatoren	met	betrekking	tot	het	voorschrijven	van	antibiotica	zijn	wel	in	
het	programma	opgenomen.	Het	meest	is	er	getwijfeld	aan	het	bepalen	van	
een	absolute	of	relatieve	prestatienorm.	Slechts	een	kleine	meerderheid	gaf	de	
voorkeur	aan	relatieve	normen.	Doorslaggevend	argument	voor	het	hanteren	
van	relatieve	normen	was	het	binnenboord	kunnen	houden	van	laag	scorende	
praktijken.	Gevreesd	werd	dat	absolute	normen	als	niet	haalbaar	gezien	zouden	
worden	door	de	laag	scorende	praktijken.	Dit	P4P	programma	dat	ontwikkeld	
is	samen	met	de	beoogde	gebruikers	bevat	elementen	van	verschillende	P4P	
programma’s	uit	andere	landen	die	op	een	unieke	manier	gecombineerd	zijn.	
De	meer	evenwichtige	positie	van	patiëntervaringen	in	ons	programma	is	
uitzonderlijk	vergeleken	met	andere	programma’s.
	
In	hoofdstuk 4	presenteren	we	een	observationele	studie	van	de	medische	
dossiers	van	82	huisartsenpraktijken	om	de	indicatoren	van	het	medisch	
handelen	in	ons	P4P	programma	te	evalueren.	We	evalueerden	vier	betrouw-
baarheids-	en	validiteitsonderwerpen,	(1)	de	correlatie	tussen	de	indicatorensets,	
(2)	interne	consistentie	van	de	indicatorensets,	(3)	betrouwbaarheid	van	de	
indicatorscores	per	patiëntpopulatie	en	(4)	de	betrouwbaarheid	van	de	bench-
mark.	De	indicatoren	met	betrekking	tot	chronische	zorg	(diabetes,	COPD,	astma	
en	cardiovasculair	risicomanagement),	preventieactiviteiten	(griepvaccinatie,	
baarmoederhalskankerscreening)	en	antibioticabeleid	hadden	een	zwakke	
correlatie,	wat	suggereert	dat	het	instrument	voorziet	in	een	tamelijk	grote	
reikwijdte	qua	onderwerpen.	Bovendien	werden	de	verschillende	onderwerpen	
elk	gemeten	met	indicatoren	die	voldoende	samenhangen,	wat	suggereert	dat	ze	
een	duidelijk	onderliggend	begrip	meten.	Om	een	betrouwbare	indicatorscore	
te	behalen	is	berekend	dat	gegevens	van	ten	minste	96	patiënten	nodig	zijn	bij	
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een	toegestane	fout	van	10%	.	Voor	een	betrouwbare	benchmark	zijn	233 
praktijken	nodig	bij	een	toegestane	fout	van	5%	.	De	indicatoren	van	het	medisch	
handelen	in	het	P4P	programma	zijn	betrouwbaar	en	valide	betreffende	de	
getoetste	eigenschappen,	maar	het	benodigde	aantal	patiënten	en	praktijken	
geeft	aan	dat	openbare	informatie	over	enkelvoudige	indicatoren	geen	betekenis	
heeft.
Hoofdstuk 5	beschrijft	het	effect	van	ons	P4P	programma	dat	in	samenspraak	
met	de	gebruikers	tot	stand	is	gekomen	op	het	medisch	handelen	en	patiënt-
ervaringen	na	de	invoering.	Een	observationele	studie	werd	uitgevoerd	met	een	
voor-	en	nameting	in	zestig	huisartsenpraktijken	in	het	zuiden	van	Nederland.	
Het	effect	is	gemeten	voor	het	medisch	handelen	en	patiëntervaringen	waaraan	
een	bonus	werd	gekoppeld	afhankelijk	van	de	praktijkprestaties.	De	metingen	
omvatten	procesindicatoren	voor	chronische	zorg	(diabetes,	COPD,	astma	en	
cardiovasculair	risicomanagement),	indicatoren	met	betrekking	tot	voorschrijf-
beleid	van	antibiotica	en	opkomstcijfers	(griepvaccinatie	en	baarmoederhals-
kankerscreening),	alsmede	indicatoren	met	betrekking	tot	patiëntervaringen	
(functioneren	huisarts	en	praktijkorganisatie).	Uitkomstindicatoren	voor	
chronische	zorg	zijn	ook	verzameld,	hoewel	hier	geen	bonus	aan	gekoppeld	
werd.	Met	een	lineair	mixed	effect	model	is	het	effect	berekend	van	het	P4P	
programma	op	de	indicatoren	gedefinieerd	in	de	domeinen	medisch	handelen	
en	patiëntervaringen,	waarbij	de	metingen	voorafgaand	aan	het	uitkeren	van	de	
bonus,	het	praktijktype	en	de	stedelijkheidsgraad	als	covariaten	in	het	model	zijn	
opgenomen.	Na	1	jaar	zijn	significante	verbeteringen	gevonden	voor	de	proces-
indicatoren	van	de	diabeteszorg	(+10,4%),	COPD-zorg	(+8,1%),	astmazorg	(+11,5%)	
en	het	cardiovasculair	risicomanagement	(+7,9%).	Patiëntervaringen	met	het	
functioneren	van	de	huisarts	verbeterden	statistisch	met	5,9%	en	de	patiënt-
ervaring	met	de	organisatie	van	zorg	met	5,6%.	Vijf	van	de	zeven	uitkomst-
indicatoren	lieten	significante	verbeteringen	zien,	variërend	van	5,9%	(bloeddruk	
diabetes)	tot	14,7%	(bloeddruk	cardiovasculair	risicomanagement).	Geen	signifi-
cante	verbeteringen	werden	gemeten	voor	griepvaccinatie	en	de	opkomstcijfers	
voor	baarmoederhalskankerscreening.	Kleinere	praktijken	toonden	meer	
verbetering.	We	concludeerden	dat	ons	P4P	programma	kwaliteitsverbetering	
kan	bewerkstelligen	in	het	medisch	handelen	en	dat	ook	de	patiëntervaringen	
positiever	zijn	geworden.
In	hoofdstuk 6	presenteren	we	een	kwalitatieve	studie	naar	de	ervaringen	
van	huisartsenpraktijken	met	het	P4P	programma.	Verondersteld	werd	dat	de	
betrokkenheid	van	de	beoogde	gebruikers	bij	het	maken	van	de	keuzes	voor	het	
ontwerp	van	een	P4P	programma	de	impact	ervan	zou	vergroten.	Onbekend	was	
nog	wat	de	mening	van	de	deelnemers	was	over	ons	P4P	programma.	Dertig	van	
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de	65	huisartsenpraktijken	die	deelnamen	aan	het	P4P	programma,	gestratificeerd	
naar	de	hoogte	van	de	bonus,	zijn	uitgenodigd	voor	een	semigestructureerd	
interview	over	de	haalbaarheid,	de	feedback,	de	bonus,	de	besteding	van	de	
bonus,	de	negatieve	bijwerkingen	en	toekomstige	ontwikkelingen.	De	techniek	
van	inhoudsanalyse	is	gebruikt	voor	de	uitwerking	van	de	interviews.	De	geïnter-
viewden	trokken	de	haalbaarheid	van	het	P4P	programma	in	twijfel	vanwege	de	
aanzienlijke	tijdsinvestering	voor	het	verzamelen	van	de	benodigde	gegevens.	De	
feedback	op	het	medisch	handelen,	praktijkmanagement	en	patiëntervaringen		
is	voornamelijk	besproken	in	het	team	en	gebruikt	voor	verbeterplannen.	Eén	
huisarts	vond	de	feedback	vervelend,	en	voor	een	andere	huisarts	bracht	het	
gevoelens	van	onzekerheid	met	zich	mee.	De	meeste	praktijken	zagen	de	bonus	
als	een	stimulans	om	de	kwaliteit	van	zorg	te	verbeteren,	naast	een	vergoeding	
voor	hun	geïnvesteerde	moeite	en	tijd.	Onderscheidende	prestaties	zijn	niet	
gepubliceerd	op	bijvoorbeeld	een	website.	De	bonus	is	vooral	besteed	aan	
nieuwe	apparatuur	of	teambuilding.	Als	negatieve	bijwerkingen	werden	gaming	
en	focus	op	de	aspecten	waar	een	bonus	aan	gekoppeld	is	(‘tunnel vision’)	
genoemd.	Als	suggestie	voor	bijstelling	van	het	programma	is	voorgesteld	de	
relatieve	normen	te	veranderen	in	absolute	normen.	Absolute	normen	hebben	
het	voordeel	dat	de	praktijken	zich	beter	kunnen	voorbereiden	op	de	te	
verwachten	prestatienormen.	Andere	voorstellen	gingen	over	het	meer	stan-
daardiseren	van	de	audit	en	het	ontwikkelen	van	nieuwe	indicatoren	om	het	
proces	gaande	te	houden.	Het	koppelen	van	een	deel	van	de	bonus	aan	innovatie	
is	tevens	gesuggereerd.	Huisartsen	beschouwden	de	feedback	en	de	bonus	als	
een	stimulans	voor	het	verbeteren	van	de	kwaliteit	en	prestaties	in	het	komende	
jaar,	alhoewel	de	dataverzameling	een	grote	tijdsinvestering	betrof.	De	deelnemers	
waren	over	het	algemeen	positief	over	het	P4P	programma,	maar	er	dient
rekening	gehouden	te	worden	met	negatieve	bijwerkingen	zoals	gaming en	een	
focus	op	de	onderwerpen	in	het	programma.
In	hoofdstuk 7	presenteren	we	de	discussie	van	dit	proefschrift,	waarin	we	de	
belangrijkste	bevindingen	van	ons	onderzoek,	de	sterke	en	zwakke	punten,	en	
de	belangrijkste	aanbevelingen	voor	praktijk	en	onderzoek	samenvatten.	We	zijn	
er	van	uitgegaan	dat	het	betrekken	van	huisartsen	bij	het	ontwerp	van	een	P4P	
programma	op	een	gestructureerde	manier	de	intrinsieke	motivatie	zou	verbe-
teren,	en	dat	het	koppelen	van	een	bonus	aan	prestaties	de	extrinsieke	motivatie	
zou	stimuleren.	Deze	hypothese	wordt	grotendeels	ondersteund	door	onze	
data.	Ons	P4P	programma	resulteerde	in	significante	verbeteringen	van	gemid-
deld	6%	voor	patiëntervaringen	en	10%	voor	het	medisch	handelen.	Vergeleken	
met	andere	programma’s	die	ofwel	gericht	zijn	op	intrinsieke	dan	wel	extrinsieke	
motivatie,	laat	ons	P4P	experiment	grotere	veranderingen	zien.	Alles	bij	elkaar	
genomen	heeft	het	betrekken	van	huisartsen	en	vertegenwoordigers	van	de	
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zorgverzekeraars	bij	het	ontwerp	van	het	P4P	programma	geleid	tot	een	
programma	met	minder	indicatoren	dan	in	het	programma	in	de	UK	(Quality	
and	Outcome	Framework),	maar	tot	meer	indicatoren	dan	in	programma’s	in	
de	VS	of	Australië.	De	drie	belangrijkste	verschillen	tussen	ons	P4P	programma	
en	andere	programma’s	zijn:	(1)	het	gebruik	van	relatieve	prestatienormen,	(2)	
het	belonen	van	zowel	het	kwaliteitsniveau	als	de	kwaliteitsverbetering,	en	(3)	de	
hoogte	van	de	bonus.	Ondanks	de	kwaliteitsverbetering	die	werd	aangetoond	
en	de	vrij	positieve	evaluatie	van	het	P4P	programma	door	de	huisartsen,	is	de	
nationale	uitrol	vertraagd.	In	de	tussentijd	ontstond	een	nationale	discussie	over	
geïntegreerde	eerstelijnszorg.	In	deze	programma’s	ging	de	aandacht	uit	naar	
de	chronische	zorg	en	is	veelal	gekozen	voor	dezelfde	indicatoren	als	in	ons	P4P	
programma.	Echter,	de	vergoeding	werd	niet	uitgedrukt	in	een	bonus,	maar	in	
ketenfinanciering.	De	indicatoren	zullen	vermoedelijk	ook	een	plek	krijgen	in	
een	aantal	regionale	projecten	waarbij	bekostiging	op	populatiemanagement	
wordt	geïntroduceerd.	De	lessen	die	we	geleerd	hebben	uit	de	introductie	van	
ons	P4P	programma	kunnen	daarbij	gebruikt	worden.	Het	betrekken	van	de	
beoogde	gebruikers	bij	het	ontwerp	van	deze	programma’s	kan	mogelijk	ook	
daar	de	impact	op	kwaliteit	van	zorg	verbeteren.
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Jullie	mogen	best	aan	me	vragen	hoe	ver	ik	ben	met	mijn	proefschrift,	want	het	is	klaar!	
Ik	ga	proberen	iedereen	te	bedanken	die	mij,	op	wat	voor	manier	dan	ook,	gesteund	heeft	de	
afgelopen	jaren.
Allereerst	wil	ik	mijn	promotor	en	copromotores	bedanken.	Richard	Grol,	bedankt	voor	je	
kritische	blik	en	feedback	waarmee	het	onderzoek	en	de	artikelen	iedere	keer	naar	een	hoger	
niveau	getild	werden.	Ik	heb	veel	geleerd	van	al	jouw	kennis	over	(het	verbeteren	van)	kwaliteit	van	
zorg	en	de	implementatie	van	verbeteringen	in	de	praktijk.	Jozé	Braspenning,	wij	hebben	samen	
veel	zitten	puzzelen	aan	de	artikelen.	Sommige	artikelen	kenden	aardig	wat	versies.	Samen	hebben	
we	de	paneldiscussies	begeleid,	dat	vond	ik	iedere	keer	weer	spannend.	Bedankt	dat	ik	altijd	bij	je	
binnen	kon	lopen	en	voor	je	steun	en	vertrouwen	de	afgelopen	jaren.	Annelies	Jacobs,	ik	wil	je	
bedanken	voor	je	frisse	en	heldere	blik	tijdens	het	schrijven	en	jouw	kunst	van	structureren	en	
plannen	die	ervoor	zorgde	dat	ik	het	overzicht	kon	bewaren.	Tevens	wil	ik	de	(co)-auteurs	van	de	
artikelen	bedanken,	Jako	Burgers,	Reinier	Akkermans	en	Arna	van	Doorn.
Toen	ik	startte	als	junior	onderzoeker	ben	ik	in	de	wereld	van	pay-for-performance	en	het	project	
meegenomen	door	Margot	Tacken.	Bedankt	Margot	voor	al	je	hulp	en	steun	zowel	live	als	
telefonisch	en	voor	de	leuke	trip	naar	Dublin!	Voor	de	(logistiek	rondom)	dataverzameling	en	het	
rekenen	met	de	indicatoren	heb	ik	van	meerdere	mensen	hulp	gekregen.	Hiervoor	wil	ik	Jan	
Hermsen,	Maarten	Krol,	Jan	van	Doremalen,	Jolanda	van	Haren,	Yvon	de	Bruin	en	Helen	Vos	
bedanken.	Angèle	van	de	Ven	en	Petra	Wopereis	zijn	tot	grote	steun	geweest	bij	het	interviewen	
van	de	huisartsen.	Jullie	ervaring	in	de	huisartsenpraktijk	was	hierbij	onmisbaar.	Voor	het	uitwerken	
van	de	interviews	wil	ik	Joost	Wammes,	Lieke	van	Brakel,	Roosmarijn	Jansen	en	Sophie	Verdonschot	
bedanken.
Gedurende	het	onderzoek	stond	er	een	stuurgroep	klaar	om	mee	te	denken	over	de	te	zetten	
stappen	in	de	praktijk.	Hiervoor	wil	ik	de	huisartsen	Maarten	Klomp	en	Wim	Verstappen	bedanken.	
Tevens	wil	ik	Paul	Muijrers,	Dennis	van	de	Rijt,	Angelique	Bonte,	Coline	van	Everdingen	en		Truus	
Gootzen	van	zorgverzekeraar	CZ	en	Jacqueline	Batenburg	van	zorgverzekeraar	VGZ	bedanken.
Ik	bedank	ook	alle	deelnemende	huisartsen(praktijken)	aan	het	project	die	de	input	hebben	
geleverd	voor	de	ontwikkeling	van	het	pay-for-performance	programma	en	de	toetsing	hiervan.	
Bij	IQ	healthcare	heb	ik	veel	geleerd	maar	ook	veel	afleiding	gehad	in	de	vorm	van	gezamenlijk	
lunchen,	film	kijken,	high	tea-en,	bowlen,	BBQ-en	en	zelfs	skiën	in	Frankrijk	met	Selma,	Linda,	Arna,	
Lianne,	Renate	en	Lucy.	Iedereen	bedankt	voor	deze	leuke	uitstapjes	en	gezelligheid.	Ik	heb	een	
aantal	jaar	een	bijdrage	mogen	leveren	aan	de	PhD	Council.	Ik	wil	de	leden	bedanken	voor	de	
prettige	en	leuke	samenwerking.	Lieve	Nicole,	bedankt	voor	je	enthousiasme,	je	interesse	in	mijn	
wel	en	wee	en	je	dansje	toen	je	hoorde	dat	mijn	manuscript	was	ingeleverd.	Lieve	Anke,	bedankt	
dat	je	me	altijd	met	open	armen	hebt	ontvangen	en	voor	je	kritische	Engelse	blik!
Dierbare	collega’s	van	ZorgImpuls,	jullie	inspireren	me	stuk	voor	stuk.	Ik	ben	blij	om	in	zo	een	
geweldig	team	te	mogen	werken.	We	werken	hard,	lachen	veel	en	af	en	toe	is	er	ruimte	voor	een	
traan.	Lieve	(former)	BB’s,	Matine,	Annelies	en	Astrid,	jullie	hebben	me	gesteund	door	dik	en	dun!		
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Bedankt	voor	de	TT.	Moet	je	kijken	waar	die	me	gebracht	heeft!	Thanks	ladies!	Femke,	bedankt	
voor	het	vertrouwen	en	de	ruimte	die	je	me	hebt	gegeven	om	het	proefschrift	af	te	ronden.
Ik	ben	erg	trots	op	mijn	twee	paranimfen	aan	mijn	zijde.	Lieve	Elvira,	mijn	vriendinnetje	van	de	
middelbare	school,	mijn	huisgenoot	in	Maastricht,	mijn	collega	bij	IQ,	mijn	dierbare	vriendin	
waarmee	ik	keihard	kan	lachen	en	serieus	kan	filosoferen.	Onze	levens	blijven	elkaar	kruisen.	Ik	
ben	dan	ook	erg	benieuwd	naar	ons	volgende	kruispunt.	Wat	een	eer	dat	je	mijn	paranimf	wilt	zijn.	
Lieve	Renate,	we	begonnen	in	2006	tegelijkertijd	aan	onze	promotie.	Deze	gezamenlijke	start	heeft	
een	bijzondere	band	geschept.	We	hebben	vaak	samen	gespard	over	onze	onderzoeksperikelen.	
Ik	heb	naast	jou	mogen	staan	tijdens	jouw	promotie	en	ik	ben	vereerd	dat	jij	mij	nu	bij	staat.
Lieve	Inge,	bij	jou	en	Randy	is	het	altijd	thuis	komen.	Bedankt	voor	je	gastvrijheid,	je	luisterend	oor	
en	de	warmte	die	je	me	geeft.	Je	scheetjes	Mas	en	Raf	geven	onze	vriendschap	een	extra	dimensie.
Lieve	Marloes,	samen	hebben	we	bijna	alle	steden	in	België	ontdekt	en	komen	we	op	de	meest	
leuke	en	gezellige	plekjes	uit.	Alsof	het	voorbestemd	is.	Bedankt	voor	het	kneuteren	en	keuvelen	
(dit	keer	leesbaar).	Lieve	Lucy,	bedankt	voor	de	gezelligheid	als	kamergenootje	bij	IQ	healthcare	en	
nu	als	vriendin.	Of	het	nu	gaat	om	een	weekendje	Leeuwarden,	een	lunch	in	Rotterdam,	een	diner	
in	Arnhem	of	een	statistieksessie,	je	inspireert	me	enorm	en	overlaadt	me	met	positieve	energie.	
Lieve	Stefan	en	Chantal,	Alex	en	ik	zijn	erg	blij	met	jullie	in	onze	buurt.	Samen	naar	de	kermis	of	tot	
diep	in	de	nacht	uitbuiken	van	een	lekkere	BBQ,	het	kan	allemaal.	Bedankt	daarvoor!
Guus,	Mieke,	Mariska,	Gerwin,	Daan	en	Mark,	lieve	schoonfamilie,	bedankt	voor	jullie	interesse	in	
alle	jaren	dat	ik	gewerkt	heb	aan	mijn	promotie.	
En	dan	mijn	dierbare	familie.	Als	we	samen	zijn	komt	onze	humor	pas	écht	tot	zijn	recht,	kun	je	
nagaan!	Wat	kunnen	we	met	elkaar	lachen	en	wat	zorgt	dat	voor	een	heerlijke	ontspanning.	
Lieve	papa	en	mama,	bedankt	voor	jullie	onvoorwaardelijke	steun	en	liefde.	Jullie	geven	me	het	
ultieme	thuisgevoel	en	hebben	ervoor	gezorgd	dat	ik	weken	rustig	heb	kunnen	schrijven.	Ook
het	gezamenlijk	vormgeven	van	het	boekje	met	papa	was	een	geweldige	ervaring.	Zie	hier	het	
resultaat!	Lieve	Jochen,	grote	broer,	bedankt	voor	de	stevige,	warme	knuffels	en	de	heerlijke	
diners	en	lunches	die	je	bereidt!	Lieve	Birgit,	kleine	zus,	je	bent	er	altijd	voor	mij	en	Alex.	Bedankt	
daarvoor	en	laten	we	nog	veel	lachen,	kletsen	en	gezellige	avondjes	hebben	in	’t	Appeltje	en	
tegenwoordig	ook	in	de	Gouden	Griffel.	Lieve	Birgit	en	Martine,	jullie	maken	de	familie	Kirschner	
compleet	en	zijn	me	dierbaar.	Bedankt	voor	jullie	interesse	en	gezelligheid.	
Lieve	Alex,	lieve	Xel,	wij	zijn	geen	wereldreizigers,	maar	als	wij	de	kilometers	bij	elkaar	optellen	die	
we	de	laatste	jaren	gemaakt	hebben	om	bij	elkaar	te	zijn,	zijn	we	de	hele	wereld	rond	geweest!	
Jij	zorgde	er	iedere	keer	weer	voor	dat	ik	mijn	rust	vond	om	aan	mijn	proefschrift	te	werken.	
Bedankt	voor	je	steun	en	de	vrijheid	die	je	me	hebt	gegeven	en	voor	de	schop	onder	de	kont	en	
reflectie	die	ik	(af	en	toe)	nodig	had!	
Lieve	opa,	ik	draag	dit	proefschrift	aan	u	op.		Wat	zou	u	trots	geweest	zijn	op	uw	kleindochter.
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Kirsten	Kirschner	werd	geboren	op	2	september	1981 in	
Nijmegen.	Ze	groeide	op	in	Druten	samen	met	haar	broer	
Jochen	en	zus	Birgit.	Ze	gaat	naar	de	lagere	school	in	Puiflijk	
en	daarna	naar	het	Pax	Christi	College	in	Druten.	Ze	
behaalt	haar	VWO	diploma	in	2000.		
Kirsten	gaat	op	kamers	in	Maastricht	om	aan	de	Universiteit	
Maastricht	Gezondheidswetenschappen	te	studeren.	Ze	
kiest	voor	de	afstudeerrichting	Zorgwetenschappen.	Hier	
volgt	ze	verschillende	keuzevakken	zoals	informatie	en	
professionele	kwaliteit,	transmurale	zorg	en	verslag-legging,	
gezondheidszorg	en	politiek,	en	palliatieve	zorg.		Tijdens	
haar	afstudeerstage	heeft	Kirsten	bij	het	Integraal	Kanker-
centrum	Limburg	(IKL)	onderzoek	gedaan	naar	
de	kwaliteit	van	zorg	in	hospicevoorzieningen.	Voor	dit	
onderzoek	heeft	Kirsten	enkele	hospices	in	het	zuiden	van	Nederland	bezocht	en	werknemers	
geïnterviewd.
Na	haar	studie	te	hebben	afgerond	heeft	Kirsten	enkele	maanden	bij	de	thuiszorg	gewerkt	totdat	
ze	in	2006	bij	IQ	healthcare	aan	de	Radboud	Universiteit	Nijmegen	begon	met	haar	promotie-
onderzoek	‘Improving	primary	care	by	pay-for-performance’.	
In	2010	is	Kirsten	gaan	werken	bij	ZorgImpuls,	de	regionale	ondersteuningsstructuur	(ROS)	in	
Rotterdam.	Ze	verhuisde	naar	Rotterdam	en	ging	samenwonen	met	Alexander	Odijk.	In	2013	zijn	
Kirsten	en	Alexander	verhuisd	naar	Berkel	en	Rodenrijs.	Bij	ZorgImpuls	is	Kirsten	werkzaam	
als	regioadviseur	in	de	gemeentes	Lansingerland,	Capelle	aan	den	IJssel	en	Zuidplas.	Tevens	is	ze	
aandachtsfunctionaris	voor	de	oefentherapeuten	en	specialist	op	het	gebied	van	de	ROS-Wijkscan.

